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E PLURIBUS UNUM-OPT OF MANY, ONE: WHY THE




The United States needs to consolidate the over 115 existing state and
federal agencies that regulate banking, securities and insurance firms and their
products and services into a single, federalfinancial services agency; a U.S.
Financial Services Agency ("US FSA"). The US FSA would be able to
more effectively regulate the U.S. financial services industry than the existing
regulatory regime. The current U.S. financial regulatory regime suffers from
a range of problems, including an inability to anticipate and plan for future
financial crises, an inability by regulators to quickly adapt to market
innovations and developments, inconsistent regulations for financial products
andfirms that are competitors in the market, and the capture ofagenciesfocused
on a single sector of the financial services industry by the firms that they
regulate. In addition, the U.S. financial regulatory regime is one of the most
expensive in the world, costing 12 times more than the United Kingdom's
regime and 86 times more than Germany's regime. The US FSA would
eliminate or significantly reduce these problems, as well as provide more cost
effective and transparent regulation of the financial services industry than is
available under the current system.
1. INTRODUCTION ...................... r............... 4
Ii. THE CURRENT U.S. REGULATORY REGIME FOR
FINANCIAL SERVICES ................................. 10
A. Current Structure of U.S. Financial Regulation ............ 10
1. Banking and Other Depository Institutions
Regulatory Agencies .................... T ..... 12
Assistant Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law, BA 1985, College of
William and Mary; MA 1987, Johns Hopkins University Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies; J.D. 1994, University of Chicago School of Law. E-mail: efbrown@stthomas.edu. Research
stipends from the University of St. Thomas School of Law were of assistance in the preparation of this
Article. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Howell,Jackson, Jerry Organ, Lisa
Schiltz, Heidi Mandanis Schooner, and Caroline Bradley, and the research assistance of University of St.
Thomas School of Law students Natalie Walz and Sejal Desai. This article reflects the information
available on this topic as ofJanuary 1, 2006.
2 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:1
2. Insurance Regulatory Agencies .................. 17
3. Securities and Futures Regulatory Agencies ........ 18
4. Functional Regulation ......................... 19
5. Consolidation of State Financial Services Agencies.. 20
6. A Picture of the Current Regulatory Structure
from the Perspective of a Financial Holding
C om pany .................................... 24
B. Prior Proposals to Consolidate Agencies .................. 26
III. CHALLENGES FACING THE CURRENT REGULATORY REGIME 27
A. Need to Monitor Risks Across Firms and Sectors and to
Address Such Risks Strategically ........................ 28
1. Existing Regulators Fail to Communicate and
Cooperate With One Another Effectively ......... 28
2. Current System Contains Inconsistent Regulations . 32
3. Current System Contains Duplicative Regulations.. 33
4. The Current Regime Contains Regulatory Gaps ... 36
B. Need to Regulate Financial Conglomerates More
Effectively ........................................ 39
1. Current System Has Failed to Deal Effectively
with the Range of Conflicts of Interest Created by
Financial Conglomerates ....................... 39
2. Current System Has Failed to Adequately
Address the "Too-Big-To-Fail" Problem Posed by
Financial Conglomerates ....................... 43
C. Need to Respond to the Globalization of Financial Market .... 46
D. Need to Reduce the Likelihood ofAgency Capture ........... 50
1. Current Specialized Agencies are Prone to Capture 50
2. Agencies That Currently Do Not Control Their
Budgets Are More Prone to Capture ............. 51
E. Need to Improve Consumer Protections .................. 52
1. Regulatory Competition Promotes a
Race-to-the-Bottom ........................... 52
2. The Current Regulatory Structure Discourages
Innovations That Would Benefit Consumers ...... 57
3. Consumers Find That the Current Regulatory
Structure is Confusing ......................... 59
F. Need to Provide More Cost Efficient Regulation ............ 59
1. U.S. Financial Regulatory Regime is More
Expensive Than Any Other Developed Country's
Financial Regulatory Regime .................... 59
2. Inter-Agency Turf Wars in the United States Waste
Funds ....................................... 64
A SINGLE FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY
3. Compliance Costs Incurred by the Financial
Services Industry Exacerbate the Problem ......... 65
IV. POSSIBLE STRUCTURE FOR THE U.S. FINANCIAL SERVICES
AGEN CY .. ............................................ 67
A. Structure and Operations of the US FSA ................. 67
B. Accountability Safeguards for the US FSA ................ 73
V. ADVANTAGES OF A SINGLE FINANCIAL REGULATOR ....... 74
A. US FSA Would Monitor Risks Across Firms and
Sectors and Address Such Risks Strategically ............... 74
1. US FSA Would Create a Permanent System
for Coordination and Cooperation Concerning
Regulatory Goals for the Entire Financial Services
Industry ..................................... 74
2. US FSA Would Harmonize Regulations Across
Sectors and Eliminate Duplicative Regulations ..... 75
B. US FSA Would Regulate Financial Conglomerates
M ore Effectively .................................... 76
1. US FSA Would Better Address the Conflicts
of Interest Created by Financial Conglomerates .... 76
2. US FSA Would be Better Able to Address the
"Too-Big-To-Fail" Problem Posed by
Financial Conglomerates ....................... 78
C. US FSA Would Respond More Effectively to the
Globalization of Financial Market ...................... 79
D. US FSA Would Be Less Prone to Capture ............... 79
E. US FSA Would Improve Consumer Protections ........... 81
1. US FSA Would End the Regulatory
Race-to-the-Bottom ........................... 82
2. US FSA Would Encourage Innovations That
Would Benefit Consumers ..................... 83
3. US FSA Would Provide Consumers With a One-Stop
Shop for Information About, and Protection
From, the Financial Services Industry ............ 84
F. US FSA Would Provide More Cost Efficient Regulation ..... 85
VI. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS POSED BYA SINGLE FINANCIAL
REGULATOR ........................................... 87
A. US FSA Would Lose the Benefits of Regulatory Competition 88
1. US FSA Maintains the Proven Beneficial
Aspects of Regulatory Competition While
Eliminating the More Problematic Ones .......... 88
2. Proponents of Regulatory Competition Have
Exaggerated How Frequently It Occurs ........... 90
2005]
4 UNIVERSITYOFMIAMIBUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:1
3. The Benefits of Regulatory Competition Have
Not Persuaded Other Countries to Recreate the
Multitude of Regulators in the United States ...... 91
B. US FSA Would be Large and Unwieldy ................. 94
C. US FSA May Have Dffitculty Prioritizing Issues .......... 97
D. US FSA May be Unresponsive to Small Firms ............ 97
E. US FSA May Fail to Develop Staff With Specialized
Knowledge Concerning Sectors Within the Financial
Services Industty ................................... 97
F. US FSA May Lack Accountability ..................... 98
G. US FSA May Experience Logistical Problems
When it Merges the Multiple Regulators .................. 98
VII. CONCLUSION ....................................... 100
I. INTRODUCTION
The financial services' industry in the United States has undergone
profound changes in the past seventy years, but the U.S. regulatory structure
for this industry has failed to keep pace with these changes. During the 19th
and early 20th centuries, the markets for banking, securities, and insurance
products and services and the firms selling these products and services were
separate from each other and were local or regional rather than national or
international. Today, however, the market for financial services no longer
operates in this manner. Financial products, whether they are loans,
securities or insurance policies, are increasingly viewed as part of the same
market that enables individuals and institutions to price risks.2 Not only are
banks, securities firms, and insurance companies offering products and
services that compete with one another, many of the top financial service
companies individually now offer a smorgasbord of financial products and
services.3 Every year financial conglomerates 4 are expanding their shares of
1 In this article, financial services refers to any of the activities considered financial in nature
pursuant to Section 103 of the GLBA, which include banking, securities, merchant banking, and insurance
products and services. GLBA, 12 U.S.C.S. § 1843 (2004). This definition of financial services is not
universally applied by other organizations. For example, the Basel II Capital Accord excludes insurance
activities from the definition of "financial activities" and excludes insurance entities from the definition
of "financial entities." BANKFOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
INT'L CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS - A REVISED FRAMEWORK
7 n.5 (June 2004) [hereinafter BASEL II CAPITAL ACCORD].
2 Gary Silverman, Banks Break the Old Boundaries, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 18,2002, at 15.
3 The Insurance Information Institute conducted a survey in August 2002 of the top 10
companies, ranked by revenues, in each ofthe major financial services sectors included in the Fortune 500
(diversified financials, securities, commercial banks, savings institutions, and property/casualty insurance).
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the markets for these products and services.5 Globalization has transformed
the financial services industry and forced U.S. companies within this
industry to compete on a national and international basis.
Unfortunately, U.S. regulation 6 of financial services does not reflect
these changes. Instead, the United States maintains a multitude of state and
federal agencies that regulate only certain sectors within the financial services
industry. The current regulatory structure in the United States is comprised
of well over 115 different state and federal regulators, including, among
others, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ("Federal
Reserve"), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), the
INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE AND THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ROUNDTABLE, THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES FACT BOOK 9 (2003) [hereinafter FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK]. The survey assessed
which institutions offered one or more of the following products: auto/homeowners insurance, life/health
insurance, commercial insurance, annuities, asset management/retirement funds, personal banking,
securities/investment banking, commercial banking and mortgages/credit cards/personal/business loans.
The survey did not distinguish between the "manufacturers" of a product and its "distributors." Nine of
the 57 companies offered products in all nine product categories, while 40 of the remaining 48 companies
offered products in four or more product categories. Id. at 9-12.
4 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Joint Forum on Financial
Conglomerates defines financial conglomerates as "any group of companies under common control whose
exclusive or predominant activities consist of providing significant services in at least two different
financial sectors." TRIPARTITE GROUP OF BANK, SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE REGULATORS, THE
SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES 36 (July 1995). This article will use this definition
when referring to financial conglomerates. Financial conglomerates are distinguishable from "mixed
conglomerates," in which groups of commercial or industrial enterprises include a financial institution
as part of their structure. Id. While mixed conglomerates may raise some of the same regulatory and
supervisory issues as financial conglomerates, such concerns are beyond the scope of this article.
5 The asset share of the top ten companies in property/casualty insurance grew from 30% in 1995
to 45% in 2001. FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at vii. The asset share of the top ten
companies in life insurance grew from 34% in 1995 to 44% in 2001. Id. The asset share of the top ten
banks grew from 34% in 1995 to 40% in 2001 and the asset share of the top ten savings institutions grew
from 21% in 1995 to 38% in 2001. Id. Only in the securities sector did the asset share of the top ten com-
panies decline from 60% in 1995 to 53% in 2001. Id. Even so, the number of participants in each sector
has declined. The number of commercial banks dropped from over 25,000 prior to World War I to 8,096
in 2001; the number of life insurance underwriters fell from about 2,200 in 1985 to 1,549 in 2000. Id. at
1. The number of securities broker and dealer firms decreased from 9,515 in 1987 to 7,029 in 2001. Id.
6 Unless otherwise indicated, the term "regulation" is used in this article to refer broadly to the
ability of agencies to issue rules, to supervise the practices and operations of the entities under their
authority, and to enforce laws by bringing civil, criminal, or administrative proceedings. Some
commentators emphasize the distinction between an agency's rulemaking authority and its supervisory
authority and limit their use of the term "regulation" to an agency's rulemaking authority. Panel I (Part
2): A ComparativeAnalysis of Consolidated and Functional Regulation: SuperRegulator: KeynoteAddress the Honor-
able Peter R. Fisher Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, U.S. Department of the Treasury The Need to Reduce
RegulatoryArbitrage, 28 BROOK.J. INT'LL. 455,455 (2003) [hereinafterAddress byPeterR. Fisher] (proposing
a separation of financial rulemaking authority from supervisory authority and a placing of rulemaking
authority into a single, federal regulator while leaving supervisory authority within several agencies).
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Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") in the Treasury Department, the
National Credit Union Administration ("NCUA"), the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), the Commodities Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"), the
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight ("OFHEO") in the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Affairs, the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation ("SIPC"), and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
("PBGC"), as well as state insurance, banking, and securities regulatory
agencies in all 50 states plus the District of Columbia. No other nation has
such a fragmented regulatory regime for its financial services industry.
As a result of this balkanized regulatory structure, U.S. regulators are ill-
equipped to handle the current challenges posed by the financial services
industry. The U.S. Government Accountability Office ("GAO") issued a
report in October 2004 noting that in almost none of the recent financial
crises that it examined did a single existing regulator have the necessary
resources, authority orjurisdiction to handle the crisis by itself'8 The GAO
also noted that the regime of multiple regulatory authorities sometimes
hindered the ability of the federal government to identify financial crises in
their early stages and to monitor crises once they began.9 These crises
include the financial aftermath of the September 11, 2001 destruction of the
World Trade Center, and the 1998 insolvency of Long-Term Capital
Management.'0
The current financial regulatory system is expensive when one compares
it to how much other developed nations spend to regulate their financial
services firms and when one considers the quality of the regulatory authority
being exercised. For example, in 2002, the budgets for the U.S. federal and
state banking agencies, other federal financial regulators and the state
insurance regulators were 12 times more than the budget of the Financial
Services Authority of the United Kingdom ("UK FSA") and 86 times more
than the budget of German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority
(Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht or "BaFin"), which is the
7 Some states have incorporated the regulation of banks and securities or banks and insurance
or all three sectors into one agency. In most cases, each sector may have its own division within this single
agency. If one counts only the separate agencies and not the different divisions, then the total number
of state agencies regulating financial services totals 110.
8 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMM. ON
BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, FINANCIAL REGULATION - INDUSTRY
CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE 110 (October 2004)
[hereinafter GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT].
9 Id.
1o Id.
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single financial regulator in Germany." It is highly doubtful, however, that
the U.S. financial services industry is 12 times more sound than the U.K.'s
financial services industry or 86 times more sound than Germany's financial
services industry.
To address these challenges, the United States needs to create a single,
federal financial services agency, a U.S. Financial Services Agency ("US
FSA"), which would be similar to the United Kingdom's Financial Services
Authority, to supervise and to more effectively regulate the U.S. financial
services industry. To create the US FSA, the existing state and federal
agencies that regulate and supervise banking, securities and insurance firms
and their products and services, would be consolidated and reorganized.
States' attorneys general or other duly authorized officials, however, would
retain some ability to enforce the financial laws and regulations promulgated
by Congress and the new federal agency. Following the creation of the US
FSA, the Federal Reserve Board would continue to be responsible for
monetary policy and would continue to operate as the central bank for the
United States, but its role as a supervisor and regulator of financial holding
companies and banks would be transferred to the new US FSA.
Prior efforts to modernize U.S. financial regulations failed to adequately
address the problems inherent in the existing regulatory structure.
Congress's last attempt to address some of the major regulatory problems in
the financial services area was its enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
of 1999 ("GLBA").12 The GLBA repealed portions of the Glass-Steagall Act
of 1933,13 the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956"4 and other laws in order
to permit banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other entities
engaged in the provision of financial services to become affiliated with one
another in order to form financial conglomerates. These types of affiliations
allow financial services entities to cross sell each other's products and
services. 15 The GLBA, however, did not represent a transformation of the
U.S. regulatory regime for financial services. Instead, it merely ratified the
dismantling of the barriers between banks, securities firms, and insurance
companies that had already begun to take place as a result of the regulations
11 See discussion infa Part V. F. and accompanying notes.
12 Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 1, 107 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified at scattered sections of 12, 15, 16, 18
U.S.C.).
13 The Glass-Steagall Act is the name given to four sections of the Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89,
48 Stat. 162 (1933). GLBA repealed Section 20 of Glass-Steagall, which prevented any Federal Reserve
member bank from being affiliated with an entity principally engaged in securities and Section 33, which
banned interlocking managements between Federal Reserve member banks and securities firms. GLBA,
12 U.S.C.S. § 377(a) and 12 U.S.C.S. 5 78(b) (LexisNexis 2004).
14 Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified at 12 U.S.C. SS 1841-49).
15 GLBA, S 101, 12 U.S.C.S. S 377 and S 78 (LexisNexis 2004).
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issued by the existing state and federal financial service regulatory agencies. 6
The GLBA preserved all of the existing federal and state regulators while
making only minor adjustments to their regulatory responsibilities. 17 As a
result, the GLBA failed to enact the kind of dramatic changes to the financial
regulatory structure that are needed to enable the United States to face the
challenges posed by the new financial conglomerates and hybrid financial
products.
Recognition of the need to alter the current regulatory regime is growing.
The GAO Financial Regulation Report recommended that Congress
reconsider consolidating or modifying the existing financial regulatory
structure in order to "(1) better address the risks posed by large, complex,
internationally active firms and their consolidated risk management
approaches; (2) promote competition domestically and internationally; and
(3) contain systemic risk.""8 The GAO suggested that Congress consider
adopting one of the following four options to address the problems in the
current system:
" Consolidating regulators within each of the banking, insurance,
securities and futures sectors to create a single federal regulator for
each sector (hereinafter referred to as the "functional consolidation
option");
* Consolidating the regulatory structure into two agencies - one that
would focus on the safety and soundness of the financial system and
the entities within it, while the other agency would focus on
conduct-of-business issues, such as consumer and investor
protection, disclosure, and money laundering (hereinafter referred
to as the "twin peaks option");
* Consolidating the regulatory structure into a single financial services
regulator (hereinafter referred to as the "single regulator option");
and
* Creating a new agency to deal with the special issues posed by large,
complex or internationally active financial services firms while
16 For example, investment banks attempted to offer products and services similar to those
offered by commercial banks when they created products, like money market accounts, that mimicked
the features of demand deposits offered by banks and began to invest in nonbank banks, which could
make commercial loans like banks but could not accept deposits. Beginning in the 1980s, commercial
banks were allowed to offer some investment banking services and to provide insurance. See discussion
infra Part II.
17 See discussion infra Part II.
Is GAO FINANcIAL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 8, at 19.
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retaining all of the other existing financial regulators (hereinafter
referred to as the "financial conglomerate agency option").' 9
While the GAO Financial Regulation Report briefly discussed the pros
and cons of each option, it did not indicate a preference for one option over
another, although it did call the single regulator option the most "radical" of
the four.20 Conventional wisdom on the U.S. financial regulatory structure,
however, rejects the idea of creating a single, federal agency either on the
grounds that it is undesirable because the United States benefits from
regulatory competition or that it is politically unfeasible because the United
States fears big government and favors federalism. 21
Nevertheless, the creation of a US FSA would, in fact, be the best
solution to the challenges facing the U.S. financial regulatory regime. Each
of the other proposed solutions would only perpetuate many of the problems
that exist in the regulation of the financial services industry. The US FSA
would enable the United States to regulate financial conglomerates and
hybrid products more efficiently and effectively than it does at present or
than it would be able to do under the other proposed options. Given the
important role of the financial services industry in the U.S. economy,
eliminating the problems inherent in the current regulatory structure for the
U.S. financial services industries would seem imperative if one wants to
preserve and enhance the soundness and growth of the U.S. economy.
22
This article will lay out the case for why the United States needs to create
a single financial services authority now, before the advent of a financial crisis
that completely overwhelms the existing regulatory structure. Part II will
briefly describe the contours of the current U.S. financial services regulatory
regime. Part III will discuss the major challenges to the financial services
industry that the existing regulatory structure is ill equipped to handle. Part
19 Id. at 19-23.
2 Id.
21 See Address by Peter R. Fisher, supra note 6, at 458 (commenting that concentrating power in a
single regulatory violates U.S. political tradition); HELEN A GARTEN, US FINANCIAL REGULATION AND
THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 135-38 (2001) (describing the opposition to a single regulator because of a
.preference for federalism, fear of big government and faith in the power of regulatory competition");
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2360
(1998) (arguing that states should play a greater role in securities regulation because of the benefits of
regulatory competition).
2 Financial services represented 8.3% of the U.S. gross domestic product ("GDP") in 2000 and
5.7% of the total U.S. employment for the period from 1999 to 2001. THE FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT
BOOK, supra note 3, at 5-6. If real estate transactions (e.g. development, mortgages and related services,
property sales and rentals) were included in the financial services industry, then financial services would
have accounted for almost 20% of the U.S. GDP in 2000. Id. at 6
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IV will outline one possible structure for the US FSA. Part V will address
why the US FSA best meets the challenges facing the U.S. financial services
industry. Part VI will analyze the major objections that have been raised
against creating a single financial regulator and explain why these objections
are either exaggerated or outweighed by the benefits provided by a single
financial services regulator.
II. THE CURRENT U.S. REGULATORY REGIME FOR
FINANCIAL SERVICES.
A. Current Structure of U.S. Financial Regulation.
The current regulatory structure in the United States governing the
financial services industry (banking, securities and insurance) is a
hodgepodge of federal and state agencies with overlapping authority. This
structure was cobbled together over the past two hundred years, primarily in
response to one financial crisis after another.' The forces that have created
the current regulatory structure in the United States follow a Hegelian
dialectic. A financial crisis would occur due to some market failure, which
would prompt state or federal legislators to enact laws creating a new agency
23 For overviews of the evolution of the U.S. financial services industry, see ALAN GART,
REGULATION, DEREGULATION, REREGULATION: THE FUTURE OF THE BANKING, INSURANCE, AND
SECURITIES INDUSTRIES (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1994); and THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION
(Clifford E. Kirsch, ed., Irwin Professional Publishing 1997). For detailed descriptions of the evolution
of the U.S. banking system, see Alan Greenspan, Our Banking History, Remarks before the Annual
Meeting and Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Nashville, Tennessee (May 2, 1998) available at
http:/Avww.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1998/19980502.htm; BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND
POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR (Princeton University Press 1957);
JAMES WILLARD HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1774-1970 (University
of Nebraska Press 1973); Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. BANKING
INST. 221,223 (2000) [hereinafter Markham, Banking Regulation]; PATRICIA A., BANKING LAW MANUAL
2d (2003); ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREWJACKSON AND THE BANKWAR (W.W. Norton & Company Inc.
1967); and Edward L. Symons, Jr. The "Business of Banking" in Historical Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
676 (1983). For detailed descriptions of the evolution of the U.S. securities sector, see CHARLES R.
GIESST, WALL STREET FROM ITS BEGINNINGS TO THE FALL OF ENRON (Oxford University Press 2004)
and LOUIS LOSS AND JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3D, §1-B-I (2004). For detailed
descriptions of the evolution of the U.S. insurance industry, see SHEILA BAIR, CONSUMER
RAMIFICATIONS OF AN OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTER FOR LIFE INSURERS, 6-9 (2004) available at
httpAV/www.isenberg.umass.edu/finopmgt/uploads/basicContentWidget/8631/bair-cons-ramifications.pdf
[hereinafter the BAIR REPORT]; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 2D., 443
(1985);JAMESM. POTERBA, THE HISTORY OF ANNUITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 36 (National Bureau
of Economic Research Working Paper No. 6001, April 1997); and Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in
the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 625 (1999).
A SINGLE FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY
to regulate the aspect of the industry that gave rise to the market failure. The
financial firms would respond by creating new entities, affiliations or
products in order to avoid government regulations. These new entities,
affiliations or products would create new market failures, prompting new
legislation or regulations on the part of federal or state lawmakers. In many
cases, federal and state legislators chose to create new regulatory agencies to
deal with financial crises in different segments of the financial services
industry rather than expand thejurisdiction of existing regulators. As a result
of these historical forces, both the federal government and the state govern-
ments ended up regulating banking and securities, the federal government
attained primary responsibility for regulating futures, and the state
governments maintained primary responsibility for regulating insurance.
For most of U.S. history, U.S. financial regulation predominately was
entity regulation. Entity regulation focuses on the type of financial institu-
tion and the type of products offered by the institution because distinct
financial products were offered by distinct institutions." Thus, banking
regulators and laws controlled banks and their products, securities regulators
and laws controlled securities firms and their products, and insurance
regulators and laws controlled insurance firms and their products.25 As a
result, when a bank sold securities, its securities sales were regulated by the
relevant banking regulator and not by the SEC or the state securities
regulators.
In the latter half of the twentieth century, market forces increasingly
pushed banks to offer more securities and insurance products and pushed
securities and insurance firms to devise new products that were in direct
competition with banking products.26 The distinctions between the banking,
securities and insurance sectors began to blur because these new financial
products were fungible.27 A consumer could choose to open a deposit
account with a bank or a money market account with a securities firm. An
investor could buy securities through a brokerage firm or a bank. As a result,
pressure was brought to bear on Congress to move away from a system based
predominately on entity regulation to a system that employed a more
functional regulation approach in order to create a level playing field.
Functional regulation focuses on regulating based on the type of product
being provided, instead of on the type of institution providing the product.
28
Under a pure functional regulation scheme, the securities regulators would
24 McCoy, supra note 23, § 12.02[2].
25 Id.
26 Id. at S12.02[1].
Z7 Id.
28 Id. at §12.02[2].
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regulate securities regardless of whether they were sold by banks or by
securities firms.29
In 1999, Congress finally acknowledged that the old regulatory regime
was no longer adecuate to handle the challenges posed by the new financial
products and services and by the financial conglomerates that provided them
and it enacted the GLBA. The GLBA preserved many aspects of the federal
and state regulatory structure that had evolved over the past 200 years while
repealing most of the laws and regulations that had prevented companies in
the insurance, bankifig and securities sectors from engaging in each other's
businesses. As previously noted the GLBA merely ratified the changes that
were ongoing in these sectors and that resulted in the convergence of
financial products and services.3" Under the GLBA, the regulatory structure
preserves some forms of entity regulation by granting regulatory authority to
some agencies based on the institution being regulated; 31 while in other
instances regulatory authority is assigned to an agency based upon the nature
or function of the product or service being provided.32
1. BANKING AND OTHER DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY
AGENCIES
A. REGULATION OF FINANCIAL AND BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
The GLBA permitted banks, securiies firms, insurance companies and
other entities engaged in financial services to become affiliated under the
umbrella of a financial holding company ("FHC") and to cross sell each
other's products. 33 The Act designated the Federal Reserve, which supervises
bank holding companies, to become the supervisor for these FHCs.34 A bank
holding company may elect to become a FHC, provided that all of its
depository institution subsidiaries are well-managed and well-capitalized and
have at least a "satisfactory" rating under the Community Reinvestment Act
of 1977.3s
29 Id.
30 MCCOY, supra note 23, S 12.02[1].
31 For example, the OCC continues to regulate nationally chartered banks, the SEC continues
to regulate brokerage firms, and the state insurance commissions continue to license insurance under-
writing companies. See discussion infra Part II.A.4.
32 For example, under the GLBA, the SEC now regulates the sale of securities by bank broker-
dealers. The bank regulators previously had regulated such sales. See infra text accompanying notes 81
and 82.
33 GLBA, S 103(a), 12 U.S.C.S. S 1843(k) (2004).
34 Id.
35 COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT OF 1977, 12 U.S.C. S 2901 et seq. (2004); GLI3A, S 103
(codified at 12 U.S.C.S. S 1843(l) (2004)).
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The GLBA specified that FHCs may engage in certain activities that are
financial in nature, including securities underwriting and dealing, insurance
underwriting, insurance agency activities, and merchant banking.36 A FHC
may also engage in any activity that the Federal Reserve, in consultation with
the Secretary of the Treasury, determines to be financial in nature, incidental
to finance, or complementary to a financial activity, provided that such
activity does not pose a substantial risk to the safety and soundness of the
FHC.37
Only 12 percent of all of the bank holding companies in existence as of
March 31, 2003, have elected to become FHCs.38 In addition, 78 percent of
the companies registered as FHCs as of March 31,2003, had previously been
bank holding companies before the enactment of the GLBA.3 9 Only a few
firms that had not previously been affiliated with a commercial bank before
the enactment of the GLBA, elected to become FHCs.4° Charles Schwab &
Co., MetLife and Franklin Resources fall into this category.4' Many of the
largest financial conglomerates have not registered as FHCs, including
American Express, Merrill Lynch, American International Group, and
Household International.42
Concerns about how the Federal Reserve has operated as the regulator
for FHCs appear to have deterred many financial conglomerates from
becoming FHCs. Financial conglomerates that grew out of securities and
insurance companies note that they currently are subject to fewer restrictions
on affiliations than they would be if they became FHCs.43 In addition, they
36 GLBA, S 103 (codified at 12 U.S.C.S. S 1843 (2004)).
37 Id.
38 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES UNDER THE GRAMM-





42 Financial Holding Companies as of August 6, 2004, Federal Reserve Board
www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/flhc/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2004); THE FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT
BOOK, supra note 3, at 9. In fact, only two the top ten companies classified as diversified financials by
Fortune have registered as FHCs. Financial Holding Companies as of August 6, 2004, Federal Reserve
Board; www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/fhc/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2004).
43 Steve Bartlett, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Financial Services Roundtable, commented
in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (July 13, 2004):
One of the central features of GLBA was the creation of financial holding companies.... The
financial holding company structure significantly expanded the scope of activities permissible
for banking firms; it did not offer insurance firms and securities firms a similar benefit.
Outside of the financial holding company structure, securities and insurance firms are subject
2005]
14 UN1VERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:1
believe that the Federal Reserve lacks the expertise to regulate financial
conglomerates with substantial businesses in the investment banking and
insurance sectors, because the Federal Reserve has traditionally only
regulated commercial banks.'
These financial conglomerates are also particularly concerned that the
Federal Reserve is slow to approve new products and services for FHCs.
These delays may put FHCs in a competitively disadvantageous position
compared to other financial conglomerates." This concern is based on the
fact that the Federal Reserve has designated only a few new activities as
"financial activities" within the past five years. 46 From the viewpoint of these
financial conglomerates, the failure of the Federal Reserve to permit FHCs
to provide real estate brokerage and real estate management services is
illustrative. Savings associations and approximately half of the state-chartered
banks currently are allowed to provide real estate brokerage and real estate
management services to their customers. In January 2001, the Federal
Reserve and the Treasury proposed a regulation that would have permitted
FHCs and national bank financial subsidiaries to provide such services.47
Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury still had not adopted this
regulation as ofJanuary 1, 2006.48
B. REGULATION OF BANKS
Whether an agency supervises and regulates a bank depends upon
whether the bank in question has a national charter or a state charter,
whether it is a member of the Federal Reserve System, and whether its
deposits are insured by the FDIC. National banks are chartered by the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") and subject to its
to few limitations on affiliations. Thus, it is not surprising that only a handful of securities and
insurance firms have become financial holding companies.
Id.
44 This issue has been raised by financial conglomerates such as Merrill Lynch and Goldman
Sachs, which developed out of traditional investment banks. Silverman, supra note 2, at 15.
45 Harry P. Doherty, Vice Chairman of the Board, Independence Community Bank Corp. and First Vice
Chairman, Board of Directors, America's Community Bankers, Testimony ofAmerica's Community Bankers on An
Examination of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Five Years After its Passage before the Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs of the U.S. Senate 6 (July 13, 2004).
46 Id. at 3. See also Bartlett, supra note 43, at 10.
47 Doherty, supra note 45, at 6.
48 The Federal Reserve Board, Regulations, Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank
Control, Proposed Amendments to permit financial holding companies to act as real estate brokers and
managers, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/regulations/default.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2006).
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supervision and regulation.49 National banks are also required to be
members of the Federal Reserve System. °
Well-capitalized and well-managed national banks can own financial
subsidiaries that sell insurance or securities.5' These financial subsidiaries
can only engage in financial activities that the bank could engage in directly.
Thus, these subsidiaries cannot engage in annuities or insurance under-
writing, insurance company portfolio investments, real estate investment or
development, or merchant banking. 2 In addition, a national bank cannot
allow the aggregate consolidated total assets of all of its financial subsidiaries
to exceed the lesser of $50 billion or 45 percent of the national bank's
consolidated total assets.53 These rules mean that a financial conglomerate
does not have to be a FHC or a bank holding company regulated by the
Federal Reserve, but can merely be a national bank that owns securities and
insurance company subsidiaries, which is regulated by the OCC.
State banks are chartered by individual states and have the option of
becoming a member of the Federal Reserve System.5 4 A state chartered bank
is supervised and regulated by the banking commission of the state that
issued its charter. If the state chartered bank is a member of the Federal
Reserve System, then it will be subject to the regulation and supervision of
the Federal Reserve.55 If the state chartered bank is not a member of the
Federal Reserve System, then the FDIC will be its primary federal
regulator. 56 The FDIC also acts as a back-up supervisor for other nationally
chartered and state chartered banks, which are insured by the FDIC.s7
In the years following the enactment of the GLBA, the total number of
banks in the United States, both nationally chartered and state chartered, has
declined. 8 In 2003, nationally chartered banks comprised only a little more
49 National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.S. SS 21,23,26,27 (2004).
so Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 12 U.S.C.S. S 221 (2004).
51 12 U.S.C.S. S 24a(a)(2)(C), (g)(5) & (g)(6) (2004). "Well-capitalized" for these purposes is
defined as having the same meaning as in section 38 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 12 U.S.C.S.
S 1831o (2004). For a bank that has been examined, "well-managed" means that the bank has received
a composite rating of one or two under the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System and at least a
rating of two for management. For banks that have not been examined, "well-managed" means that the
bank's managerial resources are deemed satisfactory by the appropriate federal banking agency. Id.
52 12 U.S.C.S. S 24a(a)(2)(B) (2004).
53 12 U.S.C.S. S 24a(a)(2)(D) (2004).
54 MCCOY, supra note 23, SS 2.03 [a], 3.02.
55 12 U.S.C.S. § 248,325,338,483 (2004).
56 12 U.S.C.S. S 1831a (2004).
57 See 12 U.S.C.S. SS 1815, 1828 (2004).
58 FDIC, Statistics on Depository Institutions, http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index.asp (last visited
September 8, 2005) (click "Enter SDI"; follow hyperlink "Retrieve Predefined Standard Reports"; then
run "Standard Report #5"). Between the years 1999 and 2003, the total number of nationally chartered
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than 25 percent of the total number of banks in the United States, but held
55.4 percent of the country's total deposits.59 In addition to holding more
deposits than state chartered banks, nationally chartered banks were, on
average, more profitable than state banks in 2003.60
C. REGULATION OF SAVINGS AND LOANS AND THEIR HOLDING
COMPANIES
The Office of the Thrift Supervision ("OTS") supervises savings and
loan holding companies, which are companies that directly or indirectly
control a savings association or thrift.6 The OTS also charters, examines,
supervises and regulates federal savings associations that are insured by the
Savings Association Insurance Fund ("SAIF") of the FDIC and examines,
supervises and regulates state chartered savings associations that are insured
by SAIF.62 State chartered thrifts are also chartered, supervised and regulated
by the state savings and loan commissions that granted them their charters.
The FDIC also acts as a back-up regulator for thrifts that are insured by
SAIF.63
In 2003, nationally chartered savings and loans comprised 87.8 percent
of all of the savings associations in the United States.' In addition, the
savings and loan holding companies owned over half of the savings
associations in the United States in 2003.6' Thrifts on average are as
profitable as state banks, although they hold fewer assets than national and
banks declined 15.5 percent to 1999 banks in 2003, while the number of state chartered banks declined
7.1 percent to 5771 banks in 2003. See id.
s9 See id.
60 See id. In 2003, the return on equity for national banks was 16.1 percent, up slightly from 1999
when the return on equity for national banks was 15.1 percent. See id. The return on equity for state
banks was 13.0 percent in 2003, down 9.7 percent from the 14.4 percent return on equity that state banks
had in 1999. See id.
61 OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 2003 FACT BOOK 72 n.17
(2004) [hereinafter OTS FACT BOOK].
62 12 U.S.C.S. § 1463 (2004).
63 12 U.S.C.S. SS 1814-1816 (2004).
6 OTS FACT BOOK, supra note 61, at 2. The United States had 928 savings associations in 2003,
of which 815 had national charters. Id.
65 See id. at 68. Some savings associations may be owned by more than one holding company,
which is why there are more holding companies than savings associations that own them. Id. at 72 n.17.
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state banks.66 In 2003, thrifts held assets equal to about 20 percent of the
assets held by national and state banks.67
D. REGULATION OF CREDIT UNIONS
A dual regulatory system also exists for credit unions. Credit unions may
be chartered and regulated either by state authorities or by the National
Credit Union Administration ("NCUA").6' The NCUA also contains the
National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund ("NCUSIF"), which insures
deposits within credit unions.69 Credit unions can only serve their members,
who generally must share a single common bond based on an occupation or
community if the credit union has more than 3,000 members, or may share
multiple common bonds if the credit union has less than 3,000 members.70
While credit unions share many of the same attributes as banks, they are
granted special tax benefits and are exempt from the lending requirements
of the Community Reinvestment Act because they serve only a limited group
of people.7
2. INSURANCE REGULATORY AGENCIES
Unlike depository institutions, which are regulated by both the federal
and state governments, the insurance business is regulated almost exclusively
by the state insurance commissions.72 State insurance commissions regulate
the products and services offered by insurance companies. All state insurance
commissions also license insurance prod4cers, although the exact type of
licenses issued varies.73 Some states issue a general insurance producer
license while others issue licenses for eich different type of producer, such
as individual licenses for agents, brokers, solicitors, consultants, and
66 Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Number of Commercial Banks by Charter, available at
www.csbs.org/info_stats/banksbycharter.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 205); THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
FACT BOOK,supra note 3, at 71. The return on equity for thrifts is similar to the return on equity for state
banks. In 2001, thrifts averaged a return on equity of 13.10 percent compared with the 13.14 percent
earned by state banks in that year. Id.
67 THE FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 71.
6s 12 U.S.C.S. S 1752 (2004).
69 12 U.S.C.S. § 1783 (2004).
70 12 U.S.C.S. § 1759 (2004).
71 12 U.S.C.S. SS 1768, 2902(2) (2004).
72 NATIONALASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, 2002 INSURANCE DEPARTMENT
RESOURCES REPORT (2003) [hereinafter NAIC 2002 REPORT].
73 Id.
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reinsurance intermediaries. 4 In 2002, there were 7,173 domestic insurers
and 3.8 million licensed insurance producers in the United States.75
3. SECURITIES AND FUTURES REGULATORYAGENCIES
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") regulates broker-
dealers, investment companies, investment advisors, mutual funds, public
utility holding companies, and self-regulatory organizations, including stock
exchanges. State securities regulators also regulate broker-dealers and
brokerage firms who sell securities within their states as well as investment
advisers who manage less than $25 million.
In order to protect brokerage clients in the event that a brokerage goes
out of business, Congress created the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation ("SIPC") in 1970.76 SIPC ensures that investors will receive
securities that a bankrupt brokerage firm held for their account in street
name up to a limit of $500,000 per customer.77 SIPC only guarantees to
return the securities. It does not guarantee the value of the securities.
Unlike bank regulators, federal and state securities regulators did not
traditionally focus on prudential concerns that would address the stability of
the financial system and the solvency of the firms operating within it.
Rather, they focused on protecting investors from fraud by requiring
disclosure of all material information. 78 The SEC, however, has become
more focused on the prudential concerns of safety and soundness since it has
begun to supervise some types of investment bank holding companies. In
2004, the SEC created a new regulatory regime for financial conglomerates
comprised of financial service providers that are not affiliated with certain
types of banks, such as foreign banks or savings associations, and have a
broker-dealer with a substantial presence in the securities markets.79 Such
financial conglomerates may elect to be supervised by the SEC as supervised
investment bank holding companies ("SIBHC"). 80
The Commodities Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") regulates
commodity futures and option markets, traders, brokers, futures commission
merchants, commodity trading advisors, commodity pool operators, and self
74 Id.
75 Id. at 39, 53.
76 GART, supra note 23, at 75.
77 Id.
78 MCCoY, supra note 23, S 12.02[2].
79 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, FINAL RULE: SUPERVISED INVESTMENT BANK
HOLDING COMPANIES (CORRECTED VERSION), RELEASE NUMBER 34-49831 (2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/fina/34-49831 .htm.
80 Id.
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regulating organizations such as the National Futures Association."' The
CFTC also regulates options and futures products andjointly regulates some
hybrid products, like single stock futures, in conjunction with the SEC.
4. FUNCTIONAL REGULATION
With a few exceptions, financial products and services continue to be
regulated by the agencies that regulated such transactions prior to the
adoption of the GLBA. As previously noted, this form of regulation is
referred to as functional regulation and is based on the function (or
classification) of the type of product or service rather than the institution that
provided it.82 Under the GLBA, the state insurance commissions regulate
the sale of insurance, the SEC and the state securities regulators regulate the
sale of securities, the CFTC regulates options and futures, and the federal
and state banking regulators regulate banking services and products.
Prior to the enactment of the GLBA, some financial products were
regulated based on the classification of the institution providing the product
or service and not based on the classification of the product or service being
offered. For example, bank regulators had regulated the securities activities
of banks rather than the SEC. After the enactment of the GLBA, in keeping
with the concept of functional regulation, some of these activities became the
responsibility of the functional regulator, while others continued to be
regulated based on the classification of the institution offering the product
or service rather than the classification of the product or service. The most
substantial change wrought by the GLBA in this area was to make many bank
securities activities by bank broker-dealers subject to regulation by the SEC
rather than by the bank regulators.' Nevertheless, other bank securities
activities, such as commercial paper and exempted securities, private place-
ments, asset-backed securities, derivatives, third-party networking arrange-
ments, trust activities, employee and shareholder benefit plans, sweep
accounts, affiliate transactions, and safekeeping and custody services,
continue to be regulated by the bank regulatory agencies. 4
The GLBA also attempted to set up a system for determining which
functional regulator should regulate new hybrid products. Section 205 of the
See generally the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.S. 5 1 et. seq. (2004), which further
outlines the purposes of the CFTC.
82 Michael P. Maloy, Functional Regulation: Premise or Pretext?, in FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION
AFTER GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY 179, 180 (Patricia A. McCoy ed., 2002). See also GLBA Title II, Pub. L.
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 1385 (1999) (codified at scattered sections of 12, 15, 16, 18 U.S.C.).
83 15 U.S.C.S S 78c (a)(4)-(a)(5) (2004).
84 Id. S 78c (a)(4)(B).
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GLBA defines a "new hybrid product" as one that was not previously defined
as a security before the enactment of the GLBA and is not defined as an
identified banking product within the GLBA.8 ' The GLBA gave the SEC
primary regulatory authority over new hybrid products that the SEC
determined were securities. However, the GLBA did require the SEC to
consult with and to seek the concurrence of the Federal Reserve before
imposing broker-dealer registration requirements in connection with such
hybrid products.8 6 The definition for new hybrid product in Section 205 of
the GLBA does not mention the possibility of the product being an insurance
product nor does Section 205 require the SEC to consult with the state
insurance regulators before issuing rules governing hybrid products that may
be combinations of insurance and securities products.87 Section 104 of the
GLBA, however, did reaffirm that the states would retain control over the
regulation of insurance products and services.88
5. CONSOLIDATION OF STATE FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCIES
While the federal government enacted changes to the financial regulatory
regime with the passage of the GLBA, the states have also been altering the
regulatory regime by consolidating state financial regulators. Slightly more
than half of the states have either created a single agency that deals with
banking, securities and insurance or have created a semi-integrated agency
that deals either with banking and securities, banking and insurance or
securities and insurance in a single agency.89 Thirteen states and the District
s5 Id. S 78o (i)(6)(A) (2004). "Identified banking product" is defined as a deposit account, savings
account, certificate of deposit, or other deposit instrument issued by a bank, a banker's acceptance, a letter
of credit or loan made by a bank, a debit account at a bank arising from a credit card or similar arrange-
ment, a participation in a loan which the bank or an affiliate of the bank (other than a broker or dealer)
funds, participates in, or owns that is sold to qualified investors or sophisticated investors, or any swap
agreement, except for any equity swap sold to a person other than a qualified investor. Id. § 78c (a)(4).
86 Id. S 78o. If the Federal Reserve disagrees with the SEC's determination that the product is
a security and subject to regulation by the SEC, then the Federal Reserve may have the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia review the final regulation adopted by the SEC, provided that the
Federal Reserve files not later than 60 days after the date of publication of the final regulation a petition
with the court requesting that the regulation be set aside. Id. S 78o (i)(5). The Court of Appeals must
base its determination on whether to set aside the regulation on whether the court finds that the product
is a new hybrid product, that the new product is a security, and that imposing a requirement to register
as a broker or dealer for banks buying or selling the product is "appropriate in light of the history, purpose,
and extent of regulation under the Federal securities laws and under the Federal banking laws" without
giving deference to either the SEC or the Federal Reserve. Id. S 78o (i)(5)(D).
97 Id. S 78o (i)(5)(D).
88 Id. § 6701.
89 THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE CHARTERED
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of Columbia have created a single agency to supervise and regulate all
financial services. 9°
Below is a table that shows which states still have separate agencies for
banking, insurance, and securities, and which have combined the regulation
of two or more sectors into a single agency.
BANKING 35 (19th ed., 2003); CAL. DEP'T FIN. INST., ANN. REP. 24 -25 (2002); GA. DEP'T OF BANKING
AND FIN., ANN. REP. (2002); HAw. DEP'T OF COM. AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS, ANN. COMPLIANCE
RESOL. FUND REP. (2002); IND. DEP'T OF FIN. INST., ANN. REP. 16 (2002); IOWA SUPERINTENDENT OF
BANKING, ANN. REP. 27 (2002); Miss. DEP'TOF BANKING & CONSUMER FIN.,ANN. REP. 12-14 (2002);
N.Y. BANKING DEP'T, ANN. REP. 1 (2002); S.C. STATE BD. OF FIN. INST., ANN. ACCOUNTABILITYREP.
(2002); VT. INS. COMM'R, ANN. REP. 10 (2002); WASH. DEP'T OF FIN. INST., ANN. REP. 2 (2002); W.VA.
BD. OF BANKING AND FIN. INST., ANN. REP. 14, 18, 23 (2002); State of Illinois Department of Financial
and Professional Regulation, httpV/www.idfpr.com (last visitedJan. 1,2006); Michigan Office of Financial
& Insurance Services, http://www.michigan.gov/cis/0,1607,7-154-10555-40268--,00.html (last visitedJan.
1,2006).
90 THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE CHARTERED
BANKING 35 (19th ed., 2003); CAL. DEP'T FIN. INST., ANN. REP. 24 -25 (2002); WASH. DEP'T FIN. INST.,
ANN. REP. 2 (2002); HAw. DEP'T OF COMM. AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS, ANN. COMPLIANCE RESOL.
FUND REP. (2002); IOWA SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKING, ANN. REP. 27 (2002); Miss. DEP'T OF
BANKING & CONSUMER FIN., ANN. REP. 12-14 (2002); VT. INS. COMM'R, ANN. REP. 10 (2002); State
of Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, http://www.idfpr.com (last visited Jan.
1, 2006); Michigan Office of Financial & Insurance Services, http://www.michigan.gov/cis/0,1607,7-154-
10555-40268--,00.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2006).
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BANKING 35 (19th ed., 2003); CAL. DEP'T FIN. INST., ANN. REP. 24 -25 (2002); GA. DEP'T OF BANKING
AND FIN.,ANN. REP. (2002); HAW. DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND CONSUMERAFFAIRS, ANN. COMPLIANCE
RESOL. FUND REP. (2002); IND. DEP'T OF FIN. INST., ANN. REP. 16 (2002); IOWA SUPERINTENDENT OF
BANKING, ANN. REP. 27 (2002); MISS. DEP'T OF BANKING &CONSUMER FIN.,ANN. REP. 12-14 (2002);
N.Y. BANKING DEP'T, ANN. REP. 1 (2002); S.C. STATE BD. OF FIN. INST., ANN. ACCOUNTABILITY REP.
(2002); VT. INS. COMM'R, ANN. REP. 10 (2002); WASH. DEP'T OF FIN. INST., ANN. REP. 2 (2002); W.VA.
BD. OF BANKING AND FIN. INST., ANN. REP. 14, 18, 23 (2002); State of Illinois Department of Financial
and Professional Regulation, http://www.idfpr.com (last visitedJan. 1, 2006); Michigan Office of Financial
&Insurance Services, http://www.michigan.gov/cis/0,1607,7-154-10555-40268--,00.html (last visitedJan.
1,2006).
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While the District of Columbia and most of the 13 states that have a
single agency to regulate financial services maintain separate divisions for
each financial sector, some of the states have organized their financial services
regulator into divisions based upon regulatory goals. Michigan is an example
of one of the states that has reorganized its financial regulatory structure to
focus on regulatory goals rather than financial sectors.
Michigan, through its Office of Financial and Insurance Services
("OFIS"), claims to be "the first state to coordinate regulation of financial
institutions, insurance, and securities industries under the federal Financial
Services Modernization Act of 1999. " 92 Michigan created the OFIS in April
of 2000 by combining the Financial Institutions Bureau, the Insurance
Bureau, and the Securities Bureau. 93 Frank Fitzgerald had been the
commissioner of the Michigan Insurance Bureau before becoming the first
commissioner to lead the OFIS. Hejustified the creation of the new office
by stating: "The old fire walls are breaking down and the operative word
today is convergence .... The new office is intended to improve regulatory
efficiency."
94
Initially, the OFIS had three divisions that essentially replicated the three
former bureaus.95 Within the past four years, however, the OFIS has
reorganized its internal structure so that now it is divided into two offices,
the Office of Financial Evaluation, which deals with prudential regulation
and supervision, and the Office of Policy, Conduct and Consumer
Assistance.96 The Office of Financial Evaluation has four divisions: (1) banks
and trusts, (2) credit unions, (3) insurance examinations, and (4) supervising
and monitoring financially troubled insurance companies. 97
In the Office of Policy, Conduct, and Consumer Assistance, three of the
four divisions deal with more than one financial sector.9 The Consumer
Services Division acts as the initial point of contact for consumer inquiries
and complaints.99 The Conduct Review and Securities Division licenses
mortgage brokers, securities brokers-dealers, investment advisors, securities
agents, insurance agents, and insurance agencies as well as undertaking
92 Michigan Office ofFinancial &Insurance Services, http://www.michigan.gov/cis/0,1607,7-154-
10555-40268--,00.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).
93 MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES, ANN. REP. (2000).
94 R.J. King, State to Oversee Financial Firms: Engler Plans to Set Up Regulatory Office to Keep Tabs on
Banks, Insurers, Brokers, DETROIT NEWS,Jan. 28, 2000, at B1.
95 MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES, ANN. REP., supra note 93.
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investigations and enforcement actions under all of the OFIS codes. "3 The
Policy Division provides research, policy analysis, and recommendations in
support of all regulatory activities and policy development regarding the
financial services industry.'01 The Health Plans Division regulates HMOs
and non-profit healthcare providers. °2
6. A PICTURE OF THE CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF A FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANY.
The result of these regulations is that a financial conglomerate that
operates in all 50 states, is controlled by a financial holding company and
owns a nationally chartered bank, a state chartered bank that is a member of
the Federal Reserve System, a state chartered bank that is not a member of
the Federal Reserve System, a federal thrift, a state thrift, an investment bank,
and an insurance company would, at a minimum, face supervision and
regulation from the host of regulators shown in the following diagram.
0 3
too Id.
t01 MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES, ANN. REP. 7 (2004).
102 Id.
103 This picture would be even more muddled if it illustrated which agencies regulated the
products and services provided by each entity. For example, many national banks also sell annuities which
are regulated by both the SEC and the state insurance commissions.
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B. Prior Proposals to Consolidate Agencies.
Over the past sixty years, many commentators have noted the problems
created by having multiple state and federal financial regulators and have
called for the consolidation of the regulators at the federal level. The
following are illustrative of the most important consolidation proposals
advanced during the past 60 years:
* In 1949, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of Government (the "Hoover Commission") recommended
transferring all of the federal regulatory authority over banks from
the OCC and the FDIC to the Federal Reserve.
°4
* In 1971, the President's Commission on Financial Structure and
Regulation (the "Hunt Commission") recommended consolidating
banking regulatory responsibilities into three new agencies: (1) the
Administrator of National Banks, who would assume the
supervisory duties of the OCC, (2) the Administrator of State Banks,
who would assume the supervisory duties of the Federal Reserve and
the FDIC but leave in place the state banking regulators, and (3) the
Federal Deposit Guarantee Administration, which would assume the
insurance functions of the FDIC, the FSLIC and the NCUSIF. °5
* In 1975, the House Banking Committee completed a study which
recommended the creation of a new federal agency responsible for
all federal regulation over state and federally-chartered depository
institutions.
10 6
* In December 1982, the Task Group on Regulation of Financial
Services recommended creating a new "Federal Banking Agency"
within the Treasury Department that would regulate all national
banks and their holding companies while the Federal Reserve would
oversee federal regulation of all state-chartered banks and their
holding companies. The FDIC's sole responsibility would be to
focus on providing deposit insurance and administering the deposit
insurance system. Antitrust matters related to banks would be
primarily the responsibility of the Justice Department, while
104 Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM & MARY L. REv. 503, 564 n.371
(2000).
1o5 Id. at 33.
106 Id.
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securities matters related to banks would be primarily the
responsibility of the SEC. 7
" In 1987, a Presidential commission headed by Nicholas Brady (the
"Brady Commission") recommended that the SEC and the CFTC
should be merged into the Federal Reserve, which would serve as a
single agency to regulate the securities and commodity futures
markets."'
* In 1994, Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, suggested in a statement before Congress
that the OCC and the OTS ought to be merged to form a Federal
Banking Commission to supervise all national banks and thrifts, but
the Federal Reserve should continue to supervise state banks and
bank holding companies.0 9
" In 1994, the Treasury proposed consolidating the OCC and the
OTS into a single agency, which would also have assumed some of
the regulatory functions of the Federal Reserve." 0
* In 1996, the GAO recommended that the OCC and the OTS be
combined into a single agency, which also would have assumed the
FDIC's supervisory responsibilities in the new agency."'
None of these efforts were ever adopted. Each of the foregoing proposals
highlights the persistent problems with the existing regulatory structure that
could be solved in part by consolidating agencies. These problems include
poor communications and cooperation among agencies, unproductive and
costly turf wars between agencies, inadequate or inconsistent regulations
promulgated by agencies, and duplication of regulatory efforts by agencies.
III. CHALLENGES FACING THE CURRENT REGULATORY REGIME
The U.S. financial services regulatory structure is facing several major
challenges which make the continued reliance on multiple regulators
untenable. This section will examine these challenges and why the current
system is unable to deal with them.
107 Id. at 11-12, 91-92.
108 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS (1988) [hereinafter
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT].
109 GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 8, at 75-76.
Ito Id.
III Id. at 77.
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A. Need to Monitor Risks Across Firms and Sectors and to Address Such Risks
Strategically.
1. EXISTING REGULATORS FAIL TO COMMUNICATE AND COOPERATE
WITH ONE ANOTHER EFFECTIVELY.
The United States lacks a single forum in which all of the state and
federal financial services regulators can meet to share information, assess
risks that cross traditional regulatory sectors, and develop and coordinate
regulations to address such risks. While forums exist for federal and state
regulators operating within the same industry segment to coordinate
activities, coordination and information sharing between regulators for
different sectors currently occurs only on an ad hoc basis. 112 The GAO had
the following dismal assessment of the existing efforts at cross-sector
communication among the federal and state regulators:
In evaluating some of the means by which U.S. regulators com-
municate across sectors, we have found that these generally do not
provide for the systematic sharing of information, making it more
difficult for regulators to identify potential fraud and abuse, and for
consumers to identify the relevant regulator. In addition, these
means do not allow for a satisfactory assessment of risks that cross
traditional regulatory and industry boundaries and therefore may
113inhibit the ability to detect and contain certain financial crises....
For more than a decade, the GAO has repeatedly identified the failure of
federal and state financial regulators to communicate and coordinate across
sectors, and even within the same sector, as a problem." 4
112 Id. at 97-98.
13 Id. at 109.
114 GAO, Long-Term Capital Management: Regulators Need to Focus Greater Attention on
Systemic Risk (Oct. 29, 1999), in GAO/GGD-00-3; GAO, Financial Services Regulators: Better
Information Sharing Could Reduce Fraud (March 6, 2001), in GAO-01-478T; GAO, State Insurance
Regulation: Efforts to Streamline Key Licensing and Approval Processes Face Challenges (June 18,2002),
in GAO-02-842T; GAO, Potential Terrorist Attacks: Additional Actions Needed to Better Prepare Critical
Financial Market Participants (Feb. 12, 2003), in GAO-03-251; GAO, Insurance Regulation: Common
Standards and Improved Coordination Needed to Strengthen Market Regulation (Sept. 2003), in GAO-
03-433; GAO, Bank Tying: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure Effective Enforcement of Tying
Prohibitions (Oct. 2003), in GAO-04-4; and GAO, Better Information SharingAmong Financial Services
Regulators Could Improve Protections for Consumers (June 29,2004), in GAO-04-882R.
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The existing inter-agency forums include the Federal Financial Institu-
tions Examination Council ("FFIEC"), the President's Working Group on
Financial Markets (the "President's Working Group"), the Financial and
Banking Information Infrastructure Committee ("FBIIC"), the Financial
Literacy and Education Commission, the North American Securities
Administrators' Association ("NASAA"), the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors ("CSBS"), and National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners ("NAIC")." 5 Of these, the FFIEC, the President's Working Group,
and the FBIIC come the closest to creating an interagency forum for
strategically addressing the issues facing the financial services industry.
Unfortunately, the scope of these groups' authority is too limited to meet the
needs of the financial services industry.
The FFIEC was created on March 10, 1979, pursuant to Title X of the
Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 (the
"FFIEC Act"). 1 16 The FFIEC is comprised of the Federal Reserve, the FDIC,
the NCUA, the OCC, and the OTS. n 7 The mission of the FFIEC is to
prescribe uniform principles and standards for the examination of financial
institutions and, following the enactment of the GLBA, to have an increased
coordinating role.1 18  The President's Working Group was created by
executive order in 1988 to analyze the 1987 stock market crash and was
reactivated in 1994.119 It is comprised of the heads of the Federal Reserve, the
SEC, the CFTC, and the Treasury, and has dealt with a wide range of issues,
generally related to more recent crises.
120
The FBIIC was created by a Presidential executive order following the
September 11, 2001 attacks and was tasked with ensuring the preparedness
and stability of the financial sector in the event of future threats.' 21 The
FBIIC is comprised of representatives from the Federal Reserve, FDIC,
OCC, OTS, SEC, CFTC, NCUA, NAIC, CSBS, OFHEO, the Federal
115 GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 8, at 97-108. NAIC, NASAA and CSBS
are the associations for the state insurance, securities, and banking regulators, respectively. The Financial
Literacy and Education Commission was created by Congress to coordinate efforts to educate the public
on financial matters and is composed of 20 federal agencies, including all of the federal financial
regulators. Id. at 108.
116 OFFICEOF INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE DEPARTMENTOFTHETREASURYJOINTEVALUATION
OF THE FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL3 (2002) [hereinafter OIG FFIEC
REPORT].
117 Id. at 3-4.
118 Id. at 3.
119 GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 8, at 107.
12D Id. The President's Working Group addressed the 1997 market decline, year 2000 preparedness
issues, and the growth of the over-the-counter derivatives market. Id.
121 Id.
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Housing Finance Board, the Office of Homeland Security, and the Office of
Cyberspace Security."2 None of these groups currently has the authority,
jurisdiction or resources to ensure the systematic sharing of information
between regulators in order to coordinate their activities and to assess the
systemic risks to the financial industry as a whole.' 3
Inter-agency rivalries have also deterred efforts to expand the scope and
composition of these groups in order to provide a strategic assessment of the
financial industry's risk. In March 2002, the Inspectors General of the
Treasury, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve completed a joint evaluation
of the FFIEC.124 One of the items that they investigated was whether the
membership of the FFIEC ought to be broadened to include other
regulators, such as the SEC and the CFTC, in order to better assess the risks
confronting the financial services industry. While the Inspectors General
interviewed staff members of the agencies that already composed the FFIEC,
they did not interview anyone from the SEC or the CFTC. In addition, the
Inspectors General did not obtain any information from the SEC or CFTC
regarding major risks or emerging issues facing the banking industry, despite
the fact that banks are increasingly competing against other financial
entities. 25 It is not surprising that the Inspectors General found that the
officials of the Federal Reserve, FDIC, NCUA, OCC and OTS were not in
favor of expanding FFIEC membership to include agencies that regulate the
insurance and securities sectors. 126 The existing members of the FFIEC also
opposed creating a separate coordinating entity under the GLBA in order to
handle cross-sectoral issues because they felt that the periodic meetings called
by the Federal Reserve or other ad hoc arrangements adequately dealt with
cross-sectoral issues. 127 This opposition existed, even though "some officials
indicated that the relationship between the banking agencies and the SEC
needed to be improved through better dialogue." 26
The report went on to state that the banking agencies and the SEC were
in the process of negotiating a memorandum of understanding ("MOU")
covering the sharing of critical information on a case-by-case basis. 29 It also
commented that coordination with state banking regulations needs to be
improved. 3 ° Currently, five state banking commissioners comprise the State
122 Id.
123 Id. at 107-08.
124 OIG FFIEC REPORT, supra note 116, at 3.
125 Id. at 22.




130 OIG FFIEC REPORT, supra note 116, at 9.
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Liaison Committee to the FFIEC, but these commissioners do not have
voting rights on the FFIEC.'3 '
Out of the three existing inter-agency forums, only the FBIIC contains
representatives from the insurance regulators. When questioned by the
Inspectors General about expanding the FFIEC to include insurance
regulators, the existing members of the FFIEC pointed to the bilateral
information sharing agreements between the banking agencies and state
insurance commissioners as effective mechanisms for sharing relevant
regulatory information. 132 Not all states, however, have signed such agree-
ments with all of the federal banking agencies. By the end of 2001, 45 states
had agreements with the OTS, 23 states had agreements with the OCC, 31
states had agreements with the FDIC, and only eight states had agreements
with the Federal Reserve. 13 3 Only 30 percent of the state banking commis-
sioners had entered into information sharing agreements with state insurance
commissioners by the end of 2001, although an unspecified number of state
banking commissioners reportedly had informal information sharing
arrangements with state insurance commissioners. 134 While such agreements
established mechanisms for sharing information between the agencies who
are parties to the agreements, they do not establish a mechanism for ensuring
that the information reaches all of the agencies that may need it, nor do they
establish a mechanism forjointly evaluating the issues raised by the informa-
tion.
The FFIEC also highlights the inherent problems with these inter-
agency forums as means to resolve the communication and coordination
problems that currently exist among the regulators. First, the FFIEC has no
legal authority to force agency members to adopt a particular proposal, but
serves only as a coordinating and policy-making entity. 135  Because the
FFIEC lacks rulemaking authority, any projects resulting in rulemaking must
be issued jointly by the relevant agencies. 136 In addition, the FFIEC's effec-
tiveness seems to be contingent on who the members are at a given time. 37
131 Id. at 8-9.
132 Id. at 18.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 12 U.S.C.S. § 3305 (2004).
136 OIG FFIEC REPORT, supra note 116, at 7.
137 Id. at 7. The Inspectors General report noted:
A number of the officials noted that the Council's success depended in large part on the
individual principal's interaction and level of commitment to the FFIEC. One senior agency
official indicated that while the FFIEC exists in law, in practice the FFIEC exists at the consent
of the Council and task force members. One principal stated that personal relationships are
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Second, not all agencies are involved in the FFIEC, rendering it ineffective
for handling issues that must be dealt with quickly or involve agencies that
are not members. 38
2. CURRENT SYSTEM CONTAINS INCONSISTENT REGULATIONS
Inconsistent regulations exist within the current regulatory regime
because functional regulation was imperfectly enacted in the GLBA. For
example, some bank securities activities continue to be subject to the
oversight of bank regulators rather than the SEC. These products and
activities include commercial paper and exempted securities, private
placements, asset-backed securities, derivatives, third-party networking
arrangements, trust activities, employee and shareholder benefit plans, sweep
accounts, affiliate transactions, and safekeeping and custody services. 39 In
addition, national banks can continue to engage in underwriting any of the
insurance products that had been authorized by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") as ofJanuary 1, 1999.140
The existing regulatory regime also does not work well for products or
services that do not clearly fall into one of the banking, securities or
insurance categories. Section 205 of the GLBA defines "new hybrid product"
as one that was not previously defined as a security before the enactment of
the GLBA and is not defined as an identified banking product within the
GLBA. 14 1 This definition does not mention the possibility of the product
important at all levels of the FFIEC and that without good relationships there is no basis for
completing inter-agency projects.
Id.
138 Id. at 10. Even FBIIC which has the widest membership, does not have representatives from
the financial regulators in all 50 states and the associations of state regulators that are members (NAIC,
CSBS, and NASAA) do not have the authority to bind their members.
139 15 U.S.C.S. § 78c(a)(4)(B) (2004). The top ten banks and thrifts based on income from
mutual fund and annuity sales earned over $3.8 billion in income from such sales in 2001. THE
FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 75 (2003). The top ten banks and thrifts in terms of
income from mutual fund and annuity sales were Bank of America NA, Mellon Bank NA, First Union
NA, PNC Bank NA, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Wells Fargo Bank NA, Bank of New York, Washington
Mutual Bank, Fleet Bank NA, and Citibank NA.
140 GLBA § 302.
141 GLBA § 205 (codified at 15 U.S.C.S. S 78o(i) (5) (D) (2004)). Section 206 of the GLBA defines
"identified banking product" as a deposit account, savings account, certificate of deposit, or other deposit
instrument issued by a bank, a banker's acceptance, a letter of credit or loan made by a bank, a debit
account at a bank arising from a credit card or similar arrangement, a participation in a loan which the
bank or an affiliate of the bank (other than a broker or dealer) funds, participates in, or owns that is sold
to qualified investors or sophisticated investors, or any swap agreement, except for any equity swap sold
to a person other than a qualified investor.
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being an insurance product, nor does Section 205 require the SEC to consult
with the state insurance regulators before issuing rules governing hybrid
products that may be combinations of insurance and securities products.
14 2
Hybrid securities and insurance products do exist. Variable annuities, which
are regulated by both the SEC and the state insurance commissions, are one
example of such hybrid securities and insurance products.
Section 104 of the GLBA reaffirmed that the states would retain control
over the regulation of insurance products and services. 4 Nevertheless,
Section 104(c) prohibits states from preventing or restricting a depository
institution or an affiliate of such institution from being affiliated with any
person except in certain limited circumstances related to insurers. 44 The
GLBA permits states to collect, review and take actions (including approval
or disapproval) on applications concerning the proposed acquisition of, or
change or continuation of control of, an insurer domiciled in the state, or to
require a person seeking to acquire control of an insurer to maintain or
restore the insurer's capital requirements under the state's capital regulations,
or to restrict the change in control in the ownership of stock in the insurer,
or a company formed for the purpose of controlling the insurer, after the
insurer has converted from a mutual to a stock form so long as such
restrictions do not discriminate against depository institutions or their
affiliates.
4 1
These inconsistent regulations mean that companies competing with one
another face an uneven playing field because they are governed by different
regulators and different rules."4 6  Thus, these regulations decrease
competition and distort the markets for financial products.
3. CURRENT SYSTEM CONTAINS DUPLICATIE REGULATIONS
Numerous studies have identified the problem of overlapping regulatory
authorities producing inconsistent regulations. 147 For example, the GAO
142 GLBA S 205 (codified at 15 U.S.C.S. S 78o(i)(5)(D) (2004)).
143 GLBA 104.
144 GLBA S 104(c).
145 GLBA S 104(c)(2). In the event of a dispute between federal regulators and state insurance
regulators regarding insurance, the GLBA provided for a dispute resolution mechanism under which
either the federal or the state regulator may seek expedited review from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
circuit in which the state is located or from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. 15 U.S.C.S.
§6714 (2004).
146 David L. Ratner, Responsethe SECatSixty:A Reply to ProfessorMacey, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1765,
1773 (1995) ("A system in which some of the firms competing for a certain market are regulated in one
way and others in a different way, leads to competitive unfairness and customer confusion.").
147 For example, the GAO Financial Regulation Report, the Task Group Report, and the
Presidential Task Force Report all cited this as a problem.
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Financial Regulation Report, the Task Group Report, and the Presidential
Task Force Report all cited this as a problem in the areas of banking and
securities. Sheila Bair of the University of Massachusetts, Isenberg School
of Management completed a study (the "Bair Report") on the consumer
ramifications of creating an optional federal charter for life insurers in
2004.148 The Bair Report concluded that the duplicative nature of state
insurance regulations resulted in: (1) multiple state reviews of product filings
that are cumbersome and inefficient; and (2) significant delays in multi-state
company licensing that have inhibited the ability of smaller companies to
expand operations and have benefited larger companies with pre-established
multi-state infrastructures. 49
The federal and state banking and insurance regulators have over the
years attempted to eliminate some duplicative practices by jointly issuing
regulations and by adopting common forms for certain activities. An
example of such cooperation may be found in the banking area, in which the
OCC, OTS and the FDIC have adopted a uniform application form for a
charter and federal deposit insurance in 2002.150 The form allows an entity
to fill out one application when seeking a charter to become a national bank
or thrift and to apply for federal deposit insurance. The agencies worked
with the Conference of State Bank Supervisors in the hope that most states
would also adopt the form for entities applying for state charters. 151
The GLBA also required states to establish uniform or reciprocal
requirements for licensing of insurance agents.'52 The GLBA mandated that
the NAIC had to determine whether a majority of states had to meet this
requirement within three years after the enactment of the GLBA.5 3 If the
NAIC was unable to do so, then the National Association of Registered
Agents and Brokers would be established as a non-profit corporation to act
as a mechanism through which "uniform licensing, appointment, continuing
education, and other insurance producer sales qualification requirements and
conditions" could be adopted.'54
Perhaps not surprisingly, when given a choice between reciprocity and
uniformity, the states chose reciprocity. 55 Reciprocity only required that
148 BAIR REPORT, supra note 23, at i-ii. The study focused solely on life insurance and not the
other forms of insurance, although it did concede that other insurers, particularly property and casualty
insurers, faced many of the same regulatory inefficiencies.
149 Id.
155 Regulators Issue Common Form, 21 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POLICY RPT. 7 (Aug. 2002).
151 Id.
152 15 U.S.C.S. § 6751 (2004).
153 Id.
154 15 U.S.C.S. § 6752-53 (2004).
155 Richard J. Hillman, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, General
Accounting Office, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government
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states accept the licensing decisions of other states, even though their
requirements might be different, while uniformity would have required the
same set of requirements to be applied by the states. As of December 29,
2004, the NAIC had certified 41 states as meeting the reciprocity
requirements under the GLBA.' 6 Nevertheless, major states, like California,
New York and Florida, still have not complied with the reciprocity
requirements. 57 The major stumbling blocks to nationwide reciprocity are
the fingerprinting and surplus lines bond requirements for nonresident
producers, which are considered important consumer protection issues in the
states that require them, particularly California and Florida."'8 Both industry
representatives and the NAIC have admitted that until states with large
insurance markets reciprocate in the licensing process, the states' reciprocity
initiative would not be completely successful.
59
In reviewing the NAIC's progress in complying with the GLBA's
requirements, the GAO commented, "If the objective of NAIC's agenda of
regulatory reform and modernization is simply to have all states agree, then
what has occurred thus far may be considered a failure."160 The GAO also
concluded that "state regulators and NAIC may not be able to achieve
uniformity through common consent" and federal oversight and intervention
might be required to achieve "positive change and continuing improvement
in state regulation of insurance., 1 61 The state insurance regulators through
the NAIC have unsuccessfully attempted several times to centralize the filing
and approval process for some types of life and health insurance products 62
and to facilitate the licensing process for companies that want to provide
insurance on a multi-state basis.'63
Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives, State Insurance
Regulation: Efforts to Streamline Key Licensing and Approval Processes Face Challenges 2 (June 18,
2002).




159 Hillman, supra note 155, at 2. In addition, the GAO noted that some state licensing
requirements that were waived in order to meet the reciprocity requirements under the GLBA have been
recharacterized as postlicensing requirements, which undermines the GLBA's intended benefits of
streamlining insurance regulations. Id. at 7.
160 Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
161 Id. at 17.
162 Id. at 2; NAIC, INTERSTATE INSURANCE PRODUCT REGULATION COMPACT, Art. 111 (2003),
available at http://www.naic.org/GLBA/narab.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2004).
163 NAIC attempted to implement the National Treatment and Coordination initiative, which
sought to facilitate the licensing process for companies that want to provide insurance on a multi-state
basis. Hillman, supra note 155, at 3. NAIC abandoned its initial efforts to provide a more centralized
insurer licensing and oversight process. NAIC's draft 2004 Work Plan of the National Treatment and
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These efforts by federal and state regulators to reduce duplicative
regulations have only had a marginal impact. The unsuccessful efforts at
achieving uniformity and information sharing both at the federal and state
levels suggest that the existing regulatory agencies probably will never
cooperate to the degree necessary to create a uniform national market with
the same laws, rules and standards for competing financial products and
firms.
4. THE CURRENT REGIME CONTAINS REGULATORY GAPS.
Even though Congress, in the GLBA, assigned the primary responsibility
for regulating some hybrid products to certain agencies, regulatory gaps still
exist. The narrowly defined sectoral responsibilities of the existing agencies
results in situations similar to those that occur in baseball when two
outfielders are each pursuing a fly ball. Each assumes that the other will
make the play, and so neither attempts to catch the ball. 164 The results in the
financial services industry can be equally disastrous for consumers and the
economy when the existing agencies drop the ball concerning the regulation
of innovative products and firms.
The rescue of Long-Term Capital Management ("LTCM") illustrates
one of these gaps in the existing regulatory structure. LTCM was founded
in 1994 byJohn Meriwether, a former Salomon Brothers trader, and a small
group of associates including Nobel Prize winning economists Robert
Merton and Myron Scholes. 65 LTCM initially specialized in high-volume
arbitrage trades in bond and bond-derivatives markets, but eventually began
Coordination (EX) Working Group under this initiative calls for standardizing the filing and baseline
review procedures for insurance company licensing. NATIONAL TREATMENT & COORDINATION (EX)
WORKING GROUP, NAIC, DRAFT 2004 WORK PLAN (2004). The draft NAIC 2004 Work Plan of the
National Treatment and Coordination (EX) Working Group notes that all 50 states and the District of
Columbia have adopted NAIC's Uniform Certificate ofAuthority Application, but that a number of state
specific application filing requirements still exist. NATIONAL TREATMENT & COORDINATION (EX)
WORKING GROUP, NAIC, DRAFT 2004 WORK PLAN (2004).
164 For example, Section 43 of the FDI Act designates that the FTC should enforce the
prohibitions against a depository institution claiming to have federal deposit insurance when it does not.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO HIGHLIGHTS: FTC BEST AMONG CANDIDATES TO ENFORCE
CONSUMER PROTECTION PROVISIONS (2003), at http://gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-971. Neither
the FTC, the FDIC, nor the NCUA, however, want to be responsible for enforcing this section. Id. The
FTC had gotten Congress enact as part of its appropriations bill, a passage that prohibits the FTC from
enforcing Section 43. Id. Neither the FDIC nor NCUA want to be responsible for enforcing the
provision against entities that they do not insure. FTC Best Among Candidates to Enforce Consumer Protection
Provisions, GAO Highlights (2003).
165 KEVIN DOWD, CATO INSTITUTE BRIEFING PAPERS No. 52, TOO BIG TO FAIL? LONG TERM
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE 3 (CATO INSTITUTE) (1999) [hereinafter DOWD,
Too BIG TO FAIL].
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to engage in other markets and in speculation. 166 By the end of 1997, LTCM
had developed an impressive track record with an average annual rate of
return of approximately 40 percent. 167 LTCM's assets had grown to $120
billion and its capital had grown to about $7.3 billion by 1997, making it one
of the largest hedge funds in the United States.16
In order to achieve the rate of return for which it was aiming, LTCM
decided that it needed to return $2.7 billion of capital to the shareholders. 69
LTCM took a gamble that by increasing the risk of the fund, it would
enhance the returns for its shareholders. 70 Unfortunately, the markets
deteriorated in the summer of 1998, leading to catastrophic losses for LTCM
in July of 1998.171 In August of 1998, the Russian government devalued the
ruble and declared a moratorium on future debt repayments. 72
Unfortunately for LTCM, this resulted in the spreads between the prices of
Western government and emerging market bonds widening.'73 LTCM had
taken speculative positions based on their assumptions that such spreads
would narrow. 74 By September 19, 1998, the fund's capital had fallen to
$600 million and its assets were down to $80 billion. 175 LTCM was not
expected to survive without outside assistance. 7
6
On September 20th, 1998, the NewYork Federal Reserve and the U.S.
Treasury met with LTCM partners to ascertain whether the U.S.
government needed to intervene.177 The LTCM partners were able to
convince the government delegation that the situation was much worse than
market participants thought.17 1 Wall Street firms, particularly those with
investments in LTCM, were already concerned that the failure of LTCM
would have a significant negative impact on other financial institutions. 79
Based on that meeting, the Federal Reserve gathered a group of 14 of
LTCM's creditors to discuss a rescue package for LTCM. This group was
originally supposed to meet on September 23rd, 1998 but delayed their










175 Id. at 4.
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comprised of Berkshire Hathaway, Goldman Sachs and American
International Group.'8 0 That group had offered to buy out all of LTCM's
shareholders for $250 million and to put $3.75 billion into the fund as new
capital and to replace the fund's managers with new ones. 8'
LTCM rejected the offer made by Berkshire Hathaway, Goldman Sachs
and American International Group. Some speculate that LTCM rejected the
offer because its managers expected to get a better offer from the Federal
Reserve consortium. 8 2  The package ultimately offered by the creditor
consortium and accepted by LTCM allowed existing shareholders to retain
a 10 percent holding, valued at $400 million, while the consortium invested
an additional $3.65 billion in equity capital in LTCM in exchange for 90
percent of the firm's equity.'83 In addition, the LTCM managers were
allowed to retain their jobs. ls4 By the end of 1998, LTCM had once again
resumed making profits. 8 '
The Federal Reserve was acting without a mandate when it intervened
in the LTCM crisis. It was not responsible for regulating hedge funds,
however LTCM fell outside of the regulatory authority of any other
government agency. It was not regulated by the SEC because at the time of
its crisis, U.S. hedge funds with fewer than 100 shareholders were exempt
from regulation under the Securities Act of 1933, l86 the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,187 and the Investment Company Act of 1940.188 In addition,
such hedge funds were not regulated by any other regulatory agency. 189 In
fact, the majority of U.S. hedge funds had restricted the number of their
shareholders to fewer than 100 to avoid being regulated. 90 Overseas hedge
funds were also subject to little or no regulation and as a result, the hedge-
18D Id.
181 Id.
182 DowD, Too BIG To FAIL, supra note 165, at 5. LTCM has never provided their rationale for
rejecting the offer. Prof. Dowd believes that LTCM rejected the offer because LTCM felt it had leverage
to bargain with the Federal Reserve, which was desperate to prevent LTCM's failure and would want to




186 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 1, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C.S. S 78a et.
seq.).
187 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, S 1, 48 Stat. 881 (currentversion at 15 U.S.C.S. § 78a
et seq.).
188 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, S 220, 54 Stat. 857 (current version at 15 U.S.C.S.
S 806-1 et seq.).
189 DowD, Too BIG To FAIL, supra note 165, at 2-3.
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fund industry was essentially unregulated.'91 Nevertheless, like LTCM,
these firms can have profoundly negative impacts on the financial markets if
they become insolvent. 92 While many other regulatory gaps exist, no forum
or mechanism has been established to assess them or to address the problems
that they pose.
B. Need to Regulate Financial Conglomerates More Effectively.
1. CURRENT SYSTEM HAS FAILED TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE
RANGE OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CREATED BY FINANCIAL
CONGLOMERATES.
Financial conglomerates raise conflict of interest concerns that have
become more problematic following the enactment of the GLBA because the
financial regulatory structure was not modified to adequately address them.
In fact, by removing many of the restrictions regarding affiliations between
financial institutions, the GLBA has allowed a wide range of conflicts of
interest to develop and fester. For example, financial conglomerates are
increasingly accused of conditioning commercial lending on commitments
by the borrowers to also use the bank's investment banking services. 193 This
practice is problematic for several reasons.
First, conditional lending distorts the market for financial services by
forcing companies to purchase services at inflated prices in order to obtain
services that they need. Congress prohibited bank loans conditioned on the
receipt of other business by the same bank more than 30 years ago in order
to prevent this type of distortion. Nevertheless, financial conglomerates can
circumvent this law by making the conditioned loans through a holding
company or a securities firm. Businesses have commented that banks are not
subtle about making the linkage between loans and other business. David
Hauser, Vice President and Treasurer of Duke Energy Corp., commented to
the Wall Street Journal that "there is clearly an expectation on their part of
other business" when banks provide loans.' 94
191 Id.
192 Over five years after LTCM, concerns about the impact of hedge funds finally prompted the
SEC to adopt a rule that would require certain advisers to hedge funds to register with the SEC. SEC,
Final Rule: Registration Under Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, SEC Release No. IA-2333.
193 Jathon Sapsford and Paul Beckett, Loss Leader: Linking of Loans to Other Business Has Perils for
Banks, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2002, at Al; Christopher O'Leary, A Closer Look at Derivatives, INVESTMENT
DEALERS' DIGEST, Jan. 6, 2003, available at http://www.iddmagazine.com/idd/NYTSStories/
1031551057358.htm (last visitedJanuary 26,2006); Michelle Celarier, The God That Failed-We Went Too
Far With This-Felix Rohatyn, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIGEST, Jan. 6,2003.
194 Sapsford and Beckett, supra note 193, at Al & All.
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The Association for Financial Professionals published the results of a
credit access survey in March 2003,' which examined how often corporate
credit was linked to the awarding of other financial services. The survey
found that 56 percent of the respondents from large companies (companies
with annual revenues of $1 billion or more) reported that their commercial
bank credit providers had either denied credit or adversely changed the credit
terms after the company had not awarded them other financial business)96
This problem was most acute when the company failed to award the
commercial bank investment banking business.'97 Only 17 percent of the
respondents from large companies reported that their company did not suffer
any negative impact on its credit relationship with its commercial bank when
it did not award the bank other financial business. 9 ' This survey also found
that 33 percent of the respondents from all of the companies surveyed, and
53 percent of respondents from the large companies surveyed, reported that
a commercial bank implied that they were denied credit or had the credit
terms changed because those companies did not award the commercial bank
other business.' 99 Indeed, 29 percent of the large companies and 17 percent
of all of the companies surveyed reported that the commercial bank explicitly
told them that they had denied credit or had changed the credit terms
because the companies had failed to award them other business.200
The pressure from banks is growing. Fifty-six percent of large company
respondents and about 20 percent of all company respondents stated that the
pressure to award additional business had grown over the prior year.2°'
About 90 percent of the respondents from large companies reported that they
had been pressured by their banks to award the banks other financial business
in the prior year.20 2
The result of banks' attempts to link credit access to other financial
services is that about 85 percent of the large companies surveyed and 76
percent of all companies surveyed admitted that they now give priority to
credit providers when awarding other financial business in order to protect
their access to credit.23 No respondent to the survey indicated that they had
195 Association for Financial Professionals, Credit Access Survey: Linking Corporate Credit to the
Awarding of Other Financial Services (March 2003).
196 Id. at 5.
19 Id.
198 Id. at 2.
199 Id. at 7.
200 Id. at6.
201 Association for Financial Professionals, Credit Access Survey: Linking Corporate Credit to the
Awarding of Other Financial Services 9 (March 2003).
W Id.
M3 Id. at 11.
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reported any of these activities to a regulator, which was partly due to the fact
that some respondents thought such tying arrangements were legal while
others worried about the negative repercussions of such a report.20 4 Another
reason tying has not been reported to regulators is because it is hard to
prove. 25 Ray Soifer, a former bank analyst at Brown Brothers Harriman and
a former executive at Bankers Trust, which was acquired by Deutsche Bank,
told the Investment Dealers' Digest that "[t]here's always documentation in
the file that these laws were not violated."20 6 For example, he said that at
Bankers Trust, the loan documents always had a clause stating that "the
borrower acknowledges that no other service was involved."
20 7
Another problem with tying is that it encourages banks to make barely
profitable or unprofitable loans in order to obtain future, profitable
investment banking business. Tying thus raises prudential issues in addition
to conduct of business issues; if the corporation is unable to go forward with
the anticipated investment banking transactions then the banks may be
saddled with bad debts that they will have to write-down or write-off.
Bankers have acknowledged that traditional bank lending is not very
profitable and that other business with the company effectively subsidizes the
bank loans.2 8 The commissions on loans can equal as little as 0.1 percent of
the loan's value while the fees for managing a stock deal may equal as much
as 7 percent of the offering's value. 9
Prominent firms like Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and
Citigroup have compromised their lending standards in order to enter into
such arrangements.210 In August 2002, Moody's Investors Service placed the
long term debt ofJ.P. Morgan Chase & Co. on a credit watch for a possible
downgrade, partly due to the fact that it considered J.P. Morgan's strategy of
using commercial banking relationships to boost its investment banking
business to be a "mixed success." 211 J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. incurred $1.4
billion in costs due to loans that it made to companies in the telecommunica-
tions and cable sectors in anticipation of return investment banking
business.212
204 Id. at3.
M Celarier, supra note 193.
2 Id.
W Id.
2 Sapsford and Beckett, supra note 193, at Al; Jake Keaveny, IPO View-Wall Street Banks Lend
More to Win Business, REUTERS (Feb. 3, 2003); Celarier, supra note 193.
2 Keaveny, supra note 208.
210 Sapsford and Beckett, supra note 193, at Al1; O'Leary, supra note 193.
211 Sapsford and Beckett, supra note 193, at All.
212 Id.
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Citigroup and several other banks lent $4.3 billion to WorldCom based
in part on the expectation that they would have a role in WorldCom's
planned $11.8 billion bond issuance in 2001.213 The bond issuance never
occurred and Citigroup was left with more than $300 million in exposure to
WorldCom, which filed for bankruptcy following revelations of massive
fraud by the company.214 In 2002, Bank of America joined J.P. Morgan in
arranging a $1.6 billion loan for a U.S. affiliate of Vivendi Universal SA
allegedly based in part on a promise by Vivendi that it would give each of the
banks a role in a future bond sale.215 Shortly after making the loan, Vivendi's
stock and bond prices began to decline and the ratings for Vivendi's debt
were downgraded, preventing the bond sale from going forward. 16 Vivendi's
financial troubles also raised questions about whether it would be able to
repay the $1.6 billion loan.217
Sometimes it is the companies, not the banks, who require that loans be
linked to the purchase of other services. When companies require such
linkage, it is referred to as "pay to play."218 The chief executives of Merrill
Lynch and J.P. Morgan Chase have stated that banks that want to win debt
and equity deals also need to also be able to supply loans.219 Vodafone Plc
and Ford Motor Co. are two examples of companies who required banks that
wanted to be included in advisory and underwriting business to provide
them with lines of credit.220 Clients were able to wield this power in the
hypercompetitive environment that the deregulation of the financial services
sector spawned. 22' Ralph Della Ratta, head of investment banking at the
Cleveland-based McDonald Investments, explained that "[t]he power really
ceded to the corporations, and the CEOs and the CFOs had incredible
power over Wall Street.... The power was in the hands of the Kenneth Lays
of this world. It was absolute power, and we know how it corrupts."222
The problem of tying also illustrates the dangers of having narrowly
focused financial regulators. In the case of tying, the bank regulators are
viewed as being more sympathetic to the banks' contention that they are not
engaged in illegal tying than the securities regulators. Federal Reserve
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Jr. both stated in a letter to Representative John D. Dingell, Democrat of
Michigan, in August 2002 that they were not aware that commercial banks
were engaged in tying loans to other financial services, but they promised to
review the matter.2 3  When the GAO investigated tying in 2003, it
commented that the Federal Reserve and the OCC in their investigations
had failed to analyze a broad range of transactions or generally to solicit
information from corporate borrowers. 224 The GAO noted that the loan
documentation that banks maintained did not generally provide the type of
evidence needed to prove a case of illegal tying and that it was necessary for
the Federal Reserve and the OCC to enhance the information that they
received from corporate borrowers."
SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson also promised to investigate the
matter during his confirmation hearings; the NASD was conducting an
investigation into tying as well.226 In February 2003, several commercial
banks, including Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, the Bank of America, and
Deutsche Bank, reportedly attempted to prevent NASD's investigation into
the tying allegations on the grounds that lending operations were outside of
the NASD's jurisdiction. 227 The NASD, as a securities regulator, was seen
as being less likely to find that the commercial banks were complying with
the anti-tying laws than traditional bank regulators like the Federal Reserve
and the OCC.22
2. CURRENT SYSTEM HAS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE
"Too-BIG-To-FAIL" PROBLEM POSED BY FINANCIAL
CONGLOMERATES.
The trend in the financial services industry is towards ever expanding
financial conglomerates that combine not only traditional commercial
banking, but investment banking and insurance as well. This trend has been
aided by the passage of the GLBA and the adoption of the Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994,229 which eliminated
the barriers to interstate banking. Such mergers allow bank holding
M Riva D. Atlas, Corporations in Survey Say Banks Tie Loans to Other Business, N.Y. TIMES, March
19, 2003, at C4.
224 GOV'T. ACCT. OFF., GAO-04-4, 5, BANK TYING: ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED TO ENSURE
EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF TYING PROHIBITIONS (2003).
225 Id.
226 Id.; Adrian Michaels & Gary Silverman, Leading US Banks Unite to Fight 'Tying' Probe, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2003, at 30.
M7 Id.
22M8 Id.
M Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified at 12 U.S.C.S. § 1831a) (1999).
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companies to be more diversified both geographically and across economic
sectors, leaving them less vulnerable to regional or sectoral slumps. 3
The immense size of these new financial conglomerates means that if a
single one of these firms failed, it could bankrupt the taxpayer-backed deposit
insurance fund."3 As ArthurJ. Rolnick, the research director at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in 1998, noted, "[w]ith the safety net starting
to extend beyond banking, the potential taxpayer exposure has grown." 
2
The capital structure of such mega-banks could be undermined by
excessive speculation by the traders in its investment-banking subsidiary or
by mismanagement of underwriting by its insurance subsidiary. 3 Federal
regulators may feel compelled to bail out such financial conglomerates out
of concern that allowing such a bank to fail would have a cascade effect on
the financial system, causing other financial institutions to also collapse. 234
The sheer size of such institutions may breed a sense within the
organizations that they are "too big to fail." 235
One of the motivations posited for these mergers is that banks are
actively seeking to become too big to fail. Such a strategy would allow all
uninsured liabilities to effectively gain insurance coverage because the
regulatory authorities, particularly the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, would consider it too costly to close the bank.36 When looking
solely at the information embedded in share prices, the evidence that this is
in fact a motivation for bank mergers is mixed.2 7 However, when looking
2M Dean Foust, Commentary: If This Safety Net Snaps, Who Pays?, BUS. WK., Apr. 27, 1998, at 38.
231 Id. "We have created financial institutions that are too big to fail,' says Henry Kaufman, the
former Salomon Brothers economist known as 'Dr. Doom' for saying things the Street doesn't like to
hear. 'They are not submitted to the full disclosure of the marketplace,' he adds." Michelle Celarier, The
God That Failed We Went too far With This'-Felix Rohatyn, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Sep. 9, 2002, at
1.
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237 Edward Kane, Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives Might Regulators Infer From Event-
Study Evidence?, 32 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 671 (2000) (arguing that evidence showing a
positive correlation between equity returns ofacquirer and the size of its target supports the view that one
motive for bank mergers is to become too big to fail); G. Benston, W. Hunter, & L. Wall, Motivations for
Bank Mergers and Acquisitions: Enhancing the Deposit Insurance Put Option versus Earnings Diversification, 28J.
OF MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 777 (1995) (finding that acquirers would not pay more for riskier banks
whose returns are correlated with the acquirer's returns in order to become too big to fail as opposed to
banks that offered earnings diversification); and Gayle L. DeLong, Stockholder Gains From Focusing versus
Diversifying Bank Mergers, 59 J. FIN. ECON. 221 (2001) (reporting no significant relationship between
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at bond prices, evidence has been found that the desire to become too big to
fail is a motivating factor. Research on the relationship between bank
mergers and bond prices has shown that medium size banks experienced
significant bond returns and realized reductions in costs of funds following
announcements that they intended to merge with another bank, particularly
when the merger would result in the combined bank's assets exceeding $100
billion.238 On the other hand, this research has also shown that mega-banks
(those that can be considered already too big to fail at the time of the merger)
and smaller banks (combined mean asset size of $30 billion) earned less
return than bondholders of medium-size banks. 39
Evidence of the "too big to fail" mindset in sectors other than banking
also exists.240 In late 2001, MJK Clearing ("MJKC"), a medium-size broker-
dealer firm headquartered in Minneapolis, was suffering severe financial
difficulty.241 MJKC's lawyer argued that the firm was too big to fail, that its
failure would disrupt economic activity in the Midwest, and that the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis ought to provide it assistance.242 Specifically,
it was alleged that MJKC's failure would substantially affect about 200,000
retail customers, several brokerage firms involved in the stock-lending deal
that was the original cause of MJKC's financial woes, and a variety of small
brokerage houses throughout the Midwest for which MJKC provided back-
office services.243 Ultimately, no assistance was provided and MJKC became
the largest liquidation of a securities broker by the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation.2" Fortunately, the initial claims of financial and
economic disruption proved to be exaggerated.245
Actions such as the rescue of LTCM exacerbate the "too big to fail"
mentality within the financial community.246 The LTCM rescue created the
perception that the Federal Reserve had assumed responsibility for bailing
out large hedge funds when they get themselves into financial difficulties,
even though the Federal Reserve lacks any statutory authority to do so. In
fact, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has expressly rejected the
idea that the Federal Reserve ought to have the power to regulate hedge fund
238 Maria Fabiana Penas and Haluk Unal, Too-Big-To-Fail Gains in Bank Mergers: Evidencefrom the
Bond Markets, 74J. FIN. ECON. 149, 150-51 (2001).
239 Id.
240 Gary H. Stern and Ron Feldman, Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts, FED. RES. BANK
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activity.2 47 The Federal Reserve has arguably put itself in the position of
being responsible for hedge funds while having no power to regulate them.24
This position allows hedge funds to take large risks that the Federal Reserve
cannot prevent, but for which the Federal Reserve will cover the downside
risk if the hedge funds find themselves in financial difficulties.249 The
Federal Reserve's actions in the LTCM case have raised concerns about
whether the Federal Reserve will become responsible for other financial
firms. What happens when the Federal Reserve deems a company "too big
to fail," and yet the Federal Reserve has no legal authority to regulate that
same company?
250
C. Need to Respond to the Globalization of Financial Market.
Financial service firms, consumers and investors are affected by the
globalization of this industry. Large numbers of foreign-owned financial
service firms operate in the United States and many American investors seek
to purchase foreign securities. The GAO reports that in 2001, 142 U.S. life
insurers were foreign-owned companies, slightly more than double the 69
such firms in 1995.251 In addition, U.S. investors purchased $2.5 trillion in
foreign securities in 2003.252
U.S. firms operating abroad must comply with an additional layer of
regulation. U.S. regulators are also more frequently participating in
international efforts to harmonize financial regulations across countries to
enhance the movement of financial goods and services. These efforts are not
unlike the early international efforts to harmonize trade regulations that
ultimately culminated in the creation of the World Trade Organization.
Regional and international standards for the regulation and supervision
of financial services are moving in the direction of greater consistency across
the financial services industry. Many U.S. regulators participate in the
international forums to harmonize financial regulation, including the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision ("Basel Committee"), the International
Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"), the International
Association of Insurance Supervisors ("IAIS"), the Joint Forum, and the
Financial Stability Forum ("FSF"). 253 The rules developed by these
247 Id. at 9.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 10.
251 GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 8, at 45.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 39-40. The OCC, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC participate as members of the
Basel Committee and the OTS has participated as a temporary member. The SEC participates as a
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organizations will ultimately influence U.S. regulations in the area of
banking, securities and insurance.
The Basel II Accords recognize that banks are increasingly part ofbroader
diversified financial companies, noting:
To the greatest extent possible, all banking and other relevant
financial activities (both regulated and unregulated) conducted
within a group containing an internationally active bank will be
captured through consolidation. Thus, majority-owned or-
controlled banking entities, securities entities (when subject to
broadly similar regulation or where securities are deemed banking
activities) and other financial entities should generally be fully
consolidated.2"
Basel II requires financial entities that engage in financial leasing, the
issuance of credit cards, portfolio management, investment advisory services,
custodial and safekeeping services and other similar activities to be captured
through consolidation.255
While noting that banks bear the risk for their insurance subsidiaries,
Basel II excludes insurance from its definition of financial activities and
insurance companies from its definition of financial entities to be captured
through consolidation.2 6 Instead, Basel II recommends that, when
measuring regulatory capital, banks with majority-owned insurance
subsidiaries should deduct their investments in insurance subsidiaries and
significant minority investments in insurance entities from their equity and
other regulatory capital.257 In other words, banks would remove from their
balance sheets the assets and liabilities as well as any third party capital
investments in insurance subsidiaries.
If a bank decides not to follow the recommendation of Basel II and make
the recommended deductions, then Basel II recommends that the bank
ensure that any alternative approaches it uses will avoid double counting of
capital.2"' Basel II recognizes that the capital invested by a bank's majority-
member and the CFTC participates as an associate member in the IOSCO. NAIC participates in the
IAIS. The Joint Forum was created by the Basel Committee, IOSCO and IAIS to analyze issues, like
financial conglomerates, that are not limited to any one financial sector. The Federal Reserve, the SEC
and the Treasury participate in the FSF, which promotes financial stability and the reduction of systemic
risks.
254 BASEL II CAPrrAL ACCORD, supra note 1, at 7.
255 Id. at 7, n.6.
2 Id. at 7, n.5.
257 Id. at 8.
2M Id. at. 8-9.
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owned or controlled insurance entity may exceed the amount of regulatory
capital required for the insurance entity by the relevant insurance regulator.259
As such, it defines the amount of capital invested by a majority-owned or
controlled insurance entity in excess of the legally required regulatory capital
as surplus capital.260 Further, Basel II allows for financial supervisors to
include such surplus capital from a bank's majority-owned or controlled
insurance entity when calculating a bank's capital adequacy under limited
circumstances. 261 Finally, even when a bank's majority-owned or controlled
insurance subsidiaries are not included in the bank's consolidated financial
statements, Basel II still requires the bank's supervisors to take steps to
ensure the capital adequacy of the bank's majority-owned or controlled
insurance subsidiaries in order to reduce the chance that these subsidiaries
may cause future losses to the parent bank.262
Even regional efforts to harmonize financial regulations in which the
United States is not a direct participant are influencing U.S. financial
regulations. The European Union has adopted the Financial Conglomerates
Directive ("EU FCD"),2 3 which requires supervisors and financial groups
to measure, on a consolidated basis, the prudential soundness of groups with
significant business in the banking, securities and insurance sectors and that
are operating within the European Union.z2 ' The purpose behind the EU
FCD is to better assess whether the financial group is a prudential source of
weakness as opposed to looking at the individual firms within the group.265
In addition, the amendments to the banking, investment and insurance group
directives of the EU FCD are the first steps at the EU level towards treating
financial service providers consistently across sectors.266
The EU FCD also requires non-EU financial conglomerates operating
within the European Union to have their home country supervisors provide
a form of consolidated supervision that is equivalent to that provided by the
EU FCD or be supervised on a consolidated basis by a financial supervisor
within one of the EU member nations.267 While the US system of
supervision requires this in the case of bank holding companies, financial
259 Id. at 9.
2W0 BASEL II CAPITAL ACCORD, supra note 1, at 9.
261 Id.
262 Id.
26 DIRECTIVE 2002/87/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION OF 16 DEC. 2002, published in OFFICIALJOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION L035,
1 (11 Feb. 2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003A_035/A_03520030211en
00010027.pdf, [hereinafter the FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES DIRECTIVE].
26 Id. at 2002/87/EC, ch. 2, S 1, Art. 5-9.
265 Id. at 2002/87/EC, para. 1-2.
266 Id. at 2002/87/EC, para. 3-5
267 Id. at 2002/87/EC, ch. 2, § 4, Art. 18.
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holding companies, and thrift holding companies, it does not currently
require it for financial conglomerates comprised of financial service providers
other than banks.268 Many U.S. financial conglomerates that did not qualify
as financial holding companies, bank holding companies or thrift holding
companies and that operated within the European Union did not want to be
subject to the supervision on a consolidated basis by the UK FSA, Germany's
BaFin, or a similar regulator in another EU member country. As a result,
these firms actively lobbied the SEC to create a new regulatory regime that
would allow them to be subject to supervision on a consolidated basis by the
SEC. In 2004, the SEC adopted rules that would give financial
conglomerates not currently subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve as
financial holding companies or bank holding companies or by the OTS as
thrift holding companies the option of being classified as supervised
investment bank holding companies ("SIBHC"), which would be supervised
on a consolidated basis by the SEC.269
Unfortunately, the fractured nature of the U.S. financial regulatory
regime has negatively affected efforts by U.S. regulators to participate
effectively in international forums. First, the U.S. regulation of insurance at
the state level has presented multiple problems in the international context.
While the NAIC represents the state insurance regulators at the IAIS, it has
no power to bind the state insurance regulators to any proposals developed
by IAIS.270 In addition, the NAIC is a cumbersome vehicle for handling
international problems in the insurance area, such as the insolvency of
Equitable Life. As a result, officials from the EU, UK FSA, and BaFin all
informed the GAO that they would prefer to deal with a single insurance
regulator at the federal level in the United States rather than continuing to
deal with the NAIC.271
Second, having multiple U.S. regulators with divergent agendas
participating in international negotiations, such as the Basel II Accord,
undermines the effectiveness of these negotiators and creates confusion for
their counterparts from other countries.272 During the Basel II negotiations,
the U.S. regulators lacked a unified position. This lack of a unified position
was so troubling to some members of Congress that hearings were held to
discuss why the U.S. regulators were unable to better coordinate their
efforts.273
2 GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 8, at 5.
269 Id. at 7-8.
270 Id. at 123.
271 Id. at 122-23.
M7 Id. at 122.
273 GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 8, at 8.
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D. Need to Reduce the Likelihood ofAgency Capture.
1. CURRENT SPECIALIZED AGENCIES ARE PRONE TO CAPTURE.
One of the problems discussed in administrative law is the problem of
agency capture under the interest group theory on governmental decision-
making. Interest group theory generally assumes the following:
* Interest groups seek regulatory decisions that favor the interests of
their members;
• Small, narrowly focused interest groups, whose members will
receive significant benefits from a particular regulatory decision, are
better able to overcome collective action problems to mobilize and
advance their interests, which creates a bias for regulation that aids
narrow interests;
" Politicians from either the executive or legislative branches try to
exchange regulatory benefits for political support from interest
groups that are well positioned to provide it; and
* Political control over administrative agencies is sufficient to allow
politicians to deliver the type of regulation that the interest groups
supporting them seek.274
Agency capture occurs more frequently in agencies that regulate only one
special interest group.275  In the financial services industry, specialized
agencies, such as the thrift regulators, the bank regulators, the SEC, or the
CFTC, are more likely to be captured by the businesses that they regulate
than regulators with a broader scope.276
In the thrift savings scandal in the 1980s, research shows that the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board was effectively captured by the savings and loan
industry.277 In addition, the states that regulated thrifts through a depart-
ment that focused on the entire spectrum of financial services or several
financial services sectors had fewer problems than states like California and
24 Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 15-16 (2000).
Z75 Id. at 103.
276 How much each of these regulators has been captured by their constituents has been debated.
Ratner, supra note 146, at 1776 ('Unlike the regulators of banks, thrift institutions, and insurance
companies, which have acted principally as protectors and advocates for their constituents, the SEC has
frequently been at loggerheads with some of the most powerful organizations in the securities industry,
particularly the New York Stock Exchange.") Id.
z7 Joseph A. Grundfest, Lobbying into Limbo: The Political Ecology of the Savings and Loan Crisis, 2
STAN. L. & POL'Y REVIEW 25 (1990).
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Texas that had set up special agencies to regulate only thrifts."' Ralph Nader
recently compared the behavior of existing bank regulators to those of the
savings and loan supervisors in the 1980s, noting that the agencies in both
cases had been captured by the businesses that they regulated.279
Wayne Klein, an Idaho regulator who has worked with both the SEC and
the CFTC, commented, "The CFTC is just not as aggressive as the SEC.
It's too cozy with the industry it regulates, and its record on investor
protection is abysmal."280 In the recent accounting scandals involving Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, OFHEO has been strongly criticized for being
captured by the entities that it is supposed to be regulating.
281
2. AGENCIES THAT CURRENTLY Do NOT CONTROL THEIR BUDGETS
ARE MORE PRONE TO CAPTURE.
In addition, agency capture occurs more frequently when efforts to
advance general interest regulation to the detriment of special interests would
threaten an agency's budget or other institutional interests.28 2 For example,
in response to lobbying by securities firms and corporations, Congress used
its control over the SEC's budget in the 1990s to hinder the agency's efforts
to enforce the existing securities regulations and to discourage the agency
from proposing new, more stringent regulations to protect investors.2 83 In
response to the public outcry over the Enron and WorldCom scandals,
Congress reversed itself and increased the SEC's budget almost 33 percent
278 Ramirez, supra note 104, at 554 n.299.
279 Ralph Nader, The Secret World of Banking, In the Public Interest, THE NADER PAGE (July
9,2002), at http://www.nader.org/interest/070902.html.
2W Jeffrey Taylor and Jeff Bailey, CFTC Scrutiny Failed to Halt TraderAccused of Scam, WALL ST.J.
Oct. 4, 1994, at C1.
281 Stephen Labaton, New Agency Proposed to Oversee Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, N.Y. TIMES Sept.
11, 2003, at Cl.
S Croley, supra note 274, at 15-16; Ramirez, supra note 104, at 518.
S Stephan Taub, SEC Boosting Big-Company Caseload, (March 9, 2004), available at
httpV/www.cfo.comi/article.cfrm/3012481?f=advancesearch. The SEC does not control the amount set
for its budget, but must work within the budget established by Congress. SEC, ANNUAL REPORT 2003,
APPENDIX, at 142; UK FSA, Who we are, at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Who/index.shtml (last
visited October 20, 2005); UK FSA, How we are funded, at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Who/Funded/index.shtml (last visited October 20, 2005). The
amount that the SEC earns in fees in excess of its budget merely becomes part of the general revenues of
the federal government. Press Release from the Senate Banking Committee, Schumer, Gramm Introduce
Bipartisan Bill to Reduce Section 31 Fees (Jan. 25, 2001), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/docs/cmsa/schumer.htm (last visited October 20, 2005). During the 1990s,
Congress did not allow the SEC's budget to increase in line with the growth in the U.S. securities markets
and the corresponding growth in the agency's workload.
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to $716 million in 2003, from the $540 million that it received in 2002.2 4
The SEC has requested a budget of $913 million for fiscal year 2005, which
is 69 percent more than its 2002 budget. 25 Nevertheless, during the 1990s,
the SEC's lack of control over its budget allowed it to be effectively captured
by the securities industry that it was supposed to regulate. 6
Few federal or state regulators, other than the Federal Reserve, have
control over their budgets. Research indicates that the Federal Reserve is less
likely to be captured by the banks, bank holding companies, and financial
holding companies that it regulates than other U.S. agencies because the
Federal Reserve has control over its budget rather than having it set by
Congress or a state legislature.287
E. Need to Improve Consumer Protections.
1. REGULATORYCOMPETITIONPROMOTESARACE-TO-THE-BOTTOM.
To the extent that the current structure encourages regulatory competi-
tion, it generally may be characterized as the detrimental race-to-the-bottom
variety, which is harmful to consumers. For example, while striving to
achieve reciprocity in the area of insurance regulation, consumer protections
were discarded by some states in order to meet the lower standards that other
states had enacted. The GAO raised concerns about the fact that some state
insurance regulators lack the authority to run criminal background checks on
industry applicants, unlike the regulators in the banking, securities, and
futures industries.28 ' The GAO has recommended that states grant their
regulators this authority. 289 It also noted that the few holdout states that have
refused to remove these protections in order to achieve reciprocity are
helping their citizens. The GAO stated,
[i]f the objective is more uniformity and reciprocity with an overall
improvement in regulatory performance, then the holdout states
may be the only defense against the weakening of both regulatory
2 Taub, supra note 283.
M Id.
286 One measure of the extent to which the SEC was captured is the number of enforcement cases
that it brought during the late 1990s. In 1998, the SEC only pursued 79 financial fraud cases, of which
only 5 percent of the total were against Fortune 500 companies. Id. In contrast, the SEC brought over
twice as many financial fraud cases (199 cases) in 2003, of which 17 percent of the total were against
Fortune 500 companies. Id.
2 Ramirez, supra note 104, at 531.
s Hillman, supra note 155, at 6.
2m Id.
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oversight and consumer protections .... [I]f some states did not
object to giving up fingerprinting, for example, as a means of
conducting in-depth criminal and regulatory history background
checks of agents or company owners and management, consumers
would likely be more at risk and regulation would be less effective.
In that case, neither uniformity nor reciprocity would represent
regulatory progress.290
Obviously, not all states have acted as strong consumer advocates. Only
15 states and cities have adopted laws prohibiting predatory lending.291
Pennsylvania overturned a Philadelphia law against predatory lending and
Maryland blocked efforts in Baltimore to adopt a law prohibiting predatory
lending.292 The fact that most states do not offer consumers protection
against predatory lending supports the position that it would be more
efficient and effective if a national standard was adopted.
Many of the major consumer protection laws on the books today are
federal laws. These laws provide some evidence that consumer protections
may increase if regulatory power is moved to the federal level. For example,
representatives of the insurance industry have raised concerns that the
creation ofan optional federal insurance charter would lead to "anti-redlining
provisions, unprecedented disclosure and Community Reinvestment Act-
like requirements, oversight by the Federal Trade Commission and other
federal agencies, expanded privacy provisions, and more."2 3 Most of these
items would be considered important federal consumer protection measures.
The dual banking system is often characterized as enabling banks to play
regulators against one another and to seek more compatible regulators when
they get into trouble.294 Two recent empirical studies offer some insight as
to when banks will convert from a national to a state charter. Richard J.
Rosen conducted a study that looked at why banks switched primary federal
regulators.295 His study examined regulatory switches that occurred between
1983 and 1999. Rosen concluded that his control variables were important
29 Id. at 16.
291 Predatory lending generally involves lending that targets unsophisticated borrowers, like the
elderly and the poor, at high rates and fees and burdensome terms that leave borrowers unable to repay
the loans. Jonathan D. Epstein, Customers Caught in Bank Tug-of-War, DE NEWSJ. (Aug. 10, 2003), at
16C.
29 Id.
2 Letter from Wesley Bissett, Vice President, State Relations and State Government Affairs,
Independent Insurance Agents & Brokers of America, to the Honorable Mike Pickens, Commissioner of
Insurance, Arkansas Insurance Department (June 3, 2003) (on file with author).
2 Ramirez, supra note 104, at 507-08.
295 Richard J. Rosen, Is Three a Crowd? Competition Among Regulators in Banking, 35 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 967 (Dec. 2003, Part 1).
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predictors of regulatory switches and that banks were most likely to switch
federal regulators if they have completed a merger, if they are within a
holding company, if they are performing poorly, or if they are larger.296
Rosen notes "much of the explanatory power of the regressions comes from
the merger variable and the holding company structure variables," which
conform with the view that most switches are motivated by organizational
issues within banks as opposed to other factors.297 Rosen comments that
when risk is controlled for within his model, large changes in bank portfolios
result in a higher probability of the bank switching regulators. 98 From these
facts, Rosen concludes that the bank supervisors' desire for a quiet life results
in their preference for banks with a portfolio that is as. simple as possible to
evaluate and, therefore, bank supervisors will encourage banks that want to
make significant changes in their portfolios to change regulators.299
Gary Whalen has raised a number of problems regarding Rosen's
methodology.3" Whalen notes that Rosen's loan portfolio composition
measure is likely to provide a poor indicator of how difficult it is to supervise
a bank.3"' Whalen comments, "[t]hejob of supervisors is the easiest at banks
that are financially the strongest, and supervisors would prefer all banks to be
so. Financial strength is likely to be correlated weakly with changes in loan
portfolio composition in general."30 2 Whalen goes on to criticize Rosen's
analysis for weighing each of the seven loan categories used in his study
equally and states that it "is unlikely that changes in loan portfolio composi-
tion attributable to mortgage loans or consumer loans have the same
supervisory implications as changes in construction loans."3 3 While Rosen
2% Id. at 980.
297 Id. at 983.
298 Id.
299 Id. at 983-84.
3W Gary Whalen, Charter Flips by National Banks, (Econ and Policy Analysis Working Paper No.
2002-1, 2002). Whalen's comments were based on an earlier version of Rosen's paper, Is Three a Crowd?
Competition Among Regulators in Banking, PROCEEDING FROM A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND
COMPETITION FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO (May 2002). Nevertheless, the article that Rosen
published in the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking does not differ substantially from that earlier
paper and Whalen's critique of Rosen's research remains relevant. Whalen criticizes Rosen's models for
failing to include any environmental variables and for failing to explicitly take censoring or possible
duration dependence into account. Whalen also notes that Rosen's data is based on pooled annual data
that could result in a lag between his explanatory variables and his sample bank flips of between 0 and 12
months and this substantial variation could influence Rosen's reported results. Whalen also commented
that Rosen failed to use any supervisory data to measure the pressure by bank regulators on banks to
change their regulators, but instead Rosen relies on changes in the composition of a bank's loan portfolio
and the probability of a charter switch to be positively related. Id.
301 Whalen, supra note 300, at 6.
302 Id. at 7.
3 Id.
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does classify some loans as "difficult-to-evaluate" and others as easier to
evaluate, he does not assign different weights to loans in either category.3"4
Rosen also noted that a pattern existed pursuant to which banks that were
regulated by the Federal Reserve or the FDIC were more likely to switch
than banks regulated by the OCC.3 5  Rosen notes that banks that are
increasing the size of their consumer loan portfolio are more likely to shift
regulators to the OCC, while banks that are increasing the size of their
commercial loan portfolio (including commercial real estate loans) are more
likely to shift to the Federal Reserve, and banks that are increasing the size
of their real estate construction loan portfolio are more likely to shift to the
FDIC.3 °6 From this data, Rosen concluded that each of the federal regulators
was specializing in regulating banks with the above mentioned concentra-
tions in their loan portfolios and that this is evidence of regulatory competi-
tion leading to optimal standards setting.3°7 He also noted that this
corresponds with regulatory specialization since banks increasing the portion
of real estate construction loans in their portfolio are likely to switch to a state
charter, while banks increasing the portion of consumer loans in their
portfolio are likely to switch to a national charter.38 He assumed that these
movements are publicly beneficial because the banks did not fail following
309
such a switch, but rather their revenues generally rose after these moves.
Rosen, however, fails to account for several factors. First, the fact that
the banks' revenues improved following a switch might be due to the
adoption of very profitable, yet questionable practices. For example, banks
seeking to engage in substantial consumer lending would want a national
charter because it allows them to take advantage of the exportation doctrine.
The exportation doctrine, which is embodied in federal banking regulations,
allows banks to export the interest rate available in the state in which the
national bank processes loans or other transactions and apply it to loans to
individuals or entities located throughout the United States. Subprime
lenders seek the ability to charge very high rates of interest to certain classes
of consumers. By establishing a national bank and processing loans in a state
which has no laws limiting the interest rates that may be charged, a bank can
engage in subprime lending on a national scale.310 Many banks have sought
to expand their subprime consumer lending in recent years. Among available
304 Rosen, supra note 295, at 979.
305 Id. at 980.
306 Id. at 990.
307 Id. at 969, 990.
308 Id.
3W Rosen, supra note 295, at 969, 990.
310 Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on
Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 522, 544 (2004).
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lending methods, subprime lending has the greatest potential to be classified
as predatory lending, a practice that is highly undesirable.31 1
Second, banks not failing following a switch may be due to the fact that
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
("DIDMCA") mandates that all depository institutions, regardless of which
regulator supervised them, must comply with the reserve requirements set
by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.31 Reserve requirements are one
of the most important tools used by bank regulators to prevent bank failures.
The DIDMCA eliminated the competition between federal and state
regulators on the issue of reserve requirements, which had been a major
source of state-federal competition prior to 1980.313 Rosen only examined
banks that changed their primary regulators from 1983 to 1999.
3 14
In addition, converting from a national charter to a state charter or vice
versa is a time-consuming and difficult process and banks with problematic
CAMELS scores are prevented by regulators from making such a
conversion.31 5  "CAMELS" is an acronym for: Capital adequacy, Asset
quality, Management administration, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to
market risk.3 16 Each of these six factors is ranked on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1
being the best score and 5 being the worst. A composite rating is also
assigned to each bank under the CAMELS system, which is also on a 1 to 5
scale, with 1 being the strongest performance and 5 signally critically
deficient performance.31 CAMELS ratings are used by the OCC's
examiners to assess a bank's risk management systems.
Rosen had classified real estate construction loans, commercial real estate
loans, and commercial and industrial loans as proxies for "difficult-to-
evaluate" loans and classified home mortgage loans and consumer loans as
proxies for easier to evaluate loans.3 18 Thus, it appears that banks with more
problematic portfolios were moving toward state charters while banks with
less problematic portfolios were moving toward federal charters.
In the study conducted by Gary Whalen, several indicators of bank risk
significantly increased the likelihood that a national bank would exchange its
311 Id.
312 Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221,94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.); see generally Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual
Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677 (1988) (discussing how the DIDMCA eliminated state-federal
competition in the area of reserve requirements).
313 Butler & Macey, supra note 312, at 695-96.
314 Rosen, supra note 295, at 975.
313 Butler & Macey, supra note 312, at 686-89; Whalen, supra note 300, at 17.
316 COMPTROLLER'S CORPORATE MANUAL, OFFICEOF THE COMPTROLLEROF THECURRENCY,
A GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM 20-21 (1999).
317 Id.
318 Rosen, supra note 295, at 979.
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charter for a state charter.319 Charter flips were more likely to occur in more
competitive markets and in states where past flip activity was high.32 ° In
addition, banks were more likely to flip their charter after receiving a less
favorable management rating by supervisors.32' Banks also were more likely
to flip their charter when their CAMELS ratings worsened or when they
became the subject of formal enforcement actions.3" Whalen admits that his
research does not explain the motivations behind such bank charter changes,
although he speculates that it might be due either to bank management
seeking a more amenable supervisor or to bank supervisors encouraging
problem banks to change their charters.323 The results of both the Rosen
and Whalen studies lend credence to the view that regulatory competition
supports a race-to-the-bottom.
2. THE CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE DISCOURAGES
INNOVATIONS THAT WOULD BENEFIT CONSUMERS.
The current regulatory structure, particularly with regard to insurance,
discourages some forms of product and regulatory innovation. Some
products are not brought to market because the costs of overcoming initial
regulatory approvals are high, but once achieved, other firms may easily copy
the product and sell it themselves. In these instances, the first mover bears
the bulk of the costs while later movers reap the financial rewards.
An example of a product that has had its development hampered by the
324present regulatory structure is that of home equity insurance. For most
Americans, the equity that they own in their home is their largest asset.
Despite this fact, the average family has almost no access to any form of
insurance to protect against adverse fluctuations in the value of their home.
There have been a few instances where home equity insurance or home price
insurance has been offered, such as in Oak Park, Illinois in the 1970s and in
Syracuse, New York beginning in 2002.325 These programs were sponsored
by nonprofit corporations seeking to revitalize distressed neighborhoods by
alleviating some of the concerns that people had about losing money on the
resale of the homes. Under the Oak Park program, policies would pay out
based on the difference between the insured value of the home and the actual
319 Whalen, supra note 300, at 7-9.




324 Andrew Caplin et al., Home Equity Insurance: A Pilot Project (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin. Working
Paper No. 03-12, 2003).
3B Id. at 3, 5.
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sales value of the home.326 Under the Syracuse program, policies would pay
out based on changes in a house price index rather than based on the price
for which the house actually sold.327
One of the difficulties encountered by the Syracuse program was
determining whether New York would classify the home equity policy as
insurance or as a mortgage.328 The NewYork State Insurance Commission
ultimately opined that the product failed to meet New York's definition of
insurance, which required that the insurer pay upon the "happening of a
fortuitous event in which the insured has.., a material interest which will
be adversely affected by the happening of such event."329 The Insurance
Commission concluded that the sale of a home was not a "fortuitous event"
because the homeowner controlled when he sold and that the homeowner
lacked a "material interest" as he did not have a material interest in the index
upon which the pay out would be based.330 The Syracuse program ran into
regulatory difficulties when it attempted to write the home equity policy
directly into the mortgage for the home, as this violated New York banking
regulations against Price-Level Adjusted Mortgages. 33' The Syracuse
program also determined that the home equity policy did not qualify as a
security because it was protecting against a loss rather than in anticipation of
making a profit.
32
Under the current regulatory regime, an insurance company seeking the
national introduction of a new product, like the home equity policy, would
have to conduct the same legal analysis that the Syracuse program did for all
50 states and the District of Columbia. The first company to introduce this
product would bear substantial upfront costs resulting from the necessity of
educating insurance regulators about the product's attributes. However, the
second company that wanted to sell the same or a very similar product would
bear significantly lower upfront costs because it would have to spend
considerably less time and money educating the same regulators about the
product's attributes. As a result of this situation, useful products may not be
introduced into the market because the first insurance company to introduce
the product may not realize revenues sufficient enough to offset its higher
costs due to the high upfront costs of the initial regulatory approval process.
326 Id. at 5.
32 Id. at 1-2.
328 Id. at 24-26.
329 Id. at 25.
3N Caplin, supra note 324, at 25.
331 Id. at 26. A Price-Level Adjusted Mortgage is a mortgage that adjusts its principal based on an
index, like inflation. Id. at 26 n.14.
332 Id. at 27.
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In addition, existing regulators in different agencies are locked into very
different views on what types of regulation are appropriate. The SEC's
traditional answer to almost every problem was the imposition of greater
disclosure requirements.333 Bank regulators and insurance regulators are
more paternalistic with the types of regulations they impose to ensure the
safety and stability of banks and insurance companies.334 As a result, the
existing financial regulators do not tend to be very innovative when thinking
about what types of regulations to propose. This lack of regulatory
innovation on the part of both federal and state regulators may result in less
than optimal regulations which adversely affect both the financial services
industry and consumers.
3. CONSUMERS FIND THAT THE CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE
IS CONFUSING.
Consumers find the multiple financial regulators confusing.335 It is not
immediately obvious to a consumer which regulator they ought to contact
when they have a complaint about a financial service provider. For example,
a consumer can both trade securities through and buy insurance from his
bank. If he has a problem with an annuity that was sold to him through the
bank, it is doubtful that he would immediately know which regulator to
call-the OCC or the local state banking regulator, the SEC or the local state
insurance commission? The current structure makes it difficult for
consumers and investors to seek redress for fraudulent financial activities or
to lobby for reforms that would better protect their interests.
F. Need to Provide More Cost Efficient Regulation.
1. THE U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY REGIME Is MORE EXPENSIVE
THAN THAT OF ANY OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRY.
The U.S. pays considerably more than any other developed country to
regulate its financial services industry. However, it is questionable whether
the United States is getting a proportionally better regulatory regime for its
money. The UK FSA included in its 2002/03 Annual Report data collected
from regulatory authorities in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong
Kong, Ireland, Singapore, Sweden and the United States concerning how
333 MCCOY, supra note 23, § 12.02[2].
334 Id.
335 GAO FINANCIAL REGULATIONS REPORT, supra note 8.
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much each spent to operate their financial regulatory agencies. a36 According
to the data collected by the UK FSA for comparison with its 2002/03 fiscal
year, the total annual regulatory costs incurred by the United States was
approximately 12 times more than the total annual regulatory costs for the
UK FSA and 86 times more than the total annual regulatory costs for
Germany's BaFin.
3 37
The amount used by the UK FSA actually understates the total annual
regulatory costs for the United States because it does not include the
amounts spent by federal agencies like OF-EO or the amounts spent by the
states for banking and securities regulation. 33' The total regulatory costs for
the United States for 2002 would be more than 16 times the annual expenses
3M 2002-03 U.K FIN. SERVICES AUTH., ANN. REP. 205-10 [hereinafter UK FSA, ANN. REP.].
The UK FSA raised the following caveats regarding the comparability ofthe data collected: (1) the figures
do not necessarily relate to the same accounting period and may not have been compiled on the same
basis; (2) labor and other costs vary between countries; (3) variations in exchange rates will affect the
results expressed in a single currency; (4) the scope of the responsibility of the regulatory authorities differ
from one country to the next; and (5) the nature and scale of the financial services industries in different
countries differs materially. Id. at 205.
337 UK FSA, ANN. REP., supra note 336, at 206-07. The UK FSA's fiscal year runs from April 1
to March 31. The amounts cited in the UK FSA Annual Report were in pounds. The total regulatory
costs for the United States were £3 billion (approximately $4.66 billion), the total regulatory costs for the
United Kingdom were £249 million (approximately $385.95 million), and the total regulatory costs for
Germany were £35million (approximately $54.25 million). Id.; Federal Reserve Statistical Release, United
K(ingdom Historical Rates, available at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H1O/Hist/datO0_ukhtm (last visited
Sept. 4, 2005). The UK FSA indicated that, in most cases, the exchange rate used to convert the amounts
into pounds was the rate available on April 7, 2003, although it did not provide the exact U.S. dollar-
pound exchange rate that it used. For purposes of this paper, the exchange rate used to convert the
amounts cited in the UK FSA's report back into dollars was the U.S. dollar-pound exchange rate for April
7, 2003 of $1.55 = £1, which was recorded by the Federal Reserve in its Federal Reserve Statistical
Release, United Kingdom Historical Rates, available at www.federareserve.gov/releases/HIO/Hist/dat00
uk.htm.
Prof. Howell Jackson found that the annual U.S. regulatory costs for the period 1998-2000
were 15 times higher than the regulatory costs for the UK FSA in 2000/01. Howell E. Jackson, An
American Perspective on the FSA Politics, Goals & Regulatory Intensity, Address at the Conference of
the Center for the Study of International Business Law and the Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Symposium: Do Financial Supermarkets Need Superregulators (Sep. 20, 2002). Prof.Jackson found that
the regulatory costs per employee were roughly equivalent as the United States spent $108,525 per
employee and the United Kingdom spent $111,392 per employee. Id. He also commented that it was
difficult to make comparisons because ofthe absence of appropriate measures for comparing the securities
and insurance sectors and because of the problems of accounting for inter-sector investments and
different kinds of assets. Id.
338 UKFSA, ANN. REP., supra note 336, at 206-07. In the report, the U.S. total reflects the budgets
for the OCC, OTS, FDIC, Federal Reserve, SEC, CFTC, NASD, NYSE, National Futures Association,
NCUA, and the state insurance commissions. Id. The UK FSA included self-regulatory agencies in its
calculations in order to get an amount that corresponded more closely with its regulatory structure, which
merged the financial self-regulatory organizations into the UK FSA. Id.
2005] A SINGLE FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY
of the UK FSA and more than 117 times the annual expenses of Germany's
BaFin, if all of the annual expenses for the Federal Reserve, the OCC, the
OTS, the FDIC, the NCUA, the SEC, the CFTC, the OFHEO, and the
state insurance, banking, and securities agencies were combined.33 9
The disparities in regulatory costs between the United Kingdom,
Germany and the United States are the greatest in the area of banking
regulation. In 2002/03, the total banking assets in the United States were 2.2
times that of the United Kingdom and 2.3 times the total banking assets of
Germany.340 However, during roughly the same period, the United States
spent 60 times more to regulate its depository institutions than did the
United Kingdom and 236 times more than Germany.341 The United States'
339 The total regulatory costs for the U.S. financial regulatory agencies were approximately $6.4
billion in 2002. 2003 FED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS,ANN REP. 288; 2003 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
ANN. REP. 188 [hereinafter FDIC]; 2003 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANN. REP.
75, 77 [hereinafter OCC]; 2002 OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION FIN. REP. 3 [hereinafter OTS]; 2002
NAT'L CREDIT UNION ADMIN., ANN. REP. I [hereinafter NCUA]; 2002 COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMM'N, ANN. REP. 146 [hereinafter CFTC]; 2002 NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS
INS. DEP'T RESOURCES REP. 25 [hereinafter NAIC]; 2002 SEC. &EXCHANGE COMM'N, ANN. REP. 180
[hereinafter SEC]; THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE CHARTERED
BANKING 35 (19th ed. 2003); GA. DEP'T OF BANKING & FIN., ANN. REP. 14 (2002); HAW. DEP'T OF
COMM. AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS, ANN. COMPLIANCE RESOL. FUND REP. (2002); ILL. ANN. REP. TO
Gov. 21 (2002); IND. DEP'T OF FIN. INST.,ANN. REP. 16 (2002); IOWAANN. REP. OF SUPERINTENDENT
OF BANKING 27 (2002); Miss. DEP'T OF BANKING & CONSUMER FIN., ANN. REP. 12-14 (2002); N.Y.
BANKING DEP'T ORG. &MAINT. REP. 1 (2002); S.C. BOARD OF FIN. INST., ANN. ACCOUNTABILITYREP.
4-5 (2002); VT. ANN. REP. TO THE INS. COMM'R 10 (2002); WASH. DEP'T OF FIN. INST., ANN. REP. 2
(2002); W. VA. ANN. REP. OF FIN. INST. 14,18,23 (2002); UKFSA, ANN. REP., supra note 336, at 206-07.
The total amount for the U.S. state banking budgets, except for South Carolina, was derived from data
from THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE CHARTERED BANKING 35
(19th ed. 2003). A Profile of State Chartered Banking did not contain any information regarding the
South Carolina budget for bank supervision. The data for South Carolina was derived from S.C. BOARD
OF FIN. INST., ANN. ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 4-5 (2002).
In its 2002/03 Annual Report, the UK FSA obtained the cited amounts from the U.S. agencies.
UK FSA, ANN. REP., supra note 336, at 206-07. In certain cases, the calculated amounts are hard to
determine, because the calculated amounts do not always represent the total agencies' expenses from their
annual reports. For example, the total expenses of the Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal Reserve
Board equaled $3.4 billion in 2002. However, the UK FSA lists only E357.9 million, or $554.7 million,
as the regulatory costs for the Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal Reserve Board. UK FSA, ANN.
REP., supra note 336, at 206-07; 2002 FED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS, ANN. REP. 288.
3Q UK FSA, ANN. REP.,supra note 336, at 206-07. The total U.S. banking assets for 2002/03 were
$9.67 trillion. Id.; Federal Reserve Statistical Release, United Kingdom Historical Rates, available at
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H1O/Hist/dat00_uk.htm.
W For the year 2002, the total amount spent by the U.S. Federal Reserve, OCC, OTS, NCUA,
FDIC, and the state banking regulators was $4.94 billion, the total amount spent by the UK FSA was
$89.15 million, and the total amount spent by Germany's BaFin was $20.93 million. UKFSAANN. REP.,
supra note 336, at 206-07; 2002 FED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra note 339, at 288; FDIC, supra
note 338, at 188; OCC, supra note 339, at 75, 77; OTS,supra note 339, at 3; NCUA,supra note 339, at 1;
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system costs over 27 times more to regulate banks, thrifts and credit unions
than does the United Kingdom system, and over 102 times more to regulate
banks, thrifts and credit unions than the German system. This disparity
exists even after accounting for the differences in the total banking assets in
each country.342
At least part of the reason for these cost differentials between the United
States and both the United Kingdom and Germany can be attributed to the
fact that the United States must regulate a much larger number of small and
medium-size banks, thrifts and credit unions than either the United
Kingdom or Germany. In 2002, the United States had roughly 13 times as
many banks, thrifts and credit unions as the United Kingdom.343 If the
number of banks, thrifts and credit unions supervised is taken into account,
the United States still spent roughly four times more to regulate each of
these institutions than did the United Kingdom. 344 In that same year, the
CFTC, supra note 339, at 146; NAIC, supra note 339, at 25; SEC, supra note 339, at 180; THE
CONFERENCE OF STATE BANKSUPERVISORS, supra note 339, at 35; S.C. BOARD OF FIN. INST.,supra note
339, at 4-5. The UKFSA in its Annual Report 2002/03 listed the total regulatory costs for the U.S. federal
banking, thrift and credit union regulators as £1.4 billion or $2.17 billion. UKFSA, ANN. REP.,supra note
336, at 206-07.
342 UKFSAANN. REP.,supra note 336, at 206-07; 2002 FED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS,supra
note 339, at 288; FDIC, supra note 339, at 188; OCC, supra note 339, at 75, 77; OTS, supra note 339, at
3; NCUA, supra note 339, at 1; CFTC, supra note 339, at 146; NAIC, supra note 339, at 25; SEC, supra
note 339, at 180; THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 339, at 35; S.C. BOARD
OF FIN. INST., supra note 339, at 4-5. If the total costs of the U.S. federal banking, thrift, and credit union
regulators cited by the UK FSA in its Annual Report 2002/03 are used instead of the total amount of the
budgets of the U.S. federal banking, thrift, and credit union regulators and state banking regulators, then
the United States' system costs over 12 times more to regulate banks, thrifts and credit unions than the
United Kingdom and over 45 times more to regulate banks, thrifts and credit unions than Germany, after
accounting for the differences in the total banking assets in each country. The amount in the sentence
is based on the total budgets of the Federal Reserve, OCC, OTS, NCUA, FDIC, and the state banking
regulators. UK FSA, ANN. REP., supra note 336, at 206-07.
343 In 2002, the United Kingdom had 1,429 banks, building societies and credit unions, while the
United States had 19,225 banks, thrifts and credit unions. UKFSA, ANN. REP.,supra note 336, at 206-07;
2002 FED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra note 339, at 288; FDIC, supra note 339, at 188; OCC,supra
note 339, at 75, 77; OTS,supra note 339, at 3; NCUA, supra note 339, at 1; CFTC, supra note 339, at 146;
NAIC, supra note 339, at 25; SEC, supra note 339, at 180; THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK
SUPERVISORS, supra note 339, at 35; S.C. BOARD OF FIN. INST., supra note 339, at 4-5.
3" UK FSA, ANN. REP., supra note 335, at 206-07; 2002 FED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra
note 339, at 288; FDIC, supra note 339, at 188; OCC, supra note 339, at 75, 77; OTS, supra note 339, at
3; NCUA, supra note 339, at 1; CFTC, supra note 339, at 146; NAIC, supra note 339, at 25; SEC, supra
note 339, at 180; THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 339, at 35; S.C. BOARD
OF FIN. INST., supra note 339, at 4-5. If the total costs of the U.S. federal banking and thrift regulators
cited by the UK FSA in its Annual Report 2002/03 are used instead of the total amount of the budgets of
the U.S. federal banking and thrift regulators and state banking regulators, then the United States spent
roughly $216,438 to regulate each of its banks and thrifts or almost twice as much as the United Kingdom
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United States had approximately seven times as many depository institutions
as Germany.345 If the number of depository institutions being regulated in
each country is taken into account, the United States spent 14 times as much
as that spent by Germany. 346
These large cost disparities give rise to important questions. Is the
United States' regulatory regime for depository institutions providing a
banking system that is four times more secure than the United Kingdom's
system and 14 times more secure than Germany's system? If not, what are
the benefits that the United States is deriving from its more costly regulatory
system that would justify these expenditures?
The disparities between both the United Kingdom and Germany and the
United States are considerably less significant in the area of securities and
futures regulation when the size of each country's equity market is taken into
consideration. In 2002/03, the United States spent approximately $1.5 billion
on securities regulation (excluding state regulation costs), which was 5.6
times more than that spent by the United Kingdom and 77.6 times more
than Germany spent. The total equity market capitalization for that period
in the United States was $10.7 trillion, which was 6.8 times more than that
in the United Kingdom and 15.9 times more than Germany's capitalization.
Thus, the regulatory costs incurred by the United States at the federal level
and the United Kingdom in regulating the securities and futures markets are
roughly comparable when the size of each country's markets is taken into
account.
That the United States spends significantly more than Germany does to
regulate its securities and futures markets is due in part to the fact that a
much smaller portion of the general population in Germany owns securities
than in the United States. In the United States in 2002, 84.3 million
individuals, or 29.2 percent of the total U.S. population, and 52.7 million
spent to regulate each of its banks and building societies in 2002/03. The previous amount is based on
the total budgets of the Federal Reserve, OCC, OTS, NCUA, FDIC, and the state banking regulators.
UK FSA, ANN. REP., supra note 336, at 206-07.
345 Germany had a total of 2,615 registered credit institutions, including banks, savings banks,
credit cooperatives, and securities trading banks and spent approximately $21 million regulating them.
UK FSA, ANN. REP., supra note 336, at 206-07; 2002 FED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra note 339,
at 288; FDIC, supra note 339, at 188; OCC, supra note 339, at 75, 77; OTS, supra note 339, at 3; NCUA,
supra note 339, at 1; CFTC, supra note 339, at 146; NAIC, supra note 339, at 25; SEC, supra note 339, at
180; THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 339, at 35; S.C. BOARD OF FIN. INST.,
supra note 339, at 4-5.
W UKFSA, ANN. REP., supra note 336, at 206-07; 2002 FED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra
note 339, at 288; FDIC, supra note 339, at 188; OCC, supra note 339, at 75, 77; OTS, supra note 339, at
3; NCUA, supra note 339, at 1; CFTC, supra note 339, at 146; NAIC, supra note 339, at 25; SEC, supra
note 339, at 180; THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 339, at 35; S.C. BOARD
OF FIN. INST., supra note 339, at 4-5.
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U.S. households, or 49.5 percent of all U.S. households, owned equities,
either through individual stocks or through stock mutual funds.347 In
Germany, only 9.8 percent of the population owned any stocks directly in
2000, while 23.3 percent of the population of the U.K owned stocks directly
in 1996.348 Both the United States and the United Kingdom regulate their
securities markets more intensively than does Germany due to the perceived
need to protect the larger number of less sophisticated investors active in the
securities and futures markets in these two countries.
Insurance is one area where the duplication of efforts by the individual
states in the United States substantially increases costs for both companies
and consumers. The regulatory cost disparities between the United
Kingdom and Germany and the United States highlight this problem. In
2002/03, the state insurance commissions in the United States spent
approximately $946 million to regulate insurance, which was 30.1 times
more than the United Kingdom spent and 70.9 times more than Germany
spent.349 These disparities cannot be accounted for solely by taking into
account the size of the insurance markets in each country. During the
2002/03 period, the total insurance premiums in the United States equaled
$1.17 trillion, which was 4.9 times more than the $234.8 billion in total
premiums in the United Kingdom and 7.9 times more than the $146.8
billion total premiums in Germany.35°
2. INTER-AGENCY TURF WARS IN THE UNITED STATES WASTE FUNDS.
U.S. regulatory costs are higher than those in other countries not only
because of regulatory overlap and duplication, but because of the turf wars
in which the agencies frequently engage. Turf wars amongst the federal
financial regulators, such as the long-standing battle between the SEC and
the CFTC over securities futures, and between the federal regulators and the
states have been well documented.35' Most of these battles are fought
347 U.S. Census Bureau Population Division, Time Series of National Population Estimates, available
at http:/Aww.census.gov/popest/archives/2000svintage_2002/NA-EST2002-Ol.html; INV. CO. INST. &
SEC. INDUS. ASS'N, EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA, 1 (2002).
3s Laurence Boone & Natalie Girourard, The Stock Market, the Housing Market and Consumer
Behavior, OECD ECON. STUD. 175 (2002).
349 UK FSA, ANN. REP., supra note 336, at 206-07; NAIC, supra note 339, at 25.
350 Id. The amount listed in the text is from NAIC. The UK FSA Annual Report stated that the
total premiums in the United States for 2002/03 were £581.4 billion, or $901.2 billion. Using this
amount, the U.S. total insurance premiums were only 3.8 times more than the United Kingdom's total
insurance premiums and 6.1 times more than Germany's total insurance premiums. UKFSA, ANN. REP.,
supra note 336, at 206-07; Federal Reserve Statistical Release, United Kingdom Historical Rates, available at
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/Hist/dat00_uk.htm.
351 Jerry W. Markham, Panel I (Part 2): A Comparative Analysis of Consolidated and Functional
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primarily over who should have the authority to regulate a particular type of
instrument or entity rather than over whether regulation of the instrument
or entity is desirable and, if so, what is the most appropriate form of
regulation. Once the decision as to which agency is going to regulate a
particular instrument or entity is made, the regulatory biases of that agency
usually determine the scope and form that the final regulation takes.
Donald E. Powell, Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, in a speech at the Exchequer Club on Oct. 16, 2002, explained
the costs incurred as a result of agency turf wars when he stated:
All too often, when we engage in turf warfare, the ultimate loser is
the industry and the marketplace. The price is paid in lost
opportunities and lost competitiveness. The commodity we already
lack today-and will increasingly lack in the future-is time. We
will no longer have the luxury of lengthy consideration, study,
argument, debate, and delay. The industry-and the broader
markets-will require answers from the regulators much faster than
we can provide them today. In such a market, delay will be as good
as denial. A nimble and efficient regulatory structure that evaluates
emerging issues-and problems-and moves quickly to address
them is going to be increasingly important.352
Thus, although hard to quantify, turf wars between the states and federal
government and the various federal agencies not only waste limited agency
resources, but also adversely affect the markets.
3. COMPLIANCE COSTS INCURRED BY THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
INDUSTRY EXACERBATE THE PROBLEM.
Simply looking at the amount that state and federal governments spend
to regulate financial services underestimates the total costs of the current
regulatory regime because it does not capture how much more companies
and individuals must pay to operate within the system. The regulatory costs
are a fraction of the fees, assessments and taxes that the state and federal
governments charge financial service firms. For example, in 2002, state
insurance department budgets totaled $946.6 million while the total revenues
Regulation: Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives Regulation in the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 319, 362 (2003) [hereinafter Markham, Super
Regulator].
352 Press Release, Donald E. Powell, Chairman of the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Why Regulatory
Restructuring? Why Now? (Oct. 16, 2002).
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generated from fees, assessments, fines, penalties and taxes assessed by states
on insurance companies totaled $12.52 billion.35 3 These state insurance
department budgets represented only 7.56 percent of the total revenues
generated. In order to assess the total costs for the current regulatory regime,
the amount spent by firms and individuals in complying with the regulatory
requirements of the system must also be taken into account.
In the United States, insurance companies must become licensed in each
state in which they want to offer insurance and must obtain authorization
from these states for the products they offer. If a new company wants to
offer insurance in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, it must apply for
a license to operate from each of these 51 jurisdictions, seek advanced
approval from each jurisdiction for each of the products that it will offer, and
obtain a license for each producer or agent in each state that will sell its
products. 54 The costs involved in completing the applications for all of these
licenses as well as payment of the relevant fees are significant and create a
barrier to entry, particularly for small firms. Efforts by the NAIC to
encourage uniformity and coordination among states have not met with a
great deal of success.
In 2002, the number of domestic insurers (insurers domiciled in the state
in which the business is written) in the 50 states and the District of
Columbia was 7,090, averaging 139 domestic insurers per state.355 However,
foreign insurers (insurers domiciled in a state different from the state in
which the business is written) outnumber domestic insurers in every state.
On average, 1,357 foreign insurers operate in each state, meaning that, on
average, foreign insurers comprise a little over 90 percent of the total number
of insurers in any given state. 6
If one assumes that states generally charge the same taxes, fees,
assessments, fines and penalties to foreign insurers as to domestic insurers,
then $10.88 billion of the $12.52 billion states earned from taxes, fees,
assessments, fines, penalties and other sources were paid by foreign
insurers.357 Most of this $10.88 billion could be saved if insurers only had to
pay fees and assessments to the state in which they were domiciled or to a
single federal regulator. These added costs create barriers to entry and reduce
competition in the insurance sector. 58 Compliance costs for other financial
353 NAIC, supra note 339, at 22, 25.
354 BAIR REPORT, supra note 23, at 11-12.
355 NAIC, supra note 339, at 30, 39.
356 Id.
357 Id. at 25, 39.
358 BAIR REPORT, supra note 23, at 31, 51-52. For example, about 66 percent of the respondents
to a recent survey of life insurance providers considered the current state regulatory structure for
insurance to impose barriers to entry, particularly for small firms. Out of 383 companies in the life
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service providers are equally daunting. According to industry estimates,
banking institutions spend approximately $25 billion annually to comply
with federal and state regulations.35 9
As a result of these barriers, financial service firms will attempt to pass
along the costs that they incur in complying with the existing regulatory
regime in the United States to their business and consumer clients. Thus,
consumers and the U.S. economy as a whole pay a large price for the
regulatory structure in place today.
IV. POSSIBLE STRUCTURE FOR THE U.S.
FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY.
A. Structure and Operations of the US FSA.
How should a single U.S. financial services regulator be structured in
order to best meet the challenges described above? In general terms, the U.S.
should create a single, federal financial services authority that mirrors many
of the same aspects of the U.K. Financial Services Authority. This agency
should consolidate the regulatory functions of the Federal Reserve, OCC,
OTS, FDIC, SEC, CFTC, SIPC, OFHEO, and PBGC, as well as those of
the state agencies and commissions that regulate banking, securities, and
insurance.36° The merger of all of these agencies would not necessarily be
simultaneous, but could be completed in a series of phases. The UK FSA
used this stepped method in its combination of different financial
regulators.16' This approach allows the new agency time to properly integrate
insurance business that received the survey, 129 companies responded. Id. at 31.
359 Opening Statement of Chairman Spencer Bachus, Hearing of Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit
Subcommittee on the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act, H.R. 1375, 108th Cong. 1 (2003), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/032703ba.pdf.
W I believe that the regulatory functions of OFHEO should be included within the US FSA
because the government-sponsored-entities, which OFHEO regulates, comprise some of the large
financial conglomerates in the United States. I believe that the regulatory and insurance functions of
PBGC should be included in the US FSA because of the impact that these activities have on the segment
of the financial services industry that handles employee benefits. Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of
this article to fully analyze why the regulatory functions of these agencies should be included within the
US FSA. Instead, this article will focus on the benefits to be derived from consolidating the primary
federal and state banking, securities and insurance regulators into the US FSA.
361 2003-2004 FIN. SERVICES AUTH. [FSA], ANN. REP. 50 (U.K), available at
httpV'www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annuaVar03_04/arO3_04.pdf; UKFSA, ANN. REP.,supra note 336, at 81,122;
2001-2002 FIN. SERVICES AUTH. [FSA], ANN. REP. 72 (U.K.), available at
http:/Avww.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/arOl02.pdf.
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each group of old agencies within its framework without causing major
disruptions to any segment of the financial services industry.362
The Federal Reserve, like the Bank of England, would retain control of
its role in formulating monetary policy. Thus, the Federal Reserve would
preserve its control over the discount and federal funds rates, its ability to
control reserve requirements, and, through the Federal Open Market
Committee, its control of the money supply with the purchase and sale of
government bonds.
Several reasons exist for maintaining the Federal Reserve as a separate
agency responsible for monetary policy. First, this division between the
regulation of financial services and the formulation of monetary policywould
help both the US FSA and the Federal Reserve achieve clearly defined goals
and make the goals of each agency easier to prioritize. Second, combining
the power to formulate monetary policy with the power to regulate the entire
financial services industry might concentrate too great an amount of power
in a single agency. Such a concentration mightjeopardize the existing system
of checks and balances within the federal government. Third, the former
Federal Reserve units would dominate the US FSA if all parts of the Federal
Reserve were merged to form the new agency. These units could quite
possibly stifle regulatory innovation through their exercise of dominance
within the agency in imposing regulatory preferences on other parts of the
agency. Fourth, the majority of other nations that have created single,
financial regulators have maintained their central banks as separate agencies.
This means that there are fewer acceptable models of how to create an
integrated financial regulator that incorporates a country's central bank than
there are models of an integrated financial regulator not incorporating a
country's central bank. As a result of this limitation, the United States may
have a more difficult time anticipating and formulating ways to avoid
potential problems it may face. Fifth, the US FSA does not need the power
to formulate monetary policy in order to meet the challenges facing the
financial services industry outlined in Part III. Because of the potential
problems posed by an inclusion of the Federal Reserve's monetary functions
within the US FSA and the fact that the US FSA does not need these powers
in order to address the challenges facing the financial services industry, the
US FSA as structured for purposes of this article will not incorporate those
functions.3"
M2 One of the concerns raised by the creation of the Department of Homeland Security is that
attempt to merge over 20 different agencies into one new department at the same distracted these agencies
from fulfilling their primary functions. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-102, MAJOR
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND PROGRAM RISKS: DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 3-4
(2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/pas/2003/dO3102.pdf
M For analyses of what role central banks play in financial supervision, see James R. Barth et al.,
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The internal structure of the US FSA should be focused upon
supervisory or regulatory objectives, rather than old sectoral lines, in order
to best achieve the maximum economies of scale and scope from the merger
of existing agencies. For discussion purposes, I would propose that the
internal structure of the US FSA include a Prudential Standards Division, a
Regulatory Processes and Risk Division, a Consumer Protection Division,
an Enforcement Division, and an Operations Division. This structure is an
extension of the direction that both the Michigan Office of Financial &
Insurance Services and the UK FSA have adopted in their efforts to
consolidate financial service industry regulators.3
A Cross-Country Analysis of Bank Supervisory Framework and Bank Peformance, 12 FIN. MARKETS, INST. &
INSTRUMENTS 67 (2003); Donato Masciandaro, Central Banks or Single Financial Authorities? A Political
Economy Approach, (Univ. of Lecce, Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 47/25, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=493522.
364 2000 MICH. OFFICE FIN. & INS. SERVICES, ANN. REP., available at
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/cis-ofis00full25416_7.pdf; Michael Taylor, Accountability and
Objectives of the FSA, in BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES & MARKETS ACT 2000, at 27-
28 (Michael C. Blair et al. eds., 2001).
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Prudential Regulatory Consumer Enforcement Operations Financial
Standards Processes Protection Division Division Services
Division & Risk Division Guaranty
Division Division
The Prudential Standards Division would develop the prudential
standards for both diversified and specialized financial services firms and
conduct examinations to determine that firms are complying with these
standards. Additionally, this division would conduct research, develop
policies, and maintain statistics relevant to safety and soundness concerns.
It would also work with institutions that are at risk for financial difficulties
to help them remain financially viable. Furthermore, it could take necessary
corrective actions to protect investors or consumers or more severe actions,
such as seizure, rehabilitation or liquidation, when an entity becomes
insolvent.
The Regulatory Processes and Risk Division would regulate financial
advice and products, markets, financial reporting, mergers and acquisitions,
and develop policies concerning conduct of business issues. The Consumer
Protection Division, like the UK FSA's Consumer, Investment and
Insurance Division, would receive and act upon consumer complaints from
all financial sectors, which would eliminate the confusion faced by
consumers with the vast number of existing hotlines and websites in both
state and federal agencies. The Consumer Protection Division would also
answer inquiries, approve complaint schemes, and maintain data on
companies regarding consumer complaints, how they dealt with complaints,
and provide any enforcement actions taken against companies.
[Vol. 14:1
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The Enforcement Division would handle all enforcement actions for the
US FSA. States may continue to prosecute financial service firms and market
participants for both fraud and violations of the federal laws and rules
governing such companies and individuals. States, however, must coordinate
all of their enforcement actions with the Enforcement Division in order to
avoid an action by one or more states interfering with another enforcement
action by the US FSA or another state. States would also be prevented from
attempting to establish new industry standards or rules through enforcement
actions notjointly undertaken with the US FSA. Certain types of fraud that
take place in nonintermediated markets continue to have a more local or
regional character, which makes them appropriate subjects for state-level
enforcement actions.365 Such actions, however, should not interfere with the
national markets for financial services by attempting to generate new rules
governing financial services within a particular state. Any funds recovered
by the US FSA and the states for consumer or investor fraud would become
part of a fund that would compensate the victims of such crimes rather than
becoming part of the general revenues for federal or state governments. Such
a fund is not without precedent, as one was established at the federal level by
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 for victims of securities fraud.3 66
The Operations Division would consist of the human resources,
information technology, finance, and management services. This division
would be responsible for establishing and maintaining a single computer
network for the US FSA, which would provide a one-stop shop for
information on the financial service industry and would aid enforcement
efforts by creating a single database containing information about firms or
persons who have previously violated any laws or regulations related to the
financial services industry. Sharing information between the existing federal
and state regulators can be problematic at times because of the different
computer systems used and the lack of databases containing information
about the financial market participants in certain areas, like banking, on a
nationwide basis. This division would also realize cost savings through
economies of scale resulting from consolidation of the existing regulatory
agencies.
The Financial Services Guaranty Division would fulfill the functions
previously performed by the FDIC, the SIPC and the PBGC, as well as those
performed by the state insurance guaranty funds. This division would act as
a last resort for customers or investors of financial services firms that are
members of the funds managed by the division. Additionally, the division
would control a deposit insurance fund that would insure deposits in
365 Mark Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 471, 504-05 (1993).
366 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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depository institutions for up to $100,000. It would administer a securities
insurance fund that would work to return the cash, stock and other securities
held in an investor's account at a bankrupt brokerage firm up to a limit of
$500,000. Finally, the division would manage funds that guarantee pension
benefits against insolvency and cover the claims of policyholders and
claimants of insurance companies that have become insolvent.
A Board of Directors with a strong chairman should manage the US
FSA. The number of directors should be large enough to represent a range
of opinions and interests but not so large as to be unwieldy and
counterproductive. As a basis for comparison, federal agencies that regulate
the financial services industry generally have between three to seven
members of the board. A board comprised of fewer than five directors would
probably not provide the diversity of views necessary to fully consider new
regulations for financial products and services. Alternatively, a board
comprised of more than 16 directors would likely make it too difficult to
make decisions quickly enough to respond to the rapid changes in the
marketplace.
For purposes of this article, I will assume that the board of the US FSA
would be structured similarly to the board of the Federal Reserve, which has
seven directors. Like the SEC, the CFTC and the FTC, I will assume that
the term for the directors will be five years. Also like the SEC, the CFTC,
the FTC, and the NCUA, only a slight majority of the directors may come
from the same political party, so as to avoid a partisan bias on the board. To
ensure this goal, this article proposes that only four of the seven directors of
the US FSA may come from the same political party. As with most federal
financial service regulators, all of the directors would be nominated by the
President and approved by the Senate prior to taking office.
Each director will have a small staff at their disposal to help them
effectively oversee the operations of the agency. All Federal Reserve staff
members work primarily for the chairman while other directors generally are
only allotted one secretary and perhaps one other aide.367 As a result, other
directors at the Federal Reserve are more constrained than the chairman in
their ability to stake out their individual positions. By providing the directors
of the US FSA with more extensive human resources, the US FSA would
hopefully benefit from a vigorous debate over the proper type and level of
regulation when policy goals concerning the financial services industry
conflict.
In order to foster such debates, the division proposing new regulations
to be considered for approval by the directors would be required to submit
these proposals for review and comment by each of the other divisions,
37 MARTIN MAYER, THE FED 304 (2001).
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excluding the Operations Division. Although the other divisions would not
have a veto right over the proposed regulations, their comments would be
provided to the directors for their consideration and would become part of
the public record. Regulations would only become final after approval by a
majority vote of the US FSA's board of directors.
The new US Financial Services Agency would be funded by fees charged
to those institutions that it regulates. This practice is not unusual, and is in
fact, utilized by both the Federal Reserve and the UK FSA. This revenue
would be more [than] sufficient since it is the case that most U.S. financial
regulatory agencies and the UK FSA generate more revenue from fees than
they need to fund their operations.368
B. Accountability Safeguards for the US FSA.
Obviously the size and power of the US FSA raise concerns about how
to ensure accountability and responsiveness to the needs of American
businesses, consumers, and investors. The US FSA would be directly
accountable to Congress and would be required to file an annual report with
Congress describing its activities over the past year as well as its plans for the
future. Additionally, it also would be required to make periodic reports to
both the House Committee on Financial Services and the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and to testify before other
Congressional committees when necessary. This would serve to make the
activities of the US FSA more transparent than many state agencies, which
are not required to produce any reports detailing their actions and
expenditures.
The US FSA should establish two advisory groups, one comprised of
representatives for consumers and one of representatives from financial
services firms. These groups would offer advice to the US FSA on pending
regulatory matters and publish reports giving their independent assessments
of how well the agency is achieving its statutory objectives. Both the Federal
Reserve and the UK FSA employ similar panels.
Like many other federal agencies, the US Financial Services Agency
would benefit from operating multiple offices spread throughout the
country. The US FSA would have specialists in each office that would
conduct examinations of financial institutions and investigate violations and
consumer complaints for that region. These offices would allow the US FSA
W UKFSA, ANN. REP.,supra note 336; 2002 FED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS,supra note 339;
FDIC, supra note 339; OCC, supra note 339; OTS, supra note 339; NCUA, supra note 339; CFTC, supra
note 339; NAIC, supra note 339; SEC, supra note 339; THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS,
supra note 339.
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to be more responsive to the concerns of both financial firms and consumers
across the United States than it would be if it operated solely out of a
Washington, D.C. office.
Additional details regarding the structure of the US FSA would need to
be worked out before the organization could be established. Nevertheless,
this outline of the basic structure provides us with sufficient information to
assess the benefits of such a structure over the current regime.
V. ADVANTAGES OF A SINGLE FINANCIAL REGULATOR
The advantages of the US FSA all relate to the fact that it would equip
the United States to more constructively address each of the major challenges
facing the financial services industry. Comparable benefits cannot be
realized under the present regime or under the three options proposed by the
GAO.
A. US FSA Would Monitor Risks Across Firms and Sectors and Address
Such Risks Strategically.
1. Us FSA WOULD CREATE A PERMANENT SYSTEM FOR
COORDINATION AND COOPERATION CONCERNING REGULATORY
GOALS FOR THE ENTIRE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY.
The US FSA would create for the first time in the United States a
permanent system for coordination and cooperation concerning regulatory
goals across the financial services industry. The US FSA would operate
more effectively than the FFIEC and the other ad hoc organizations because
it would be able to approve and implement regulations dealing with cross-
sectoral issues without having to rely on separate agencies following through
on their commitments. It would also cover all financial services sectors
rather thanjust the banking regulators as the FFIEC does. Further, since the
US FSA is not just adding another layer of bureaucracy on top of several
existing agencies, it would be more efficient and cost effective than would be
an expansion of the FFIEC to include more state and federal regulators. The
US FSA would also be more effective than the functional consolidation
option, twin peaks option or financial conglomerate agency option, which
were proposed by the GAO and which would still require multiple agencies
to act cooperatively in coordinating their regulations.
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2. US FSAWOULD HARMONIZE REGULATIONS ACROSS SECTORS AND
ELIMINATE DUPLICATIVE REGULATIONS.
One of the objectives of the US FSA would be to review existing
regulations and attempt to harmonize them so that they can be applied more
consistently and uniformly. This is a feasible outcome, as the UK FSA was
successful in achieving its goal of reducing the number of regulations
governing financial service firms in the United Kingdom.369 For example,
the UK FSA shortened the Code of Market Conduct by 30%, reduced the
listing rules for new securities by 40%, and cut 200 pages from the provisions
on collective investment schemes.370
The United States should be able to achieve this goal as well, particularly
when one considers the fact that the implementation of a single, federal
regulator would immediately eradicate a significant number of the
inconsistencies and inefficiencies in the current system. Simply by creating
a national regime for insurance, a federal regulator could substantially reduce
the inconsistencies and duplication of regulation of insurance providers and
insurance products.37' The United States would also benefit from the
standardization of regulations that affect other financial products and
companies. Nevertheless, this rationalization process will not happen
overnight, but probably will require several years to complete.
3 72
The creation of the US FSA would eliminate the debate over which
agency was accountable for hybrid products and firms or for situations like
the stock market bubble of the late 1990s. The new agency would be more
likely than the existing system to investigate whether new products or firms
ought to be regulated and the appropriate type of regulation needed as,
currently, agencies shirk responsibility by arguing that the product or firm
fell outside of their jurisdiction. This debate over hybrid products would
% 58 FSA HANDBOOK DEV. 2 (2004), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/handbook/HB58.pdf
370 Id.
371 BAIR REPORT, supra note 23, at i-ii.
37 Josd de Luna Martinez & Thomas A. Rose, International Survey of Integrated Financial Sector
Supervision 13 (World Bank, Fin. Sector Operations & Pol'y Dep't, Working Paper No. 3096, 2003),
available at http://www.wds.worldbank-org/servlet/WDScontentServer/WDSP/B/2003/08/23/000094946_
03080904015686/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. The Martinez and Rose survey found that few of the
nations that had adopted integrated supervision had been able to harmonize regulations and supervisory
approaches across the financial services industry, although they did find a greater degree of consistency
between the regulation and supervision ofbanks and securities firms than banks and insurance companies.
Martinez and Rose speculated that the reasons for this was the relative newness of the agencies involved,
which were generally less than five years old, and the lack of consistency of international standards across
the financial services industry.
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likely continue if any of the other three options proposed by the GAO were
implemented.
The US FSA will also be more willing to consider innovative ways of
dealing with problems arising within the financial services area, such as stock
market bubbles. Consolidation of the different agencies into the US FSA
will expose regulators to different regulatory methods as existing agencies
tend to rely only on a limited set of regulatory tools, which are products of
each agency's history and regulatory priorities. As a result, the existing
agencies are not very innovative when considering possible regulatory
approaches for new problems. Exposure to other regulatory methods may
have a synergistic result, resulting in more innovative ways of dealing with
market failures and other problems. The functional consolidation option and
the financial conglomerate agency option would not offer this benefit, but
would only maintain the current regulatory preferences. Additionally, the
functional consolidation option would create a federal agency for each
financial sector. These federal agencies would simply consolidate the
preference for disclosure in the securities area into an agency and the
preference for prudential examinations in the banking area. These agencies
would lack the synergies that can accrue from bringing experts from different
regulatory backgrounds together. Finally, the financial conglomerate agency
option would keep all of the existing regulators in place but merely add a new
agency to the mix to deal with financial conglomerates.
Given the size and breadth of the US FSA, the head of this agency would
likely have the same standing as the current Federal Reserve chairman in
being able to use his persuasive authority to talk the market down in the
event of another financial bubble, such as the one that developed in the stock
market in the late 1990s. None of the other options proposed by the GAO
would create an agency that would control the same stature and moral
authority as that which the Federal Reserve possesses.
B. US FSA Would Regulate Financial Conglomerates More Effectively.
1. US FSA WOULD BETTER ADDRESS THE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
CREATED BY FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES.
The US FSA would be better equipped to develop appropriate regulatory
responses to the financial conglomerate conflict of interest problems than the
current structure because these conflicts frequently involve more than one
financial sector. Under the current regulatory structure, fashioning an
appropriate response to such conflicts would require the cooperation of
several regulators. These regulators may view the relative importance of a
problem differently based on the objectives of their agencies and, thus, may
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be less willing to cooperate and focus on a specific problem than would other
regulators. The board of directors of the US FSA would be able to sort out
conflicting regulatory goals and to prioritize responses to the problems
created by the conflicts of interests within financial conglomerates, while
avoiding the agency deadlock or agency capture problems seen in the current
system.
For example, with regard to the problem of tying bank loans to
investment banking business, the US FSA would be ideally situated to
examine the inconsistent laws and regulations that permit tying as long as the
loan is booked through a holding company or a securities subsidiary rather
than directly by the bank. The US FSA could then develop a plan to
harmonize these laws and regulations so that all firms operate on a level
playing field. Any new regulations regarding tying would be reviewed and
commented upon by the Enforcement Division of the US FSA, which may
be better positioned than existing regulators to suggest ways of making the
rules more enforceable than those currently in place.
The other regulatory reform options proposed by the GAO would be less
successful than the US FSA at developing appropriate regulatory responses
for financial conglomerates. The functional consolidation option would still
require the three new federal financial regulators for banking, insurance and
securities to work cooperatively in devising regulations for financial
conglomerates. While it is certainly easier to coordinate three agencies than
it is to coordinate over 115, turf wars could still arise, undermining their
effectiveness in developing regulations for financial conglomerates.
However, the same problems are posed by the twin peaks option, but instead
of three agencies quarrelling with each other over regulations, only two
agencies would be fighting. The financial conglomerate agency option
would create a new entity to regulate financial conglomerates, but would
leave existing regulators in place. As a result, problems would arise regarding
which entities are classified as financial conglomerates and, thus, fall within
the scope of the new agency as opposed to those being regulated by one of
the existing financial regulators. The US FSA would avoid these problems
because, to the extent that similar issues may arise between units within the
US FSA, the US FSA Board of Directors would be able to come to a
resolution more quickly and efficiently than could any process of inter-
agency negotiation or litigation. Therefore, the US FSA would be a better
regulator of financial conglomerates than the other options proposed by the
GAO.
2005]
78 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:1
2. US FSA WOULD BE BETTERABLE TO ADDRESS THE"Too-BIG-To-
FAmL" PROBLEM POSED BY FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES.
The US FSA would be better able to deal with the "too-big-to-fail"
problem than the existing regulatory structure for three reasons. First, by
removing the Federal Reserve as a financial regulator, it would remove a
major incentive for the Federal Reserve to intervene in order to save failing
institutions. The Federal Reserve may have concerns about the damage to
its reputation caused by the failure of a bank under its supervision. Thus, the
Federal Reserve is more likely to attempt to save a troubled bank than it is to
save a bank under the supervision of another regulatory agency.
Second, the creation of the US FSA would make one agency accountable
if a financial conglomerate fails. The US FSA would be more diligent about
supervising troubled institutions and making certain that they are closed
down at an appropriate time because it would be held accountable by
Congress if it failed to act as such. As noted in Part II, the current structure
permits some financial conglomerates to be regulated by different state and
federal agencies on a consolidated basis, while other financial conglomerates
are not regulated in this fashion. The US FSA would be solely responsible
for regulating financial conglomerates and could be held accountable if it
failed to do so properly.
Third, because the US FSA would be a new agency, strong prohibitions
denying it the power to bail out large financial conglomerates could be put
in place. This would not prevent Congress from moving to rescue large,
failed institutions, but such instances are likely to occur less frequently than
agency sponsored rescues because of the difficulty in obtaining the requisite
majority vote in Congress.
The US FSA would be better equipped to deal with the "too big to fail"
problem than the other formulations proposed by the GAO because none of
these options makes a single agency accountable if a financial conglomerate
fails. If a financial conglomerate fails, responsibility would be divided among
three agencies under the functional consolidation option and two agencies
under the twin peaks option. The financial conglomerate agency option
would attempt to make the new agency primarily responsible for financial
conglomerates but the existing financial regulators would continue to play
some role in the regulation of those entities. This lack of alignment might
undermine the ability of holding the new agency accountable if a financial
conglomerate fails.
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C. US FSA Would Respond More Effectively to the Globalization of
Financial Market.
The US FSA would always maintain a unified position in international
negotiations, which would avoid embarrassing situations, such as those
occurring during the Basel II negotiations where different regulators from
the United States argued for different proposals. To the extent that divisions
within the US FSA might have different views on what the U.S.'s position
should be, those differences could be discussed and a unified position
negotiated within the agency before entering into negotiations with other
countries.
The US FSA would also be able to respond to international develop-
ments more quickly, because the head of the US FSA could resolve disputes
within the agency over the appropriate response to a problem. Under the
current system, no mechanism exists to resolve interagency disagreements
in a timely manner. As a result, the US FSA would be able to help American
financial firms take advantage of the potential benefits that result from
globalization.
The foregoing advantages are not available under any of the options
proposed by the GAO. Under all of the other options, different regulators
might have very different positions from one another. None of the other
options provide as efficient a mechanism for resolving the differences over
negotiating positions as does the US FSA.
D. US FSA Would Be Less Prone to Agency Capture.
Several factors either mitigate or eliminate the problem of agency capture
as a concern when forming a U.S. Financial Services Agency. As noted
above, agency capture occurs less frequently in agencies that regulate several
competing interest groups. 373 An agency, like the US FSA, that regulates a
wide range of businesses and sectors, is less likely to be captured because the
interests of the different businesses and sectors will generally be at odds with
one another and will, in part, cancel each other OUt. 374 In addition, the US
FSA would be less likely to be subject to capture by certain sectors within the
financial services industry because its internal structure would be based on
373 See discussion supra Part III.D.1.
374 California recently decided to consolidate many of its agencies in order to take advantage of
the reduction or elimination of the agency capture problem. CAL. PERFORMANCE REV. COMM'N, CAL.
PERFORMANCE REV., THE PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE (2004), available at
http://cpr.ca.gov/updates/archives/pdf/10 20 2004/PublicPerspective/PublicPerspectiveFullRepor
t.pdf; John M. Broder, Plan Would Consolidate California Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2004, at A15.
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regulatory goals, such as prudential concerns, rather than industry segments,
such as insurance.
The US FSA is also less likely to be captured by financial conglomerates
because market forces will ensure that a diverse mix of businesses will
comprise the U.S. financial services industry in the future. To date, the data
suggests that some firms are more profitable when they operate as
conglomerates while others are more profitable when they operate in
specialized areas.375 In the finance literature, the conglomeration hypothesis
states that conglomerates will maximize value by running various businesses
that, together, can achieve both cost scope economies, through sharing
certain inputs, and revenue scope economies, by being able to charge clients
more for the convenience of providing "one-stop shopping. ,376 The strategic
focus hypothesis states that firms specializing through focusing specifically
on core businesses and core competencies will maximize value.37 If only the
conglomeration hypothesis proves correct, then firms would tend over time
to move toward becoming conglomerates.378 However, if only the strategic
focus hypothesis is correct, then firms would tend over time to become more
specialized. 379 The reason for these trends is that the other strategies would
prove to be inefficient and firms would be compelled by market forces to
either change their strategies or to go out of business.3t °
Research on companies in the U.S. insurance industry (which allows
firms to sell both life insurance and property-liability insurance) provides
evidence that specialist firms can coexist with firms that operate in both
insurance lines, referred to as joint producers.38' The insurance sector's
profit scope economies, which take into account both costs and revenues,
375 Allen N. Berger et al., Conglomeration versus Strategic Focus: Evidence from the Insurance Industry,
28 (Univ. Pa. Wharton School Fin. Inst. Center, Working Paper No. 99-29-B, 2000), available at
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fi/papers/99/9929.pdf [hereinafter Berger et al.].
376 Id. at 1; David J. Teece, Economies of Scope and the Scope of Enterprise, 1 J. OF ECON. BEHAv. &
ORG. 233,233-47 (1980); RichardJ. Herring & Anthony M. Santomero, The Corporate Structure of Financial
Conglomerates, 4J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 471, 471-97 (1990); John G. Gallo et al., Commercial Bank Mutual
Fund Activities: Implications for Bank Risk and Profitability, 20 J. OF BANICNG & FIN. 1775, 1775-91 (1996);
Charles W. Calomiris, Universal Banking 'American Style," 154 J. OF INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 44, 44-
60 (1998).
377 Berger et al., supra note 375, at 2; Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate
Finance and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 323,323-29 (1986); Yakov Arnihud & Baruch
Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motivefor Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELLJ. OF ECON. 605, 605-17 (1981);
Margaret Meyer et al., Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes, 1 J. OF ECON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY9, 9-35 (1992).
378 Berger et al., supra note 375, at 2.
379 Id.
38D Id.
381 Id. at 28.
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suggest that conglomerates and specialist firms can coexist. This is so
because the conglomeration hypothesis is valid for large joint producers
emphasizing personal lines of business and firms utilizing vertically
integrated distribution systems while the specialization hypothesis is valid for
small and medium-sized insurers emphasizing commercial lines and firms
utilizing non-integrated distribution systems.3" As a result, the market
forces in the insurance sector will encourage the continued coexistence of
both joint producers and specialized firms.
Agency capture occurs more frequently when efforts to advance general
interest regulation to the detriment of special interests would threaten an
agency's budget or other institutional interests.3s Most countries that have
created a single financial regulator have allowed the regulator's budget to
come out of the fees that it charges.384 Thus, such agencies operate like the
Federal Reserve, which has control over its budget and is not constrained by
a budget imposed by Congress. Research indicates that the Federal Reserve
has been less likely than other U.S. agencies, such as the SEC whose budget
is set by Congress, to be captured by the banks, bank holding companies, and
financial holding companies it regulates.38 5
The functional consolidation and financial conglomerate agency options
both create agencies that are more likely to be captured by certain segments
of the financial services industry than would be US FSA. The twin peaks
option offers benefits similar to those offered by the US FSA because it
creates two agencies covering the entire financial services industry and, thus,
would be less prone to capture than the existing agencies or the other two
options proposed by the GAO.
E. US FSA Would Improve Consumer Protections.
The creation of the US FSA would benefit consumers in several ways.
First, by merging the existing regulators and ending duplicative regulations,
the US FSA would reduce the cost of bringing new products and services to
market. Second, by merging the existing regulators, the US FSA would
encourage innovation in the kinds of regulations employed, which would
lead to better, more cost efficient regulations. Third, by creating a single
database used to track people and firms who have violated financial laws and
regulations, the US FSA would be more effective in deterring financial
crimes, enforcing the laws and regulations, and ensuring consumer
382 Id. at 27.
3s3 Croley, supra note 274, at 15-16; Ramirez, supra note 104, at 541-42.
W See, e.g., About the FSA: Who are we: How we are funded, available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Who/Funded/Index.shtm (last modified Apr. 4, 2005)
385 Ramirez, supra note 104, at 541-42.
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protection. Finally, by creating the Consumer Protection Division within
the US FSA, the agency would be more likely to take into account consumer
protection concerns than would some of the existing agencies.
1. US FSA WOULD END THE REGULATORY RACE-TO-THE-BOTTOM.
The US FSA would end the race-to-the-bottom phenomenon because
firms would no longer be able to play one regulator off against another. In
addition, by clearly articulating consumer protection as one of the agency's
goals, the agency will be held accountable for its progress in this area. As
outlined in Part IV, the Consumer Protection Division would be the internal
agency that ensures consumers are heard. States would continue to be able
to protect their citizens through the enforcement of federal laws and
regulations, but would no longer be able to disrupt financial markets by
enacting conflicting laws and regulations.3"6
The experience of the UK FSA provides reason to believe that the US
FSA would improve consumer protection. During its first three years of
existence, the UK FSA has been successful at meeting its goal of protecting
consumers. In fact, the Financial Services Practitioner Panel for the UK FSA
reported in December of 2004 that some practitioners were concerned that
387the UK FSA was too focused on protecting consumers.
Under both the functional consolidation option and the financial
conglomerate agency option, firms would still be able to play one regulator
off another. Under the functional consolidation option, the opportunities
to do so would be substantially reduced but would still exist. Why? The
financial conglomerate agency option would allow all of the 115 existing
regulators to continue to operate, ensuring a continuation of the problem.
Among these options, the twin peaks option would provide an outcome that
would come close to achieving the benefits of the US FSA as it would create
two agencies having significantly different regulatory goals, one focusing on
prudential issues and the other on market issues. As a result, the
opportunities to play these two agencies off against one another would be
very few. The US FSA as a single regulator would still be marginally better
than the twin peaks option as it would eliminate the ability of financial firms
to pit different agencies against each other and thus, would avoid the race-to-
the-bottom that could exist with any of the other options.
3M Butler and Macey noted that many of the banking laws, like the Glass-Steagall Act and the
McFadden Act, were originally designed to protect banks from competitive pressures. Butler & Macey,
supra note 312, at 693. For example, the anti-branching state laws allowed local state regulators to protect
local bank monopolies.
387 3 FIN. SERVICES PRAC. PANEL SuRv. FSA's REG. PERFORMANCE (2004), available at
http://ww.fs-pp.org/uk/docs/surveys/2004perfornancereport.pdf.
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2. US FSAWOULD ENCOURAGE INNOVATIONS THATWOULD BENEFIT
CONSUMERS.
The US FSA would be more likely to encourage innovative products,
like the home equity policy, because the initial approval process would be
considerably cheaper and faster. Under this system, the first company
seeking to offer a new product would only have to submit one application to
the US FSA rather than having to contact state insurance, banking and
securities regulators in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.
A second way that creation of the US FSA would encourage innovation
is in the way products and firms are regulated. As previously noted, existing
regulators tend to have a preferred regulatory method and do not give
adequate consideration to other methods that may prove more effective.3"'
Under the structure proposed for the US FSA in Part IV(A), consolidating
the existing agencies into the US FSA would result in the prudential
regulators from the banking, insurance and securities sectors being combined
into the Prudential Standards Division and the conduct of business
regulators from those sectors being combined into the Regulatory Processes
and Risk Division. In both of these new divisions, these regulators would
expose each other to different ways of viewing prudential or conduct of
business regulatory challenges. Additionally, the US FSA would encourage
cooperation and discourse among all of its divisions, enhancing the potential
for regulatory synergies and the emergence of innovative regulatory
processes.
The potential for these types of synergies is displayed in the regulatory
proposals made by personnel that have moved from one regulatory agency
to another. The proposal by Cynthia Glassman, a senior economist at the
Federal Reserve Board and a recess appointee to the SEC, to require
disclosure of CAMELS ratings is an example of this phenomenon. In 2002,
she proposed that CAMELS ratings issued by both state and federal bank
regulators be disclosed to the public.3 89 Her suggestion was not the first time
that such a disclosure had been recommended.3" Nevertheless, Ms.
Glassman acknowledged that her willingness to consider such a disclosure
was a product of her move from one agency, the Federal Reserve, to another,
the SEC.39' The SEC has a different perspective regarding financial
38 See discussion supra Part III.E.2.
3n Rob Blackwell, Camels Score Disclosure Back in Play, [2002] AM. BANKER 1; Nader, supra note
279.
39 Both former FDIC Chairman William Isaac and former FDIC Chairman L. William Seidman
had supported disclosing CAMELS scores in the 1980s. Blackwell, supra note 387, at 1.
391 The banking industry representatives strongly oppose CAMELS scores being disclosed on the
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regulations than does the Federal Reserve and is not as beholden to the banks
as is the Federal Reserve.
In all but the financial conglomerate agency option, the initial approval
process for products and services likely would be completed in a more cost
efficient manner and with greater expediency than under the current regime.
It would not be faster under the financial conglomerate agency option
because that option retains all existing regulators and adds another agency to
deal with financial conglomerates. Thus, the approval process for products
and services likely would remain relatively unchanged under that option.
The US FSA, however, would more effectively encourage regulatory
innovations than would either the functional consolidation option or the
financial conglomerate agency option because it would expose regulators to
different types of regulation. The twin peaks options might result in benefits
similar to those realized under the US FSA because the two agencies would
also be regulating certain types of risks rather than entities or products.
Nevertheless, the two agencies created under the twin peaks option might be
marginally less innovative than the US FSA as the regulators dealing with
different types of risks would interact with one another less frequently due
to their placement in separate agencies. As a result, fewer synergies and
correspondingly fewer innovations may result when financial regulators
operate out of two agencies.
3. US FSA WOULD PROVIDE CONSUMERS WITH A ONE-STOP SHOP
FOR INFORMATION ABOUT, AND PROTECTION FROM, THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES INDUSTRY.
By eliminating the confusing array of agencies regulating financial
services and creating a single agency to which complaints may be reported,
the US FSA would make it easier for consumers to seek redress against
financial service companies. Local offices and a national call center would
make it easier for consumers to determine which agency to contact in order
to seek the help they require.
The US FSA can draw on the experiences of the OCC and other
regulators that have operated similar centers in order to ensure that the call
center is up and running quickly. The OCC currently operates a consumer
grounds that such scores are "ajudgment call" and could have a "distortional effect" on banks' operations.
Bank examiners have also opposed releasing the scores on the grounds that doing so would make their
job more difficult as banks fought for higher scores, which would make exams more hostile. Blackwell,
supra note 387.
Proponents of disclosing the CAMELS ratings argue that it would force regulators to be more
responsible in determining the ratings and that it would provide investors and depositors with greater
information about the bank. Blackwell, supra note 389; Nader, supra note 279.
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complaint center in Houston, Texas, which is used to handle complaints
about national banks. The center has 40 staff members that respond to
approximately 78,000 complaints annually.392 The center returned about $6
million in fees to consumers in 2002.393
None of the other options proposed by the GAO would create a single
place to which consumers could direct complaints or concerns about
financial institutions. The financial conglomerate agency option would add
to consumers' confusion by heaping yet another agency on top of more than
115 existing agencies. The functional consolidation option would provide
a more viable alternative, but would still not be as effective as the US FSA.
Under this alternative, three agencies would be created to which consumers
could complain, but consumers may still be confused about whether to raise
a complaint concerning insurance or securities sold by a bank to the banking
regulator, the securities regulator or the insurance regulator. The twin peaks
option would also be better than the existing regime but not as effective as
the US FSA, because consumers and investors may still be uncertain as to
what concerns or issues to raise with the agency focusing on security issues
and those to raise with the agency focusing on conduct-of-business issues.
Under the US FSA, consumers and investors would not be faced with this
confusing problem.
F. US FSA Would Provide More Cost Efficient Regulation.
US FSA would eliminate regulatory overlap and duplication as well as
inter-agency turf wars, in which the agencies frequently engage.
Additionally, the US FSA would allow more resources, in the form of both
funds and personnel, to be used in determining the proper scope and type of
regulations to apply.
Through this system, costs would be reduced in several ways. First,
money would not be wasted on duplicative efforts in the form of licensing
reviews of the same broker or company by different state and federal
agencies, on product approvals for the same product by different state and
federal agencies, or on examinations by different agencies. Second,
economies of scale would allow the US FSA to perform the same functions
with fewer employees than the combined workforce currently employed by
the state and federal agencies at issue. The US FSA could also reassign
agency officials to where the needs are the greatest more readily than could
individual smaller agencies. Internal services common to all state and federal
agencies - such as human resources, purchasing and accounting- would also
392 Blackwell, supra note 387.
393 Id.
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realize savings through economies of scale and reduction of the duplication
of efforts.394
To varying degrees, other nations and some U.S. states have benefited
from these types of cost savings. For example, the UK FSA spent less, in real
terms, between 1998 and 2002 than the combined budgets of its predecessor
regulatory bodies.395 The UK FSA's budget decreased in real terms during
this period, despite the fact that it incurred transitional costs connected with
the consolidation of its financial service regulators.3 96 In addition, by
combining its three major financial regulators, Germany was able to reduce
its annual expenses by about 4% from 95.4 million in 2001 to 91.6 million
in 2003.397 If one factors in inflation, this savings increases to over 8%. Here
in the United States, from 2003 to 2004, the State of Illinois was able to
reduce the costs it faced in regulating financial services over 14% by
consolidating its separate banking, securities and insurance regulators into
the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation.398  While
Michigan's regulatory expenses increased initially in 2001 and 2002 after the
creation of a single financial services regulatory agency, these costs decreased
substantially in 2003.399 In that year, Michigan spent 14% less than it spent
400in 1999 on the regulation of its financial services.
394 CAL. PERFORMANCE REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 373. The report cited the consolidation of
internal services to achieve economies of scale as a major benefit of its proposal to dramatically consolidate
the number of California departments, agencies and boards.
395 2001-2002 F SA PLAN & BUDGET 45, available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/plarn/pb200l_02.pdf; Clive Briault, Revisiting the Rationalefor a Single National
Financial Services Regulator, 16 FSA OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 16 (2002), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/OP16.pdf.
39 Id.
397 2003 BUNDESANSTALT FOR FINANZDIENSTLEISTUNGSAUFSICHT [BAFIN], ANN. REP. Pt. A,
at 217 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.bafin.de/jahresbericht/jb03_en.pdf- BUNDESAUFSICHTSAMT FOR
DEN WERTPAPIERHANDEL [BAWE], ANN. REP. 53, available at
http://www.bafin.de/jahresbericht/jb0l-wa.pdf; 2001 BUNDESAUFSICHTSAMTES FOR DAS KREDITWESEN
[BAKRED] Bus. REP. 70, available at http//www.bafin.de/jahresbericht/jbba.pdf; 2001
BUNDESAUFSICHTSAMTES FOR DAS VERSICHERUNGSWESEN [BAV] Bus. REP. pt. A., at 91, available at
http://www.bafin.de/jahresbericht/jb0l-va.pdf.
398 Press Release, Ill. Gov't News Network, Five-Agency Merger Will Net $14 Million in Savings
(Feb. 18, 2004), available at http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectlD = 1&
RecNum=2740.
399 2002 MICH. OFFICE FIN.& INS. SERVICES,ANN. REP. 11, available at http://www.michigan.gov/
documents/cis-ofis-ar2002_full69385_7.pdf; 2001 MICH. OFFICE FIN. & INS. SERVICES, ANN. REP. 10,
available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/cis-ofis-ar200 lfull49006_7.pdf.
400 1999 MICH. FIN. INST. BUREAU, ANN. REP. 55, available at http://www.michigan.gov/
documents/cis ofis 99full_25266 7.pdf;1999MICH.INS.BuREAu,ANN.REP.25,availableathttp://www.
michigan.gov/documents/cis ofis 99 asr25455_7.pdf; 2003 MICH. OFFICE FIN. & INS. SERVICES, ANN.
REP. 11, available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/2003_Final-withbookmarks- 97123_7.pdf.
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The United States might expect that its savings would mirror or exceed
those realized by Illinois and Michigan rather than those of the United
Kingdom or Germany, as the United States' regulatory regime is
considerably more costly than are those of the United Kingdom and
Germany. As previously noted, the United States spends 12 times more than
the United Kingdom and over 86 times more than Germany in its regulation
of financial services.4"1 While some of these costs may be due to the more
intensive regulation of financial services undertaken by the United States,
some of these costs can be attributed to the jurisdictional overlap between
state and federal agencies. These regulatory costs have a ripple effect upon
the financial services industry as the fees, assessments, and taxes raised that
are used to pay for the regulatory regimes generally far exceed the actual
budgets of the regulatory agencies. In the end, financial service customers
bear the brunt of these expenses.
These cost savings would not occur in the financial conglomerate agency
option. In fact, costs would probably increase as a new agency would be
created while all of the other agencies continued to operate. The functional
consolidation and twin peaks options would result in some of the cost
savings seen in the US FSA model, but would not realize the economies of
scale achieved by the US FSA. For example, the three agencies formed
under the functional consolidation option or the two agencies formed under
the twin peaks option would not be able to reallocate staff to needed areas to
the extent that the US FSA could.
VI. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS POSED BYA SINGLE
FINANCIAL REGULATOR
Creating a single financial services regulator may pose the following
problems:
" Any regulatory consolidation may reduce regulatory competition and
experimentation;
" A single regulator would be very large and could prove unwieldy and
costly;
" A single regulator may have difficulty prioritizing issues;
" A single regulator may have difficulty responding to smaller firms
and, thus, may undermine the diversity of institutions that currently
comprise the U.S. financial industry;
401 See discussion supra Part II.F.
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" A single regulator may lose or fail to develop staff with specialized
knowledge related to large companies, small companies and industry
sectors;
* A single regulator may lack accountability to both consumers and
market participants; and
* A single regulator will face logistical problems when it merges the
existing regulators to form a single agency. 402
All of these problems can either be avoided or managed to reduce any
negative effects. None of the issues are so grave and intractable as to prevent
the creation of a single regulator. Each of these problems will be analyzed in
turn.
A. US FSA Would Lose the Benefits of Regulatory Competition.
As discussed in Part III (E), a determination as to whether regulatory
competition exists and is desirable has been the focus of much debate.4°3
Nevertheless, the reduction in regulatory competition from the creation of
the US FSA will not result in significant harm, but will actually bring about
many benefits.
1. US FSA MAINTAINS THE PROVEN BENEFICIAL ASPECTS OF
REGULATORY COMPETITION WHILE ELIMINATING THE MORE
PROBLEMATIC ONES.
Supporters of the dual system of state and federal regulation have pointed
to the recent activities of New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer as
evidence that states will act when the federal government fails to do so.
4 GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 8, at 130-31; Martinez & Rose, supra note
372, at 27-31.
43 Regulatory competition may take several forms. Regulatory competition may occur in the area
of enacting new laws or regulations as well as in the enforcement of existing laws. Articles that support
the desirability of regulatory competition include the following, among others: BAIR REPORT, supra note
23, at 51; Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J.
2359 (1998); Rosen, supra note 295, at 967 (specialization among regulators allows banks the ability to
improve performance by switching regulators).
Arguments supporting the view that regulatory competition either does not exist or is
undesirable can be found in the following articles, among others: Butler & Macey, supra note 312, at 677
(arguing that regulatory competition in banking does not exist because of the Supremacy Clause); James
D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200, 1201 (1999) (arguing that
regulatory competition naturally leads to a "race to the bottom"); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory
Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1338-39 (1999)
(arguing that competitive federalism will decrease U.S. economic welfare); Whalen, supra note 300.
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Spitzer has used New York's Martin Act to bring anti-fraud actions against
Merrill Lynch, Salomon Smith Barney and other investment banks for
allowing their stock analysts to fraudulently promote stocks. He has also
filed suit against mutual funds for allowing certain large clients to engage in
late trading and market timing practices to the detriment of small investors,
and against hedge funds.' Critics of the SEC claim that the agency failed
to bring these cases because it was captured by the industry. °5
Spitzer's actions, however, fall into two categories: Enforcing existing
laws and creating new remedies. With regard to his enforcement actions,
several factors are worth mentioning. First, nothing in my proposal would
prevent Spitzer or any other state prosecutor from using their office to
enforce the federal finance laws. So under the US FSA, the United States
will continue to reap the benefits of state enforcement of the financial laws
and regulations. Second, as admirable as they may be, Spitzer's actions pose
somewhat of an anomaly. For over 70 years prior to Spitzer's appointment
to the position, New York attorneys general did not aggressively use the
Martin Act to prosecute fraud within the financial services industry.4°6
Spitzer's use of the Martin Act has been criticized as political opportunism
rather than as a concerted effort to have New York State remain an effective
securities regulator.47  Further, Spitzer's actions are not necessarily
representative of all state securities regulators. Enforcement actions by state
securities regulators have varied considerably from one state to another.08
In addition, state budget constraints have resulted in the understaffing of
some state banking, securities and insurance staffs, making it more difficult
these entities to operate as effective regulators."
With respect to the remedies sought by Spitzer, these actions are not as
beneficial as his supporters contend and frequently seem to have little
relation to the harms incurred. In the case of his actions against the mutual
fund industry, he required the funds to reduce their fees as part of
4(W Nicholas Thompson, The Sword of Spitzer, LEGAL AFFAIRS, at 53-54 (2004).
405 Id. at 54 (stating that Noreen Harrington, the whistleblower who tipped off Spitzer's office to
the problems in the mutual fund industry, did not approach the SEC because she did not believe the SEC
would act on her tip).
4 Id. at 51-52 (noting that the Martin Act was generally not used by the New York attorney
generals for over 70 years during the period from the end of Attorney General Albert Ottinger's term in
1928 until 2001 when Attorney General Eliot Spitzer decided to use the Martin Act against Merrill
Lynch).
40 Id. at 54 (commenting that Spitzer has raised a significant amount of money for future races
and quoting at least one critic who says that Spitzer "will screw you for everything he can to get
publicity").
40 Joel Seligman, Multiple Regulators: Wh~ere Are We? How did We Get Here?, THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES REVOLUTION, at 471 (Clifford E. Kirsh, ed. 1997).
4N Thompson, supra note 404, at 54 (2004).
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settlements even though the high fees charged by funds had little or no
relation to the market timing and late trading practices for which Spitzer had
sought legal redress.410
It is, in fact, the regulators in all 50 states that impose duplicative or
inconsistent regulations that are at the root of the current structure's
problem. Spitzer himself admitted in a speech to the alumni of New York
University School of Law that allowing all 50 states to regulate financial
services is problematic. At the same time, he expressed his hope that
Congress would not preempt state actions during over the course of the
following three years, the remainder of his term as Attorney General.4 '
2. PROPONENTS OF REGULATORY COMPETITION HAVE EXAGGERATED
How FREQUENTLY IT OccuRs.
The current regime does not provide many concrete examples of true
regulatory competition. The case supporting this proposition was well
articulated by Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey in their article, "The
Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System."412 There, they argue
that the dual banking system does not really lead to regulatory competition
because of several factors, including: (1) the federal government exercising
its powers of preemption under the power of the Supremacy Clause to
prevent any significant loss of market share or regulatory control to the states;
(2) requiring both state and federal banks to obtain FDIC insurance in order
to remain competitive and subjecting them to the regulations set forth by the
FDIC; and (3) 34 states adopting laws that automatically impose the
regulations of national banks on state banks in certain circumstances.413
Butler and Macey also concluded that it was in the best interests of both state
and federal bank regulators to engage in cooperative practices rather than in
competition to enhance their relative power and to extract the maximum
rents from the banking industry.41 4 They then went on to characterize the
existing system of state and federal bank regulators as a regulatory cartel." 5
A similar case has been made in the context of insurance. Proponents of
the existing system have argued that currently, regulators are allowed to
experiment with different regulatory frameworks. These individuals argue
that this experimentation results in the formulation of effective regulations
which then lead an adoption of the best practices at the state level. In reality,
410 Id.
411 Id. (in the same speech, Spitzer noted, "In three more years, I'll move on to other things.").
412 Butler & Macey, supra note 312.
413 Id. at 694-99; ANN GRAHAM, BANKING LAW S 4.03[10] (LexisNexis Matthew Bender: 2004).
414 Butler & Macey, supra note 312, at 691-93.
415 Id. at 690.
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this type of regulatory competition rarely occurs.416 For example, in the case
of regulations governing insurance receiverships, a lack of uniformity in how
states establish, operate and evaluate property-liability insurance receiverships
certainly exists, which theoretically should lead to this type of regulatory
competition.417 These types of regulation, however, generally garner little
attention from either the states' executive or legislative branches. This is
surprising as current regulations generally result in significantly greater losses
for government sponsored guaranty associations from property-liability
failures than for other financial institutions.418
According to a recent empirical study, the average cost to guaranty
associations for property-liability insurers' insolvencies during the period
from 1986 to 1999 was $1.10 per $1 of pre-insolvency assets, which is three
to five times as much as the losses realized by a typical bank failure.4 9 The
study determined that one of the main factors causing the high cost of
insurance insolvency resolution was regulatory forbearance and that earlier
intervention by regulators before an insurer actually becomes insolvent or
generates large deficits would result in significant cost savings. Calls for
reform, however, have occurred in only a few states. Between 1986 and
2000, three states produced auditor general reports on their state insurance
receivership practices. Each of these reports was highly critical of the existing
departmental practices and called for reform. Nevertheless, none of these
states instituted major structural reforms.421
3. THE BENEFITS OF REGULATORY COMPETITION HAVE NOT
PERSUADED OTHER COUNTRIES TO RECREATE THE MULTITUDE OF
REGULATORS IN THE UNITED STATES.
Over the past 20 years, at least 50 countries have either created a single
financial services regulator or a semi-integrated regulatory structure for
financial services by consolidating the regulation of at least two sectors,
either: banking and securities, banking and insurance, or securities and
416 Martin F. Grace et al., Insurance Company Failures: Wy Do They Cost So Much?, at 31 (Ga. St.
Univ. Ctr. for Risk Mgmt. & Ins. Research, Working Paper No. 03-1, 2003).
417 Id.
418 Id.
419 Id. at 2 (citing an empirical study by Christopher James published in 1991 that found that the
average cost of the typical bank failure in the late 1980's was $0.30 per $1 of pre-insolvency assets and
another empirical study by George G. Kaufmann published in 2001 that found that the average cost of
the typical bank failure in the period 1995-2000 was $0.20 per $1 of pre-insolvency assets).
421 Id. at 29, 3 1.421 Grace, supra note 416, at 3 1.
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insurance, into one agency.422 While some of the countries that have created
an integrated financial service regulatory agency are quite small, others - like
the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany - have large and sophisticated
financial systems. Japan, Germany and the U.K. made up three of the four
leading insurance countries in 2001 in terms of direct premiums written .423
These countries also contain three of the largest securities markets in the
world: The Nikkei, Deutsche Borse, and the London Stock Exchange.
Furthermore, Japanese, German and British banks are some of the largest
banks in the world. The following table lists all of the countries that have
single financial regulators or semi-integrated regulators:
422 A number of articles have compared the supervisory regimes of different countries adopting
a single banking or financial services supervisory agency model, including: Richard K. Abrams & Michael
W. Taylor, Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/00/213, Dec.
2003); James R. Barth et al., A Cross-Country Analysis of Bank Supervisory Framework and Bank Performance,
12 FIN. MARKETS, INST. & INSTRUMENTS 67 (May 2003); Ellis Ferran, Symposium: Do Financial
Supermarkets Need Super Regulators? Examining the United Kingdom's Experience in Adopting the Single Financial
Regulator Model, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 257 (2003); Markham, Super Regulator, supra note 351, at 319;
Martfnez & Rose, supra note 372; Marc Quintyn & Michael W. Taylor, Regulatory and Supervisory
Independence and Financial Stability (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/02/46, March 2002); 2001 HUNG. FIN.
SUPERVISORYAUTH-., ANN. REP. 3 (May 2002); 2003 CENT. BANK& FIN. SERv. AUTH. OF IR. ACT No.
12. The GDP of these countries in 2002 totaled approximately $15.35 trillion, or 31.3 percent of the
world's GDP. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, Rank Order - GDP, available at
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/200lrank.html.
42 INS. INFO. INST., INTERNATIONAL INS. FACT BOOK 2003, available at
www.intemationalinsurance.org/intemational/overview/.
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Countries with Either an Integrated or Semi-Integrated Financial
Services Agency as ofJanuary 1, 2006.42
Single Supervisor Single Agency Supervising Two Types
for Financial of Financial Intermediaries
Services
(Year Created) Banks and Banks and Securities
Securities Firms Insurers Firms
and Insurers
Austria (2002) Dominican Australia Bolivia
Bahrain (2002) Republic Belgium Bulgaria
Cayman Islands Finland Canada Chile
(1997) Luxembourg Colombia Egypt
Denmark (1988) Mexico Ecuador Jamaica
Estonia (2002) Switzerland El Salvador Mauritius
Germany (2002) Uruguay Guatemala Slovakia
Gibraltar (1991) Kazakhstan South Africa
Hungary (2000) Malaysia Ukraine
Iceland (2001) Peru














424 Martfnez & Rose, supra note 372, at 13; Barth et.al., supra note 422; 2003 CENT. BANK & FIN.
SERVICES AUTH. OF IR. ACT No. 12, supra note 422, at Part III.A., Ch. I, par. 33B (2003); Bahrain
Monetary Agency, Financial Sector Overview, available at http://www.bma.gov.bh/cmsrulefindex.jsp?action
=article&ID=16; Bulgaria Financial Supervision Commission, About the Commission, available at
www.scbg/e_fsc_page.asp?v=2; Cayman Island Monetary Authority,About Us-Some Events in the History
of the Cayman Islands, available at www.cimoney.com.ky/templates/HTMLPage/defaultdisplay.asp?textid
-HTMLPage50644&button= 1; Dominica to Set Up a Single Financial Regulatory Body, FIN. TIMES (Dec.
31, 2003); Finland Ministry of Finance, Stability and Supervision, available at www.vm.f.vim/liston/print.
lsp?r=2702&1 =en; Gibraltar Financial Services Commission, About Us - Commission, available at
www.fscgi/fsc/commission.htm; Financial Services Commission of Jamaica, Brief History, available at
www.fscjamaica.org/public info files/pageOO13.htm; Gulmira Kapenova, SupervisionoftheSecuritiesMarket
in Kazakhstan, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/30/31739306.pdf; SAUDI ARABIA MONETARY
AGENCY,A Case Study on Globalization and the Role ofInstitution Building in the Financial Sector in SaudiArabia,
at 12, Feb. 2004, available at httpV//www.sama-ksa.org/en/news/2004-03/SK521; Taiwan Combining Financial
Regulators to Bring in Investors, TAIWAN NEWS, July 1, 2004; Franco van Zyl, Financial Regulation Lagging,
SUNDAY BUS. TIMES, available at www.btimes.co.za/98/0329/btmoney/moneyl7.htm.
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Several other countries are either considering or already have considered
creating a single financial supervisor. Countries considering the creation of
a single financial supervisory agency include Russia, Bulgaria, Indonesia,
Italy, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, the
Ukraine425 and Finland.426 Some countries, like the Netherlands and
Australia, have moved from having at least one separate regulator for banks,
securities firms, and insurers, to consolidating at least two of these regulators
into one agency.
427
The actions of these nations illustrate that the international trend has
been toward the consolidation of financial supervision and regulation into
fewer agencies, even though the countries that have elected to establish a
single financial services regulator have not uniformly agreed what powers
should be bestowed upon this agency.428 This suggests that, in the
marketplace of ideas, other nations are not convinced that the benefits of
regulatory competition outweigh its considerable costs.
B. US FSA Would be Large and Unwieldy.
The GAO commented that a single financial regulator for the United
States would have to be considerably larger than those existing in other
countries, like the UK FSA in the United Kingdom. 429 The GAO noted that
the UK FSA only had 2,300 employees while the total number of employees
in the existing state and federal regulators in the United States is significantly
larger, ranging from about 30,000 to 40,000.430 The US FSA would probably
42 Martinez & Rose, supra note 372, at 4; Honey Madrilejos-Reyes, Senate Proposes Single Financial
Regulation, MANILA TIMEs,June 17, 2003.
426 On Nov. 24, 1997, a report commissioned by the Finnish Ministry of Finance was published,
which recommended that the Insurance Supervision and the Financial Supervision Authority be merged
into a single regulatory authority in the Prime Minister's Office. Kaario Jannari, Means, Strategies and
Internationalization of Financial Supervision, FINNISH FIN. SUPERVISION AUTH. BULLETIN 1, 7 (1998),
available at www.rahoitustarkastus.fi/english/publications/data/speeches-andarticles/ljannari.pdf.
4Z7 The Netherlands is in the process of adopting a twin peaks regulatory model, while Australia
adopted a twin peaks approach in 1998. THE GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 8, at 70-
71.
423 For example, some nations exclude certain financial intermediaries from regulation and
supervision by the integrated agencies. The United Kingdom initially did not grant the UK FSA the
power to regulate mortgage advisers and insurance brokers, although both groups became subject to
regulation by the UK FSA in 2004. Latvia and Singapore have not subjected leasing companies to
regulation by their respective integrated financial service regulators. Martinez & Rose, supra note 372, at
13.
429 GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 8, at 131.
430 Id.
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retain fewer people than currently are employed by all of the existing U.S.
financial regulators, as it would eliminate duplicative requirements and
administrative bodies. When Germany consolidated its banking, securities,
and insurance regulatory agencies between 2001 and 2003 to create its single
regulator, BaFin, it reduced the number of staff employed by the financial
regulators by about 20%.43 Even if the US FSA did not achieve the dramatic
reduction in staff that Germany's BaFin achieved, 40,000 people working
together would be more productive than they are in the current system, as
the number of regulatory turf wars would be greatly reduced.
Certainly the process of creating such a large agency will include a large
number of political obstacles. Nevertheless, even if the US FSA retained all
of the roughly 40,000 employees in the existing state and federal financial
regulators, the US FSA would not be the largest federal government agency,
nor would it even make the list of one of the ten largest federal departments
or agencies. 432 The US FSA, in fact, would be over 33% smaller than the
average federal cabinet department, excluding the Department of Defense,
the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Department of Homeland
Security.43
431 The number of staff for the German federal banking, securities and insurance regulators in
2001 totaled 1,133 and the number ofstafffor BaFin in 2003 totaled 901. 2001-2002 FIN. SERVICES AUTH.
[FSA] ANN. REP. 72 (U.K), supra note 361, at 80; UK FSA, ANN. REP., supra note 336, at 205.
432 The top ten federal agencies and departments in descending order are: the Department of
Defense, the Department of Veterans Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of the Treasury, the Department of Agriculture, the Department ofJustice, the Department
of the Interior, the Department of Health and Human Resources, the Department of Transportation, and
the Social Security Administration. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV'T, FISCAL YEAR 2005, available at
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005.
433 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVE'T, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FISCAL YEAR 2005, available at
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/treasury.htm; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV'T, DEP'T OF COM., FISCAL YEAR 2005,
available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2OO5/commerce.html; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV'T, DEP'T OF STATE, FISCAL
YEAR 2005, available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/state.html; OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV'T, DEP'T OF HOUS.
AND URBAN DEv., FISCAL YEAR 2005, available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/hud.html;
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOV'T, DEP'T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2005, available at
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/education.html; OFFICEOF MGMT. &BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV'T, DEP'T OF AGRIC., FISCAL YEAR 2005,
available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/agriculture.html; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV'T, DEP'T OFJUSTICE, FISCAL
YEAR 2005, available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2OO5/justice.html; OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV'T, DEP'T OF LABOR,
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The merger of the existing state and federal regulators into the US FSA
would not be the largest merger of government agencies, in terms of number
of employees, ever undertaken by the United States. The creation of the
Department of Homeland Security, which has over 183,000 employees,
represented a considerably larger merger than would be the US FSA merger
in terms of number of employees.434 The Department of Homeland Security
has roughly 41/ times the total number of employees currently making up
the workforce of all of the federal and state financial regulatory agencies
combined.435
Certainly Congress would more likely be motivated to create a large
financial regulator, like the US FSA, if the United States experienced a major
financial crisis. Prior to terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, few in the
United States would have foreseen the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security. However, following the attacks, there was sufficient
FIsCAL YEAR 2005, available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/labor.html; OFFICE OF MGMT.
& BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV'T, DEP'T OF
TRANSP., FISCAL YEAR 2005, available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/transportation.html;
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOV'T, DEP'T OF ENERGY, FISCAL YEAR 2005, available at
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2OOS/energy.html; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV'T, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. RES.,
FISCALYEAR2005, availableatwww.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2OO5/health.html; OFFICEOF MGMT.
& BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV'T, DEP'T OF
INTERIOR, FISCALYEAR 2005, available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005Anterior.html; OFFICE
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV'T,
DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FISCAL YEAR 2005, available at
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/defense.htm; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV'T, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FiSCALYEAR
2005, available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/homeland.html; OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV'T, Dep't ofVeterans
Affairs, FISCAL YEAR 2005, at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/veteransaffairs.html. The
Department of Defense, which is the largest federal government agency, has about 700,000 civilian
employees in addition to the 2.3 million military personnel in the active military, reserves and national
guard, the Department of Veterans Affairs employs 211,764 people, and the Department of Homeland
Security employs over 183,000 people. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV'T, DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FISCAL YEAR 2005, available at
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/defense.html; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV'T, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FISCALYEAR
2005, available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budgetfy2005/homeland.html; OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV'T, DEP'T OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS, FISCAL YEAR 2005, available at
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/veteransaffairs.html.
434 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOV'T, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FISCALYEAR 2005, supra note 430.
435 Id.
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political momentum to rapidly push legislation creating this department
through Congress. It is possible that some future financial crisis will help
build a political coalition desiring the creation of the US FSA. Financial
crises in the Nordic countries and in the United Kingdom provided
significant momentum to create single financial regulators.
C. US FSA May Have Dfficulty Prioritizing Issues.
The charge that the US FSA would have difficulty prioritizing issues is
unfounded. This criticism could be leveled at any organization and does not
appear to be a unique feature of a single regulator. The UK FSA has
benefited from the clear goals enunciated in its enabling legislation, which
have helped it prioritize the issues that it confronts. Congress could
minimize or eliminate this problem if it also provided a clear set of goals
when establishing the US FSA.
D. US FSA May be Unresponsive to Small Firms.
This problem could be raised with respect to any consolidation of
regulators. Merely increasing the size of an organization does not mean that
it will automatically begin ignoring small financial firms and individuals.
The accountability safeguards, such as the practitioners' panel and the
consumers' panel, would help mitigate any tendency on the part of the US
FSA to do so, as these panels would force the US FSA to account for such
actions. If this is truly a realistic concern, a separate small business panel
could be created that would ensure that the US FSA appropriately addresses
the unique concerns of small business.
E. US FSA May Fail to Develop Staff With Specialized Knowledge
Concerning Sectors Within the Financial Services Industry.
Again this problem can be eliminated in the way the US FSA is
organized. Under my proposal described in Part IV, the Prudential Division
and the Regulatory Processes and Risk Division would contain groups that
deal with diversified firms and other groups that would deal with specialized
financial firms. Under the proposed structure, the US FSA would be
developing and employing staffthat would not only retain but build upon the
specialized knowledge pertaining to certain sectors and businesses.
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F. US FSA May Lack Accountability.
How the regulator is structured will determine its level of accountability.
In Part IV, I proposed several features that would enable Congress,
practitioners and consumers to hold the US FSA accountable for its actions.
These features include the practitioners' and consumers' panels and both
annual and periodic reports to Congress, as well as the possibility of the
creation of a special office which would investigate complaints against the
US FSA. All of these features would assist in holding the agency accountable
for its regulation and supervision of the financial industry.
G. US FSA May Experience Logistical Problems When it Merges the
Multiple Regulators.
The US FSA may encounter the following logistical problems when it
merges the existing regulators to form the new agency:
" Legal constraints requiring the passage of several pieces of financial
sector legislation during the first three years of existence;
* Loss of experienced personnel;
• Delays in integrating information technology systems and the
infrastructure of merged agencies;
* Demoralization of the staff of the merged entities;
* Lack of mission and clarity in the newly merged institution;
* Budgetary problems, which will result in an insufficiency of funds
to complete the integration of agencies;
• One approach to supervision dominating the others, occurring
particularly when one agency, usually the banking regulator, has
more staff, resources and facilities prior to the merger of the
agencies;
* Market confusion arising if efforts are not made to make certain that
all market participants understand the reasons for creating an
integrated agency; and
• Integrating agencies when the financial sector is experiencing a crisis
may prevent management from focusing on important supervisory
tasks and, thus, creating an integrated financial services agency
should be done when the financial system is stable.43
6
In creating the US FSA, I recognize that the United States would face
several legal constraints that would require the passage ofmajor amendments
436 Martinez & Rose, supra note 372, at 27-31.
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to existing legislation. The burden of doing so, however, could be mitigated
if Congress would be willing to pass a single bill containing all of the
necessary changes. This is how the UK created the UK FSA, and,
subsequently, was able to avoid some of the problems faced by other
countries choosing to enact multiple pieces of legislation.
The United States would almost certainly face the problem of loss of
personnel. Nine out of the 14 countries surveyed by Martinez and Rose
reported losing experienced personnel following the integration of their
agencies. Eight of the 14 countries reported that the staffs of the merged
entities during and after the integration process were demoralized. 437 The
reasons for these problems stem from the uncertainty engendered by the
merger process, the possibility of layoffs, and the delay in establishing the
structure of the unified entity, appointment of the heads of departments, and
establishment of the conditions of employment.438 On average, the 14
nations surveyed reported that it took between 0.7 and 0.9 years to appoint
the new heads of the departments, to integrate budgetary processes, and to
reallocate personnel.439 Once the transition process was complete, however,
some nations like the United Kingdom reported that the unified agency was
considered to be a more desirable employer than any of the former agencies,
making recruitment easier.'
The United States would also be likely to experience a problem with the
integration of information technology. Eight out of the 14 countries
surveyed reported that they experienced delays in integrating the information
technology systems and the infrastructure of the former agencies. 441 The 14
nations surveyed reported that it took 1.1 years to integrate the information
systems of the merged agencies. 442 Here in the United States, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security had to deal with information technology
problems when it merged the 20 existing agencies. Since all of the state and
federal regulators do not use the same computer systems, information
technology problems are certain to arise. Nevertheless, these problems are
transitory and are outweighed by the benefits resulting from the creation of
the US FSA.
Only two nations reported other managerial problems, such as budgetary
problems or a lack of mission.443 Even so, on average, it took the 14 surveyed
nations two years to establish the definitive structure of the integrated
437 Id. at 27-28.
438 Id. at 28.
439 Id. at 30.
"0 Id. at28.
41 Martinez & Rose, supra note 372, at 27-28.
442 Id. at 30.
443 Id. at 27-28.
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agency.' 4 Both of these problems can be addressed by making adequate
budgetary appropriations and by incorporating a clear mission statement into
the act establishing the US FSA. In addition, by creating a new agency and
not merging the other agencies into a dominant agency such as the Federal
Reserve, the United States would avoid the problem of one regulatory
approach dominating others. The problem of market confusion could also
be avoided if the US FSA and its predecessor regulators properly educate the
public and market participants about the need for a new regulator.
If the structure proposed in this article is adopted, the US FSAwould not
suffer from the lack of regulatory and supervisory independence arising in
Japan. In effect, the US FSA would be closer to the Federal Reserve in terms
of its regulatory and supervisory independence than it would be to Japan's
FSA.
Finally, the problem of the management of the new US FSA being
unable to focus on important supervisory tasks while trying to integrate the
different agencies during a financial crisis could be avoided by Congress
through the immediate passage of legislation that would create the US FSA
before a major financial crisis occurs. 445 Unfortunately, history shows that
Congress frequently waits for a financial crisis to erupt before choosing to
act.
None of the problems raised above pose insurmountable obstacles to the
creation of a single financial authority. Careful planning could avoid most
of the problems revealed herein. The United States can benefit from the
experiences of others when it creates the US FSA through drawing upon the
successes and failures encountered thus far in similar transitions.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States would greatly benefit from consolidating its existing
financial regulatory organizations into a single agency. The optimal number
of agencies regulating the financial services industry in the United States is
certainly less than the over 115 agencies currently in place.
As the evidence presented above demonstrates, the optimal number of
financial regulators in the United States is one. A single, federal financial
regulator would be able to anticipate and plan for future financial crises,
more carefully monitor and regulate financial conglomerates, provide better
protection for consumers, operate more effectively in international
negotiations, quickly adapt to market innovations and developments, be
accountable for market failures, eliminate the duplicative regulations and
" Id. at 30.
445 Id. at 31.
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regulatory gaps, harmonize regulations for financial products and firms
competing in the market, and avoid being captured by narrow segments
within the financial services industry. Not only would the US FSA be able
to provide all of these benefits, but it could do so at a lower cost than the
either current regulatory regime or any of the alternatives proposed by the
GAO. The time has come for the United States to overhaul its outdated
financial regulatory system and adopt a single financial regulator for the
twenty-first century and beyond.

